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COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF READING COMPREHENSION:

A THEORETICAL STUDY OF THE ROLE OF

INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN WRITTEN

LANGUAGE COMMUNICATION

by



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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study was to provide a description of the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication. This topic was investigated by synthesizing a theoretical position from various theories in the philosophy of language, speech communication, and cognitive science.

Since the study was theoretical in nature, the nature of theoretical positions was first considered in regards to the theoretical contexts in which they are constructed. While a constructed theoretical position was understood to make some comment upon a phenomenal domain, the definition of this phenomenal domain and the construction of the theoretical position was understood to be a complex process involving the synthesis of various established and definitional positions from different paradigms. The present study was understood to involve at least four different paradigms; but the main purpose was not to establish an original paradigm, but to supplement the paradigm(s) of the reading field.

The reader as the recipient of meaningful communication was first considered in terms of the philosophy of language in order to obtain a basic description of meaningful communication. Gricean meaning was examined in terms of both Grice's and Schiffer's accounts of what is necessary for an utterer to mean something by an utterance. This type of meaning was seen to be dependent upon the utterer's intentions, including intentions that his intentions be recognized by an audience as a basis for the production of a response (belief). Within the context of this approach to meaning, both Austin's and

Searle's descriptions of speech acts were considered in order to focus more explicitly upon linguistic communication. It was concluded, however, that the description of a speech act does not necessarily exhaust the intended meaning of an utterance.

Central to both Gricean meaning and speech acts was the mutual understanding of the communication situation in which an utterance takes place. Since this situation was described in only a general way, however, it was necessary to clarify this notion. Knowledge of the communication situation was understood as a type of intersubjective understanding, and this understanding was seen to be based upon individuals' knowledge of the ways in which communication takes place. The communication situation itself was understood in terms of three distinguishable but interrelated states of affairs. The first of these dealt with message communication; the second was interpreted in terms of rhetorical situations; and the third was described as involving an encounter between the participants, and an unfolding episode which provides a structure and context for the rhetorical situation. Mutual understanding of the situation was understood to be negotiated by the participants, and was seen to provide a basis for the communication of meaningful messages.

This view of language communication was then related to the reader and the reader's encounter with a text. The reader was described as encountering a text and negotiating an understanding of this text in order to obtain a message. This type of contextualization was understood to be necessary for the meaningful understanding of a text since it is only by means of such contextualization that a message becomes available.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of Purpose	6
Data Bases	7
Definitions of Terms	8
Major Assumptions	9
Major Limitations	10
Overview of the Study	10
2. THE NATURE OF THEORETICAL POSITIONS	11
A General Framework for Understanding Theoretical Positions	13
The Nature and Definition of P-domains	14
Descriptive versus Explanatory Comments	23
The Nature of Theories and Models	25
Theory-dominant positions	26
Model-dominant positions	34
Definitional versus Constructed Theoretical Positions	40
The Position of the Present Study	47
Summary	50
3. TWO THEORETICAL APPROACHES FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE	51
Theoretical Positions in Regards to Non-Natural Meaning	53
Natural versus Non-Natural Meaning	53
The Early Grice Account of Meaning	56
Objections to the Early Grice Account	60

CHAPTER	Page
Linguistic meaning versus utterance meaning	60
Objections to the sufficiency of the early Grice account	66
Schiffer's Account of Meaning	69
Understanding the Meanings of Utterances	75
Theoretical Positions in Regards to Speech Acts	80
Austin on Constatives and Performatives	80
Austin on Speech Acts	82
Searle on Speech Acts	89
Searle's description of speech acts	91
The rule-governed nature of speech acts	94
Speech Acts and Meaning _{nn}	96
Summary and Conclusions	102
4. THE STRUCTURES OF COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS	103
The Nature of Message Transmission (SA-1)	107
The Shannon & Weaver View of Communication . . .	108
The Nature of Messages and Message Communication	112
Intersubjective Understanding and Mutual Knowledge	118
The Rhetorical Situation (SA-2)	127
Bitzer's Rhetorical Situation	128
Vatz's View of R-situations	138
Consigny's View of R-situations	141
A Synthesis of Views of the R-situation	143
The Developmental Situation (SA-3)	150

CHAPTER	Page
The Intersubjective Understanding of Procedures	151
The Negotiation of Meaning-Contexts	156
The Nature of Conventions	160
Harré's Description of Episodes	165
Frentz & Farrell's Language- Action Paradigm	170
Levin & Moore's Dialogue-Games	178
D-situations and Intersubjective Knowledge . . .	185
Goals, Plans, and Scripts	189
Intersubjective Knowledge of D-situations and Meaning _{nn}	197
Summary and Conclusions	199
5. READING AS COMMUNICATION	202
The Description of Reading Situations	202
The Reading Situation as SA-1	206
The Reading Situation as SA-2	217
The Reading Situation as SA-3	223
Illustrative Applications of Reading Situations	234
Sherlock Holmes as Communication	235
The Contextualization of Pale Fire	240
The Contextualization of "A Modest Proposal"	244
The Present Study as Communication	247
Summary	251
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	253
General Summary and Conclusions	253

CHAPTER	Page
The Present Study as Theoretical Position	257
Objections and General Problems	261
Objections to the Present Study	261
General Issues from the Present Study	264
Topics for Further Consideration	269
BIBLIOGRAPHY	272
APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF ABBREVIATIONS	284
APPENDIX B. THE MEANING OF LANGUAGE VERSUS UTTERANCE MEANING	287
APPENDIX C. OBJECTIONS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EARLY GRICE ACCOUNT	293
APPENDIX D. A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE	300
APPENDIX E. SCHIFFER'S SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO GRICE'S ACCOUNT OF MEANING	302
APPENDIX F. CONSTATIVES AND PERFORMATIVES	306
APPENDIX G. OBJECTIONS TO AUSTIN'S ACCOUNT OF SPEECH ACTS	314
APPENDIX H. CONSTITUTIVE RULES AND INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS	319
APPENDIX I. LEWIS'S ACCOUNT OF CONVENTIONS	325
APPENDIX J. A TENTATIVE LIST OF POSSIBLE READING SITUATIONS	328

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Definition of the P-domain	19
2. View of Constructed Theory	29
3. Construction of Analog Model	33
4. Revised View of the Theoretical Context	46
5. A Model of Information Transmission	110
6. The Understanding of Signs and Symbols	124
7. The Definition of Situational Exigences	145
8. A Preliminary Taxonomy of the D-situation	179
9. Final Taxonomy of the D-situation	184
10. Model of Intersubjective Knowledge	188

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the notion of "reading as communication" has become a popular concept in discussing reading and reading instruction. Ruddell (1976) has labelled his reading model a communication model. Artley (1972) has suggested that oral reading should be used for interpreting "what the writer says or feels to concerned listeners" (p. 47); and Dale (1976) advocates a communication perspective, noting that:

Communication . . . becomes explicitly or implicitly a kind of dialogue, an interaction, in which we bring our life experiences to bear in the solution or clarification of a problem . . .
Reading should be seen as language development which can be classified basically as the producing and consuming of messages.
(pp. 4-5)

Similarly, in suggesting ways that children can be given more successful reading experiences, Tovey (1976) advocates that children be led to perceive reading "as a process of communicating with an author" (p. 29).

In such views, the notion of communication seems to be used in order to discuss an aspect of reading that does not seem to fit neatly into the list of reading skills that a child can be taught. Of these writers, only Dale attempts to define the term "communication," which he considers to be "the sharing of ideas and feelings in a mood of mutuality" (p. 4); and while it is possible to grasp intuitively what Dale means by this, and agree that there is "something" involved in reading that he is alluding to, as a usable concept this notion seems to lead only to the recognition of a writer/reader dyad and an undefined notion of "meaning."

This vague use of the concept of communication in regards to reading seems to result from the fact that the communicative aspects

of the written language system have not been systematically explored. Consequently, the term "communication" seems to be used in order to evoke the interpersonal oral language situation, which is assumed to be meaningful since it involves interaction between human participants. This analogical argument seems to be used to suggest that a written message should be considered as meaningful in the same way that an oral message is, and that the child learning to read can benefit from being made aware of this perspective. As Jenkinson (1976) has noted, research in the field of reading has tended to ignore the question of meaning; and the current advocacy of reading-as-communication seems to be an attempt to incorporate meaning without a full analysis of the implications that result from evoking this perspective. As usually presented, this view does no more than allude to a possible means by which the question of meaning in the written language system can be considered; and before the notion of communication can be applied to the pedagogy of reading, a fuller analysis needs to be made of what is implied by the contention that reading is communication.

One of the major difficulties in considering the communicative aspects of reading seems to be the view of language that is commonly adopted in theories of reading. Major theorists such as Goodman (1976), Ruddell (1976) and Smith (1971) have adopted, either explicitly or implicitly, the theory of grammar presented by Chomsky (1957, 1965) even though Chomsky (1970) himself has warned that the theorizing of linguists may well be inappropriate when applied to the pedagogy of reading. It can also be suggested that such theorizing may be inappropriate when considering various aspects of the reading process.

While theories of grammar have offered valuable insights into

the way language operates, it must be recognized that such theories represent only one approach to language. G. Miller (1974) has suggested that two basic approaches to language can be distinguished, which he describes as follows:

There seem to be at least two different ways to define what a language is. According to one definition, a language is a socially shared means for expressing ideas. I would call this a functional definition, because it is stated in terms of a function that language serves. Another definition says that a language is all the well-formed sentences that could be generated according to the rules of its grammar. I would call this a formal definition, because it is stated in terms of the forms of sentences. (p. 4)

The Chomskian view, and the implicit view of most reading researchers, obviously represents the formal rather than the functional view. The functional view has, however, recently been advocated by Fraser (1977) and Griffin (1977) as a fruitful but neglected direction for reading research to pursue. It also seems to be the view that must be adopted in order to consider the question of reading-as-communication since it is as a "socially shared means for expressing ideas" that language operates in communication between writers and readers, not as a set of "well-formed sentences that could be generated according to the rules of its grammar." This is not, of course, to say that the formal aspects of language are not important in considering the nature of language communication, or that a formal view does not contribute valuable insights, but is only to contend that such properties alone are not sufficient for an investigation of communication.

The difference between formal and functional views of language can also be illustrated by the type of competence implied by both views. Chomsky (1965) suggests that in formal views of language the linguistic competence of a native speaker consists of knowledge of how sentences

are generated and transformed. In a functional view, however, the emphasis is upon what Fraser (1977) calls the communicative competence of the user of language, or the individual's knowledge of how to communicate by means of language. Fraser suggests that the difference between these two types of competence can be indicated by noting that formal views of language (linguistic competence) deal with "sentences," while functional views of language (and communicative competence) deal with "utterances," or "the speaking of sentences to do things" (p. 112). While both formal and functional views of language may have relevant comments upon and implications for the description of communication, the functional view seems to deal with communication as a primary concern while the formal view does not. For the purposes of the present study, then, a functional approach to language will be adopted; and communicative (as opposed to linguistic) competence will be the major concern.

In addition to the view of language that has generally been adopted, a further difficulty in considering reading-as-communication results from the view of human communication that is usually used when this topic is considered. The common view is that human communication can be considered to be in some way analogous to electronic communication, as originally postulated by Shannon & Weaver (1949) and later developed by writers such as Cherry (1966). This basic view of communication has been adopted and advocated in reading by writers such as Smith (1971) and, more recently, Randall (1978). Essentially, such writers contend that language communication can be understood if it is considered in terms of a transmitter, a coded signal, and a receiver who decodes the signal.

While this aspect of communication is obviously present in language communication, it has been argued by, among others, Delia (1977), Hawes (1973), O'Keefe (1975), Parry (1967), and Thayer (1963) that this view of communication is too incomplete to be adequate as a full description of what is involved in meaningful human communication since such communication involves considerably more, and is therefore much more complex, than the transmission of information. While these critics have been primarily concerned with oral language communication, there seems to be no reason to suppose that written language communication must be understood only in terms of the transmission of information, while oral language communication relies upon knowledge of such things as the situation in which the transmission takes place and the disposition of the participants. Rather, it must be asked whether such situations and dispositions exist in regards to written language communication, and what functions they have if they do exist. At the very least, before written language communication can be limited to information transmission, some justification must be given for imposing this limitation.

That these two issues are not independent of each other is readily apparent; for if the Shannon & Weaver view of communication is accepted, it would seem that a formal view of language could provide an adequate description since it could be understood to deal with the nature of the coded signal. The functional view of language, however, suggests that a different view of communication is necessary since the concern of a functional view of language is the socially shared means for communicating; and this would seem to include more than just the sharing of signal and code systems since it would also

involve the broader notion of communicative competence, or the doing of something by means of an utterance.

Statement of Purpose

It is the primary purpose of the present study to investigate and elucidate the communicative aspects of reading in regards to the comprehension and understanding of a meaningful message. Since this aspect of reading has rarely been systematically considered, and since what are to count as communicative aspects in a reading situation are not readily apparent, it will first be necessary to consider the nature of meaningful language communication. It will then be possible to apply this view of language communication to the particular realization of language communication that is the concern of the present study: written language communication. This application will, however, be primarily concerned not with the writer/reader dyad, but with the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication. Since the main purpose of the present study is thus to construct a theoretical position in regards to this issue, the study will be theoretical in nature; and since the theoretical position developed in this study will be concerned with a general description of the communicative aspects of reading, it must be considered to be basic research, without direct application to the teaching or learning of reading.

In addition to this primary purpose, a secondary purpose of this study is to present and make available views of language which can serve as a basis for considering the functional aspects of language. Since various philosophers have been concerned with the problem of meaningful communication with language these views will be drawn from

the philosophy of language and will provide a useful basis upon which to conduct the present study. This is due to the fact that these views offer insights that are not available from the formal views of language derived primarily from linguistic or psychological bases that generally serve as a foundation for the theoretical consideration of reading.

Data Bases

While various fields will be drawn upon in the course of this study, the major sources will be from the philosophy of language, speech communication, and cognitive science.

The philosophy of language will be used in order to obtain a functional view of language communication. This source has been selected since various philosophers have been concerned with this aspect of language, and since the specific philosophical theories considered have been a major influence upon linguistics (e.g., Lakoff, 1972, influenced by Grice; and Sadock, 1974, influenced by Austin) and have influenced, or have been suggested as desirable considerations, in the field of reading (e.g., Griffin, 1977, influenced by Grice; and Olson, 1977, influenced by both Grice and Austin).

The field of speech communication has been used since a primary concern of this field is the structure of interpersonal communication. Since such structures will be seen, in the course of considering the various philosophies of language, to be only vaguely described by these philosophical positions, a consideration of the relevant theoretical positions from the field of speech communication offers the possibility of elucidating these aspects.

Two theoretical approaches from the field of cognitive science will also be considered since research from this field offers a unique type of validation for the theories that they present. This is due to the fact that these theories must generally produce a successful computer simulation in order to be considered acceptable. Thus, if such theories are consistent with the other theories and models presented here, and can be synthesized with these positions, the final position of the present study will have at least an indirect validity. In addition, the concerns of cognitive science, and the method of investigation that is used in this field, have offered unique insights that provide valuable additions to, and elucidations of, the position to be developed here.

Definitions of Terms

Due to the nature of the present study, definitions of specific terms will not be presented here. This is due in part to the fact that many of the major terms have been assigned different meanings by different researchers, theorists and philosophers, and in part to the fact that many of these terms have a complex meaning that would be distorted by attempting to give a simple definition here. This is particularly apparent in regards to a term such as "meaning," which is used in different ways by different writers, and which cannot be assigned a simple or single satisfactory definition. This is also the case with terms such as "communication" (Dance, 1970), "comprehension" (Stern, 1971), and even "reading" (Ross, 1974). In a sense, however, this study is an exploration of the meanings of some of the terms that are used to describe language communication; and explicit definitions

and explanations of terms will be offered in the course of the study when clarification becomes necessary and relevant.

One term has been coined for the present study: "to contextualize." This term is used to denote the process of putting something into, or relating it to, the context in which it occurs and by means of which it should be understood. This term has been used in order to emphasize this particular concept about the use of context since this concept is of central importance to the present study.

In addition, various abbreviations will be used in the course of the present study. While these abbreviations will be explained when they are introduced, for convenience their meanings will also be given in Appendix A.

Major Assumptions

The major assumption that is made in this study is that theoretical positions from such disparate disciplines as philosophy, speech communication, and cognitive science can be related not only to each other, but to reading as well, without distorting the basic positions that are considered.

Another assumption of the present study is that a normal reading situation can be posited as a hypothetical construct to serve as a focus for the consideration of reading-as-communication, or the reader as recipient of meaningful communication. Such a situation will be considered to be one in which the reader is reading silently, the reader and the writer are not acquainted, and the writer's intention is not to address a particular individual or small group of individuals who are known to himself, but is rather to address an unknown audience.

In a normal reading situation it is posited that the reader intends to understand the meaning that the writer intends to communicate.

Major Limitations

This study is limited by the fact that the various theoretical positions that will be considered are divorced, to some extent, from the contexts in which they were constructed, and from the problems that they were formulated to address.

Another limitation is that the present study is based primarily upon the three areas indicated above as data bases. Thus, the study is limited by the content of these areas, and by the exclusion of other areas which, if they were considered, might lead to a different synthesis than the one that will be developed here.

Overview of the Study

Since the present study is theoretical in nature, its format differs in some ways from the format that would normally be used in reporting empirical research. Consequently, Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the nature of theoretical positions and the construction of these positions. Since this discussion is useful in providing a basis for understanding the nature of the present study, an overview of the study will be given at the end of that chapter when it can more relevantly be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF THEORETICAL POSITIONS

Since the purpose of this study is to obtain an understanding of the reader in regards to the notion of reading-as-communication, the purpose of this study becomes one of giving some type of theoretical description of the reader as the recipient of a communication message. To give such a description requires, of course, the development of a theoretical position; for such a position is necessary to serve as at least the basis of the description. While it would be possible to proceed with the present study without considering the nature of theoretical positions, or the structure of the present study, to do so would be to risk the possibility of confusion as to how and upon what basis this position is being developed. In order to avoid such potential confusion, and to give an explanation of the underlying structure of the present study, then, the present chapter is concerned with elucidating the view of theoretical positions, and the construction of such positions, upon which this study is based.

In order to accomplish this purpose, the first part of the present chapter is concerned with the elucidation of the nature of theoretical positions and, in general, how they may be constructed. The purpose of this discussion is not to provide a prescriptive formulation of what is to count as a position and what is not, or how such positions are to be constructed or evaluated. Rather, the description given here is intended to serve only as a framework for understanding such positions and the contexts in which they function. More specifically, this description is aimed at providing a framework for

understanding the basis upon which the present study is conducted, and thereby indicating the structure of this study. Once this general framework has been described it will be possible, in the second part of this chapter, to relate this general discussion to the present study in order to indicate the structure of this study.

While the primary purpose of this chapter is, then, to provide a basis for the present study, the general framework that will be described is intended to have a wider application. As indicated above, however, this application is not intended to be prescriptive in nature since this discussion is intended to represent what Kaplan (1964) calls a reconstructed logic rather than a logic-in-use. In fact, a reconstructed logic perspective is necessary in order to provide a framework for the present study since the presentation of the theoretical position of this study is given in a different form than the actual processes, or the logics-in-use, that were followed in order to construct this position.

It is also necessary to note that the following discussion is intended to elucidate the nature of theoretical positions within the context of what Radnitzky (1973) calls the Anglo-Saxon school, as opposed to the Continental school. This Anglo-Saxon school of science is characterized by Radnitzky as being "analytic" in nature, and by van Manen (1975) as "empirical-analytic," as opposed to the interpretive schools of Continental science. The discussion is limited to this school since it is within that context that the present study is conducted, and since consideration of the Continental school would serve to complicate further an already complex discussion.

A General Framework for Understanding Theoretical Positions

Since theoretical positions are generally composed of models and/or theories, it would seem possible to restrict the present discussion of theoretical positions to just theories and models. To do this would, however, give an incomplete view of such positions; for theoretical positions are not constructed, and do not function, in isolation but are a part of a larger theoretical context. In order to consider the nature of theoretical positions, then, it is necessary to consider these positions within the context in which they operate; and in order to do this, it is necessary to elucidate the nature of this context. This is, in effect, only to note that theoretical positions are constructed of something, and for some purpose. In other words, theoretical positions are always constructed in response to some problem or question, and in order to describe some particular phenomena. Neither the Theory of Relativity nor the Theory of Reinforcement, for example, is meaningful without reference to the particular phenomena to which these theories apply; and, in fact, theoretical positions are only useful or meaningful when they are considered in regards to the phenomena to which they relate, and when their relationship to these phenomena (or what they are created for) is apparent.

These general observations can be stated succinctly as the observation that theoretical positions make some comment upon a phenomenal domain. While each of these terms will be examined in greater detail below, this ad hoc formulation of the relevant theoretical context can be elucidated in a general way here to noting first that, as suggested above, "theoretical positions" can be considered

to be a general term for a theoretical construct consisting of a model (or set of models) and/or a theory (or set of theories). A phenomenal domain (hereafter, a P-domain) can be understood to be the collection of entities or elements that constitute the phenomena that the theoretical position addresses, is based upon, or seeks to elucidate. The comment that the theoretical position makes upon a P-domain can be considered to be what the theoretical position says about the P-domain. While in a sense the whole of the theoretical position is in some way commenting upon the P-domain, the nature of the comment will be given a more restrictive sense when it is considered in more detail. At any rate, the comment must be considered to be not something independent of the theoretical position, but a part of the position itself.

The Nature and Definition of P-domains

The term "phenomenal domain" is used here in order to avoid the connotations that attach to such alternate terms as "empirical domain" or "observational domain." The P-domain, as indicated briefly above, refers to the domain or set of phenomena that the theoretical position is constructed to address. While it would be tempting to suggest that P-domains are the segment of the real world, or "reality," that is addressed by a theoretical position, to do this would be to distort the nature of "reality" and suggest that there is a stable collection of entities or phenomena that are indisputably given. The position that will be taken here, however, is that while there may be some such indisputable empirical "reality" underlying the recognition of phenomena, this reality is, in itself, inaccessible except by means of some interpretation which has the effect of drawing attention to and in some way designating these aspects of "reality" as phenomena.

The point that is being made here is not one that is peculiar to the social sciences, or to social phenomena, but underlies the investigation of the physical sciences as well. This point has been made by Bronowski (1973), who first notes that an artist depicts "reality" by selecting features and defining objects by means of a particular interpretation. Bronowski then suggests that this artistic method is, in fact, also the method of the physical sciences:

But what physics has now done is to show that that is the only method to knowledge. There is no absolute knowledge. And those who claim it, whether they are scientists or dogmatists, open the door to tragedy. All information is imperfect. We have to treat it with humility. That is the human condition; and that is what quantum physics says. I mean that literally. (p. 353)

Bronowski also suggests that the difficulty in obtaining information about "reality" is not one that can be attributed to imperfect instruments, for it is not based upon the fact that we do not "see" quite clearly enough. What he suggests is that by the nature of observation, observations can never be clear enough:

We are here face to face with the crucial paradox of knowledge. Year by year we devise more precise instruments with which to observe nature with more fineness. And when we look at the observations, we are discomfited to see that they are still fuzzy, and we feel that they are as uncertain as ever. We seem to be running after a goal which lurches away from us to infinity every time we come within sight of it. (p. 356)

While Bronowski's concern here is mainly with the physical properties of observation, this basic inability to observe "reality" clearly can be understood to underlie research in the physical sciences, and in the social sciences as well.

In the social sciences, however, it is not only--or perhaps, merely--the impossibility of "seeing" clearly that creates difficulties; for there is also the difficulty of distinguishing what is seen. While

it has often been noted that human perceptions of the world are interpretations (e.g., Belth, 1966; Neisser, 1976; and Newtonson, 1976), the difficulty that underlies this problem for the social sciences can be considered in terms of the distinction between actions and acts. While this will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4 when it becomes of primary concern to the present study, for the present purposes it is sufficient to note that acts do not exist except insofar as actions are interpreted. For example, a man can perform a certain gesture with his hand which can be interpreted as either an offer to shake hands, or as a gambit in a wrestling match. Similarly, the actions that are performed by an individual in uttering certain vocables is different than the act of promising. The "reality" that is observable underlies the actions that are actually performed; but to distinguish these actions as acts requires further interpretation, just as the conceptualization of sensory input so that an object is recognized as a table also requires interpretation. As Furlong & Edwards (1977) have suggested, this type of interpretation underlies even supposedly "objective" or "observational" research that is conducted presumably without presuppositions.

These difficulties become particularly apparent when research based upon linguistic utterances is considered; for a vocal utterance can be considered in terms of a phonetic, phonemic, syntactic, semantic, or other level; and a written utterance can be considered in terms of, for example, graphemes, lexical items, syntactic or semantic organization. The differences between perceiving an utterance in terms of any of these levels is not a matter of obtaining different realistic entities, but rather results from the particular definition that is

given such entities as phenomena.

The point here is not that "reality" is unknown, but that it is known only through or by means of some type of definition, and that there is no observation without this predefinition of what are to count as phenomena. This is not to say, of course, that the phenomena cannot be startling, or exhibit features that are surprising and unexpected, or appear to be different (e.g., simpler or more complex than was previously considered), but only that the P-domain must be in some way defined in order for the phenomena to become apparent. This definition of the P-domain, however, presents difficulties; for it would seem that this definition must be based upon some type of theoretical position, and that in order for there to be definition there must be a theoretical position that serves as a basis for this definition. Yet since theoretical positions are constructed in order to comment upon P-domains, it would seem that what they are commenting upon are theoretically defined phenomena; and the role of the constructed theory seems somewhat questionable and perhaps redundant.

The relationship between definitional and constructed positions can be elucidated only by considering the nature of theoretical positions and their construction. Since this will be done later in this chapter, this issue will be addressed in more detail at that time. For the present, it is sufficient to note that theoretical positions are constructed only in response to a question, problem, or exigence. In order for such questions or problems to arise in regards to the P-domain, however, it is necessary for the P-domain to be, in some way, defined. Thus, a constructed theoretical position would seem to result from a difficulty that arises due to the way the definitional position

elucidates whatever underlying "reality" there may be into a P-domain. The definitional theoretical position, then, establishes a P-domain in such a way that difficulties, problems or questions of some type can arise. A constructed theory is designed to address and in some way resolve these problems or questions within the context defined by the definitional theoretical position. In this way a constructed position either supplants or supplements a definitional position, or a part of such a position.

While the definition of P-domains would seem, from the above description, to be a relatively simple and straightforward matter, this is not necessarily the case. The definition of P-domains is, in fact, further complicated by the fact that an indefinite number of orders of definition can be used in order to define a P-domain.¹ The different orders of definition can be considered to be the number of different definitional theoretical positions that are used in order to define the P-domain. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the first three orders of definition. As can be seen in Figure 1a, first order definition involves the use of a single definitional position to define a P-domain. In the figure, the definitional theoretical position is represented by a circle; and the P-domain defined by the use of a single definitional position can be considered to reside within the circle.

Second order definition, as illustrated in Figure 1b, involves the use of two separate definitional positions in order to define a P-domain. Here the definitional positions are again represented by


¹I am indebted to Dr. Marion D. Jenkinson for suggesting the different orders of definition and the way they are obtained.



1a First Order Definition of
the P-domain



1b Second Order Definition of
the P-domain



1c Third Order Definition of
the P-domain

Figure 1 Definition of the P-domain.

circles, and the defined P-domain can be considered to be the shaded area in which the two positions overlap. The fact that a spatial method is used here to represent definitional positions should not be allowed to distort the nature of this overlap; for it is not being suggested that a fragment of one theoretical position (TP-1) combines with a fragment of a second theoretical position (TP-2) in order to create a P-domain. Rather, what is suggested is that when TP-1 and TP-2 are in some way conjoined in order to define some segment of "reality," the conjunction of the two positions results in a defined P-domain that is unique in regards to the two theoretical positions that define it. Both TP-1 and TP-2 will, of course, be related to the P-domain that is thus defined; but the established phenomena will be defined in a way that is different from either of the positions considered separately.

Figure 1c illustrates third order definition of the P-domain, and can be seen to be similar to second order definition except that the P-domain is defined not only by the conjunction of TP-1 and TP-2, but by the conjunction of a third position (TP-3) as well. It is to be noted that the conjunction of TP-1, TP-2, and TP-3 results in areas of conjunction that give second order definitions TP-1/TP-2, TP-1/TP-3, and TP-2/TP-3 as well as the third order P-domain defined by TP-1/TP-2/TP-3. While these areas of potential conjunction can be understood to contribute to the definition of the P-domain, they are possible definitions of P-domains in their own right, just as each of the definitional positions can be considered independently as a first order definition.

Although third order definition is the last order illustrated

in Figure 1, it was suggested above that the definition of a P-domain can entail an indefinite number of orders. As with third order definition, each theoretical position will conjoin not only with each other position as second order definition, but also will conjoin with the other positions in third, fourth, etc., orders of definition such that the n^{th} order of definition will entail the $n-1^{\text{th}}$ order of definition and all orders preceding it.

While it is relatively easy to establish different orders of definition by means of abstract processes, it is not quite so simple to distinguish what is to count as a definitional position. Since the function of such positions is to establish or make available a P-domain, it seems evident that such positions must be general in nature rather than specific since it is not the purpose of these positions to resolve problems, but to define "reality" so that the problems can be distinguished. For the present purposes, it can be suggested that one realization of this type of definition is seen in the variety of academic fields; for each field must, in some way, define a P-domain, or set of P-domains, that constitutes the subject of that field. For example, chemistry can be considered to be based upon a definitional theoretical position that makes available certain phenomena when this position is used to interpret "reality." As such it can be considered to be a first order definition of a P-domain. Similarly, the field of biology represents a first order definition; and when these two fields are used in order to establish a second order P-domain, the result is biochemistry. While containing characteristics of both chemistry and biology, biochemistry represents a unique definition of the P-domain since it differs from the first order definitions of the P-domains of

chemistry and biology.

One difficulty that seems to arise from this example is the fact that while the conjunction of biology and chemistry may have been, at one time, a second order definition, at present biochemistry is generally recognized as a field in its own right, with its own first order definition of a P-domain. Similarly, while psycholinguistics is generally recognized as a second order definition resulting from the conjunction of linguistics and psychology, it is approaching independence as a separate field, and is therefore evolving into a first order definition.

This difficulty is, however, more apparent than real; for if it is recognized that definitional positions are not static, but develop or atrophy over time, it is then possible to conclude that second, third or n^{th} order definitions can become first order definitions when and if they are successful in representing a useful conjunction that provides a fruitful P-domain in terms of the difficulties (and thus the opportunities) it presents for investigation. Thus, while biochemistry has become, at least for the present, an identifiable first order definition of a P-domain, the field of sociobiology is still highly controversial and has not yet been accepted as a useful P-domain. In fact, at present it would seem that sociobiology is still very much a second order definition since the current work seems to be aimed at elucidating the nature of the conjunction and the resulting problems and phenomena.

This is not, however, to say that academic fields can always be clearly distinguished with regard to their origins or their present state. For example, the area that has been designated here as "speech

communication" is obviously a conjunction of other areas, including at the least speech, rhetoric, mass and organizational communication. Exactly what order of definition this should be considered to be, however, is not entirely clear, although in many institutions the field has been recognized as an independent field, thus implying a first order definition. It is therefore apparent that the relationships between different fields can be complex and cannot always be easily or definitively disentangled into clear orders of definition.

While these examples of academic fields seem to suggest that the conjunction of different fields is in some way aimed at creating a conjointly defined P-domain that will, eventually, become first order, this is not always the case. Fields can be conjoined, such as in the present study, in order to articulate a P-domain that raises relevant problems and issues that are intended to contribute to the development of a particular field. For example, some linguists have made use of the conjunction of psycholinguistics and the philosophy of language in order to establish a P-domain that offers unique opportunities for development without being concerned with establishing more than a limited second order P-domain.

Descriptive versus Explanatory Comments

As suggested in the basic framework presented above, theoretical positions can be understood to make some comment upon a defined P-domain. Since definitional positions have been considered to elucidate and make apparent the P-domain, the nature of the comment that a constructed theoretical position makes upon such a P-domain needs to be considered in order to clarify not only the nature of constructed positions, but also the relationship of these constructed positions

to definitional positions.

For the present purposes, the distinction that both Kaplan (1964) and Chomsky (1965) make in regards to description and explanation can be considered to relate to the comment of a theoretical position. According to Kaplan and Chomsky, when a theoretical position gives a description of the P-domain, basically it describes what is present in the P-domain. This description can, and usually will, do more than merely list the phenomena that constitute a given P-domain since it will often describe how the phenomena relate to each other as well. An example of a position exemplifying a description of the P-domain is Barrett's (1968) taxonomy of reading comprehension. While Barrett describes different levels, he does not discuss how they are related to each other, or why they function as they do.

In contrast to description, explanation provides an answer to why the P-domain functions as it does. Thus, the purpose of an explanation is not only to describe the P-domain, but to give an interpretation of the underlying structures that allow the P-domain to function or operate. An explanation, then, involves a description; for an explanation furthers a descriptive comment by providing an account of the functioning of the system that is described. Goodman's (1976) position in regards to the reading process is an example of a position that attempts to give an explanation rather than only a description; for unlike Barrett, Goodman is concerned with giving an account of the underlying causes and structure that explains why the P-domain functions as it does, and is not concerned only with describing how it operates.

A constructed theoretical position, then, can be considered to provide either an explanatory or a descriptive comment upon a defined

P-domain. If, however, description or explanation is a necessary aspect of a theoretical position, it would seem that a definitional position would also offer some type of description or explanation to the P-domain in order to make it accessible. If, then, the P-domain has received some description or explanation before the constructed position comments upon it, it is not entirely clear how the constructed position is related to the P-domain. It is, however, apparent that the description/explanation given by the definitional position must, in some way, be inadequate; for otherwise there would be no problem or question for a constructed position to address. Thus, constructed theoretical positions can be tentatively understood to address deficiencies in the definitional position, and thus to supplement the description/explanation given by the definitional position in the elucidation of the P-domain. While this discussion indicates the nature of the relationship between definitional and constructed theoretical positions, further clarification of this relationship is, of course, still necessary. This clarification can, however, be given only after the nature of theoretical positions themselves are more closely examined.

The Nature of Theories and Models

A theoretical position has been defined, above, as being a model (or set of models) and/or a theory (or set of theories). The term "theoretical position" has been used here due to the fact that the nature and relationship of theories and models is at the least controversial. This difficulty centers mostly upon models, for as Chao (1962) has demonstrated in a somewhat cursory examination of the literature there are at least thirty different senses attached to the

term. There are, on the one hand, those who consider a model to be basically the same as a theory (e.g., Belth, 1966; Chao, 1962) and those who vehemently object that a difference not only exists, but should be recognized (e.g., Wilks, 1974). While a distinction is generally made by those concerned with reconstructed logics (e.g., Braithwaite, 1962; Brodbeck, 1968; Hempel, 1966; Rudner, 1966; Suppes, 1960), the distinctions made by these writers are not always the ones made by those who actually construct models. Since the purpose of the present discussion of theoretical positions is not to establish a definition that can be used to pass judgment upon constructed theories/models, a definitive distinction is not of importance here. Rather, what is desired is a useful description that could be elaborated into a system of classification, rather than into an evaluative tool.

In keeping with the purposes of the present study, then, it is desirable to make a distinction between theory-dominant and model-dominant theoretical positions. The former suggests that the dominant aspect of the position is the theory, while the latter suggests that the dominant aspect is the model. This distinction can be justified by examining the nature of theories and models, and the relationship between the two.

Theory-dominant positions. Theory-dominant positions center upon a constructed theory. For the present purposes, a theory can be understood to be a set of axioms or propositions which together provide an explanation or description of the P-domain that the theory addresses. This is not to say, however, that the set of propositions must be presented as such a set; for the propositions can be embodied in a text that not only states the propositions but elaborates, explains

and justifies them as well. A fully articulated theory will have, as Rudner (1966) suggests, a set of axioms ranging from general principles to specific "bridge" principles that comment directly upon the P-domain and provide a basis for empirical investigation. Theories can, however, be articulated to different extents; for not all theories are articulated to the extent of specifying in detail all the general and bridge principles. Hill (1977/1978) has suggested that such differences in degree of articulation can be described in terms of a continuum ranging from informal to formal theory.

The fact that a theory is not fully articulated, or formalized, does not mean that it should not be allowed to count as a theory; for it would seem that when first propounded a theory may be only informally presented, with fuller and more formal articulation following if the usefulness of the theory justifies it. An articulated theory can also, of course, be modified as necessary; and this is only to contend that they do not need to be considered to be static, but rather that theories can evolve and change over time. This developmental possibility of theories, and indeed of theoretical positions in general, is clearly illustrated in Chapter 3 of the present study in regards to both Gricean meaning and speech acts.

While theories can be formulated as novel additions to states of knowledge, theories are not, of course, constructed in isolation, but rather are responses to some type of question or problem. Also, theories can make use of other theoretical positions; and this use can be either positive, in which case another position is incorporated in some way into the constructed position, or they can be used negatively, in which case the constructed theory is designed to reject an estab-

lished position, or a part of that position. The term "established" is used here to mean "previously developed or constructed" or "existing," but not necessarily "proven" or even "accepted." It is, of course, entirely possible for established positions to be used both negatively and positively in the construction of a new theory; for it is possible to adopt or incorporate some features of an established position while rejecting others as inaccurate or unhelpful. It is also possible that a theory could be constructed by means of a positive use of various established positions. This would result, of course, in a synthesized theory.

This view of a constructed theory is illustrated in Figure 2, where the constructed theory is shown to be the response to a problem arising from a defined P-domain. This is indicated by the arrow from the P-domain in the direction of the constructed theory. The established theoretical positions are indicated as offering either positive or negative assistance in the construction of the theory; and the relationship between these established theoretical positions and the definitional position of the P-domain is questioned by a dotted line running in both directions. This is necessary here since the relationship between definitional positions and established positions has not yet been examined; and some relationship would seem to be necessary in order for an established theoretical position to relate to a defined P-domain.

In a theory-dominant theoretical position it is not, of course, necessary that the theory be accompanied by a model since the theory is sufficient in itself to provide explanation or description to a P-domain. For a theory-dominant position, then, the inclusion or




Figure 2 View of Constructed Theory.

addition of a model can be understood to be optional; for in such a position the model is intended to supplement the theory; and even if the theory is not supplemented, it is still capable of constituting the whole of the theoretical position. The first realization of a theory-dominant theoretical position can, consequently, be designated as theory/no model. If a theory is supplemented by a model, and the theoretical position is theory-dominant, then the type of model can be considered to be analog, resulting in a theoretical position identified as theory/analog model.

The type of model that has been termed "analog" here is basically the sense of the term "model" that is preferred by theorists such as Black (1962), Braithwaite (1962), Brodbeck (1968) and Suppes (1960), among others. An analog model can be considered to represent the theory by means of an analogy with an alternate P-domain and/or theoretical position. The important point to note in regards to analog models is not that they are based upon analogy; for analogy is, of course, a basic characteristic of models in general. Rather, the point here is that an analog model represents (i.e., is a restatement of) the constructed theory, and only indirectly of the P-domain under consideration. The use of an alternate theoretical position and/or P-domain results, however, in a distortion of the constructed theory; and it thus becomes necessary to distinguish those features of the model that are isomorphic with the theory, and those that are not. Despite the possibility of distortion, analog models can be useful since they represent the theory in a somewhat different manner, which can produce insights that were not available in the construction of the theory. For example, a theory of the flow of electricity can be

modelled by drawing an analogy with the alternate theory of the flow of water. In the course of distinguishing those features of the analog model which are isomorphic with the theory for which it is constructed and those which are not, it is possible to obtain insights into the flow of electricity that were not considered in the construction of the original theory.

The danger in constructing analog models is, of course, the misunderstanding that may result from considering as isomorphic those features of the model that are not. For example, Goodman's (1976) theory of reading is represented by an analog model that depicts the theory in the form of a flow chart. Although it is not a part of Goodman's theory that the processing is done in a sequential manner, the linear form of the flow chart suggests exactly this type of processing since this linear quality is central to the nature of flow charts. While it is perhaps unfortunate that the model is represented by this particular analogy, it is important to note that this feature is not isomorphic with the theory or the theory's comment upon the P-domain.

If analog models are considered to be representations of the theory by means of analogy, it would seem that any illustration of the theory would, by definition, become a model by means of the spatial analogy that is drawn in making the illustration. While this seems to be technically the case, it can be suggested that illustrations are a type of model that are not intended to represent the theory by analogy but to elucidate the theory as presented. An analog model, on the other hand, can be considered to represent an articulated theory, and is intended to give such a representation by means of an analogy.

Ultimately, however, the only way to distinguish between illustrations and analog models may be the theorist's avowed intention.

While it seems difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between analog models and illustrations, the consideration of this issue suggests that just as illustrations can depict different parts of a theory, so models can represent only a part, rather than the whole, of a theory. Also, since analog models can be constructed by drawing an analogy between the theory and a different theoretical position and/or P-domain, an indeterminant number of different analogies can be derived; and it is therefore possible to have an indefinite number of analog models for the same theory, or for various parts of a theory. While theorists generally restrain themselves to a single analog model, it would seem that this restraint is, at least in principle, unnecessary; for as long as fruitful analogies can be discovered, it would be possible to expand the theoretical position with further analog models in order to elucidate the theory.

The relationship between constructed theories and analog models is illustrated in Figure 3. The theory and the model are joined by lines running in both directions since the theory provides the basis for the construction of the model, while the model, once constructed, contributes to the elucidation of the theory. An alternate theoretical position and P-domain are pictured here, with an arrow to the constructed model in order to indicate that this alternate theoretical position and P-domain are contributing to the construction of the model. The defined problem from the P-domain is joined to the theory since the theory is constructed in response to this problem. The explanation/description arrow, however, is drawn from the mutual




Figure 3 Construction of Analog Model.

relationship of the theory and the model since it is by means of both the theory and the analog model that this comment is made upon the P-domain. While only one analog model is pictured here, it is, of course, possible to add further models, with an appropriate number of alternate theoretical positions and P-domains as sources for the analogies.

Model-dominant positions. Like theory/analog model positions, model-dominant positions involve both a theory and a model, the difference being that the model-dominant position focuses upon the model rather than upon the theory. The first type of model-dominant position to be considered here is the theory/simulation model position, involving the simulation of a theory, generally by means of a computer simulation of the theory's elucidation of the P-domain. While this type of position could also be considered theory-dominant since the model represents what is presented in the theory, the construction of this type of theoretical position is directed toward the construction of the model, not the theory. Despite the fact that a theory (or set of theories) is necessary in order to construct a simulation model, the theory is not only represented by the computer simulation, but is tested as well. The success of the theory is determined by the working of the computer model, and consequently the theory becomes important only in elucidating the basis of the working model.

While simulation models rely upon analogy, they differ from analog models in that, as suggested above, they do not merely represent the theory, but actually test it as well. If the analogy that has been chosen as the basis of an analog model does not succeed in giving a useful representation of the theory, the theory is usually unaffected,

and the model discarded. If a simulation model is unsuccessful, however, the theory must be modified until the model succeeds, or else the theory must be rejected.

The contention that simulation models are dominant in regards to the theories upon which they are based is, however, only partially the case. For while the model is the goal toward which the theory is constructed, and provides a test of the theory, once a successful model has been constructed it is the theory that is reported to other workers in the field. It is, then, ultimately the theory that is of interest; but since the theory is constructed and modified in order to produce a simulation model, for the present purposes the model can be considered to be dominant.

Although simulation models have, as yet, exerted only a minor influence upon the field of reading, this seems to be due, at least in part, to the fact that the development of computer technology, and of appropriate programming languages, has only recently progressed to the point at which computer simulation has become a viable type of model for the field. Simulation models should not, however, be confused with the notion of artificial intelligence; for the purpose of a simulation model is to test a theory, not to create an "intelligent" system. For example, Schank's (1975a) system of language processing is not intended to represent an intelligent system, but rather is intended to model the theory of language processing devised by Schank and his co-workers. There is no claim that the resulting computer model is in any way "intelligent," nor that it was intended to be.

Another type of model-dominant theoretical position can be termed the theories/synthesized model position. Although there are

various possibilities in regards to this general designation, synthesized models can be considered basically to be constructed by means of a synthesis of various theories in order to give a general representation of the P-domain. Since there are various realizations of this type of model, synthesized models can best be understood by considering a few of these various types.

One example of a synthesized model is similar to simulation models except that the model is static rather than dynamic. This type of model is demonstrated by the use of models reported by Watson (1968) in his discussion of the discovery of the double helix structure of the DNA molecule. While the researchers were attempting to discover this structure, they had partially articulated theories about the nature and components of the DNA molecule; and in order to discover the structure, various models were constructed of the molecule; and these models were then evaluated in terms of what was known about DNA. The model was manipulated in various ways in order to account for the structure until finally the double helix form was discovered. Since this form accounted for the known properties of DNA, the successful model could then be used to articulate more fully the existing theories.

While it could be argued that this use of a model is really only a scale model that must be understood as an analog model, this is not necessarily the case. Theories and models have been considered here not simply in terms of the relationship between them, but also in terms of the intent and function of the theory and model within the theoretical context in which they are constructed. While a scale model can, of course, be an analog model, as in the case of a scale model of a new aerodynamic design, in the present case the model is intended

to function as a final synthesis of the position. Thus, the model that Watson manipulated was the final object of the position and not a representation of a theory that had already been constructed. A successful model was, in fact, necessary before the theory could be formulated; and thus, for the present purposes, this use of a scale model can be understood to be synthesized rather than analogical.

A second type of synthesized model involves the synthesis of various theories about different aspects of a P-domain in order to give a representation of the components and/or structure of the P-domain. Examples of such synthesized models are models such as those proposed by Gough (1976), Baker (1976), and Fagan (1978). In all of these models various theories and theoretical positions are synthesized in order to give an interpretive model of the P-domain. The dominant feature of such models is not the theories that provide their bases, but the models themselves. Unlike the type of synthesized model that Watson discusses, this type of model is not aimed at elucidating the theories that are used in their construction, but are, instead, intended to serve as a basis for further theorizing and research. This is not, however, to say that in synthesizing this type of model the same tentative formulations and modifications that Watson reports are not also apparent; but the dissimilarity lies in the different function that the model is intended to serve; for in Watson's formulation, the model is only a tool by means of which the theory can be elucidated. In this second type of synthesized model, however, it is the model that is the intended final product; and the theories upon which it is based can be understood to contribute toward the development of the model.

A third type of synthesized model is similar to these first two

types, but again differs somewhat in terms of its function. This type of model is illustrated by the model of saccadic eye movements suggested by Bahill & Stark (1979), who report that "when bioengineers want to analyze a very complicated system, they often resort to a model to describe the system in a less complicated way" (p. 110). The point of this type of model is, then, to present a simplified interpretation of the functioning of the P-domain; and while this can also be the case in either of the first two types of synthesized models considered, it is not necessarily so. Unlike models such as Gough's, these models do not necessarily provide syntheses, but rather simplify the theories that are considered in order to give a more manageable view of the essential features of the P-domain, and thus avoid the distractions of non-essential structures. This type of model resembles the simulation model, which also represents the workings of the system; and in fact, Bahill & Stark report that their synthesized model was in turn represented by a simulation model. The difference between these two types of models, however, can be understood to lie in their functions; for simulation models are constructed in order to develop and test theories, while this type of synthesized model is intended as a final theoretical position.

While these three types of synthesized models cannot be considered to be exhaustive, they have been discussed here in order to illustrate the general notion of synthesized models. On the basis of this discussion, then, a synthesized model can be understood to provide a synthesis or representation of a theory or a set of theories such that the model is the dominant aspect of the theoretical position. While synthesized models can be used in order to elucidate theories,

the model should really be considered to be the dominant aspect of the theoretical position; and the fuller articulation of the theory can be understood to be aimed at bringing the theory into the same state of elaboration as the model. This type of position differs from a theory-dominant position in that the development of the model, not the theory, is the ultimate goal of the theoretical position; and while this position may be reported in terms of the theory as well, as in the case of the structure of DNA, the theory is still a reflection of the model, whereas in a theory-dominant position the reverse is true.

While various types of theoretical positions have been discussed here, it could be objected that many actual theoretical positions are not easily classifiable in terms of this description. This is, however, only to note the difference between the reconstructed logic that is the concern here, and the logic-in-use of actual theory/model construction; for in considering actual theoretical positions it may be difficult to determine exactly which of these theory/model types actually describes the position. For example, the synthesized model of saccadic eye movements suggested by Bahill & Stark obviously makes use of a theory-based position, although the final form of the theory is given as a synthesized model. This synthesized model is, however, used as the basis for a simulation model; and it becomes questionable as to whether or not their synthesized model should really be considered to be a simulation model. The position taken here has been to follow Bahill & Stark as to the role and function of their model; but while this particular case is clearly discussed by the researchers, other cases are not and seem to qualify for more than one theory/model type. The development of the distinctions discussed here into a definitive

classification system is, however, beyond the scope of the present study. As was noted earlier in this section, considerable disagreement exists about the nature and relationship of theories and models; and this discussion has been aimed at providing a potentially useful description, rather than a prescriptive classification system.

Definitional versus Constructed Theoretical Positions

Thus far, a distinction has been tentatively maintained between constructed positions and definitional positions. In addition, it has been noted that in the construction of a theory, established positions are in some way used; and it would seem that such established positions are also necessary in constructing both types of model-dominant positions. This is due to the fact that the theory/simulation model position requires established positions in order to aid in the construction of the theory that provides the basis for the simulation; and the theory/synthesized model position will generally rely upon established positions to provide a basis for the synthesis of the model. The relationships among definitional positions, established positions, and constructed positions thus require some clarification in order to indicate how a constructed theoretical position functions within its theoretical context.

In order to clarify these relationships, it is helpful to make use of Kuhn's (1962) notion of scientific paradigms, which are, according to Kuhn, major theories or positions which provide a context in which research can be conducted. For example, the Copernican Revolution brought about a situation in which the Ptolemaic paradigm of a geocentric universe was replaced by a heliocentric view. The difference, Kuhn suggests, consisted in the replacement of one paradigmatic

theory by another, and thus changed the way in which the P-domain was viewed and defined. Within the context of a general paradigm, Kuhn suggests, further theoretical work can be conducted, such as the construction of supplementary theories that elucidate particular problems within the context of the paradigm. While a supplementary theory can suggest modifications of the paradigm, the basic paradigm still survives as a definitional context. In addition to sharing a paradigm, researchers also share a set of rules for conducting research within the context of the paradigm; and the combination of a shared paradigm and shared rules gives a view of scientific activity as what Kuhn calls puzzle-solving. In this view, the paradigm determines the nature of the problem; and the shared rules or procedures indicate how the puzzle, or problem, is to be solved. Thus, according to Kuhn, the scientist involved in paradigmatic research is given the problem, the manner of its solution, and to a great extent the type of solution that is acceptable; and research becomes a process of fitting together the pieces of the puzzle into the paradigm.

While the notion of paradigms is easily posited, and is exemplified in such historical cases as Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, or Newtonian versus Einsteinian physics, the identification of paradigms is not as straightforward or simple a matter as could be desired. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that Kuhn is concerned with a reconstructed logic rather than a logic-in-use, although he attempts to apply this reconstructed logic to the general scope of a logic-in-use of the physical sciences. The concept of a paradigm is, nonetheless, useful; for it seems that not only do what have been termed definitional positions seem to be what Kuhn calls paradigms,

but at least some types of synthesized models seem to be intended to create a paradigm which can serve as a definitional position for establishing a P-domain. Thus, in presenting his synthesized model of language, Baker (1976) suggests that:

The last twenty years of claims, counter-claims, and confusion in linguistic and psycholinguistic theory, and the accompanying proliferation of experimental literature without clear growth of knowledge has, if nothing else, demonstrated how remarkably little we can agree upon about language. (p. 1)

Baker goes on to suggest that the model he presents is intended to "provide a single framework within which a genuine psycholinguistics, involving a real interaction between linguists and psychologists, could take place" (p. 2). What Baker is suggesting, then, is that the field of psycholinguistics is in need of a dominant paradigm that will allow research to contribute toward the fuller development of that paradigm.

While Baker's description of the intent of his model seems to clarify the potential relationship between paradigms and synthesized models, further difficulties arise from the consideration of this example. First, it is apparent that in attempting to construct a paradigm for psycholinguistics, Baker is relying upon some sort of paradigm that dictates what is to be included in such a P-domain. This is necessary since he is relying upon established theoretical positions in order to synthesize a model; and such theoretical positions are, themselves, based upon paradigmatic views of P-domains. Second, since Baker is concerned with the synthesis of linguistics and psychology into psycholinguistics, it would seem that the creation of a second order definition of a P-domain involves, to some extent, the creation of a new paradigm by means of the synthesis of the two first order

definitional positions.

In order to clarify the difficulties which arise here, it seems necessary to suggest that different levels within the paradigm may be required in order to obtain a level that is general enough to specify all that is to count as scientific activity within the field under consideration. This would include the rules and procedures that those involved in the field share. Within the context of this general level, there would also need to be different levels to deal with the definition of particular P-domains. For example, it is possible to consider the definitional paradigm of psychology in terms of the study of human mental processes and behavior, yet this does not suffice as a paradigm for the different concerns of psychology, such as behavioral psychology, social psychology, educational psychology, and physiological psychology. Consequently, the paradigm for a field may actually be a complex of sub-paradigms, or even competing paradigms, that are interrelated yet in some ways independent of other specific realizations of the general paradigm of the field as a whole.

While it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine in any detail the nature of such levels of paradigms, it can be noted here that what has been considered first order definition may, within the context of the definitional position, actually be more complicated than has been indicated. For the present purposes, however, this definitional position, or paradigm, can be considered to be a single unifying although hypothetical construct, the inherent complexity of which has been simplified for the present purposes.

Second order definition of a P-domain, then, results in the creation of a new paradigm through the synthesis of two relatively

independent paradigms. Such a second order definition would result in the creation of a potentially new paradigm. As is suggested by Baker's concerns with psycholinguistics, however, the elucidation of this second order paradigm may be difficult and troublesome, and may, ultimately, prove unsuccessful (as may, perhaps, prove to be the case with sociobiology).

The established positions that are used in the construction of a theoretical position can be understood to be paradigmatic theories in the sense suggested by Kuhn. This is to say that these theories supplement some basic paradigm by elucidating the composition, functions or workings of the defined P-domain. Since, however, constructed positions can make use of established positions by rejecting them, it is possible for a constructed position to question the definition of the P-domain to such an extent that the original paradigm cannot accommodate the suggested modifications. In such a case, a new paradigm can be understood to be suggested by the constructed position as a replacement for the old paradigm.

In this view, supplementary constructed positions are, at least to some extent, absorbed by the paradigm in such a way that while they are still discernible as separate theoretical positions, they become a part of the paradigm and contribute toward the definition of that part of the P-domain to which they apply. This is possible since the paradigm can be considered to consist of different levels of generality such that the positions that are considered as established and are used in the construction of a theoretical position will generally be near the specificity end of the generality/specificity continuum within the paradigm. To make use of an established position, however,

is to include the comment (i.e., explanation or description) that the position makes upon the P-domain; and this amounts, of course, to defining the P-domain specifically in the way suggested by the established position. Thus, the use of an established position in the construction of a new theoretical position is a sanctioning (or condemning) of the established position's comment upon the P-domain.

The suggestion that established theoretical positions are embedded within or at least related to a paradigm does not, however, mean that such positions are not related to each other except by means of paradigms; for a constructed position may rely explicitly upon a position that has become embedded within the paradigm, and may be aimed at either elucidating this position within the paradigm, or strengthening the position in an attempt to expand it to a more dominant role within the paradigm. Established theoretical positions related in this way can be considered here to be approaches, and it is in this sense that speech acts (to be discussed in Chapter 3) can be considered to be an approach; for while the original formulation was suggested by Austin (1962) as a theoretical position that was embedded in the paradigm of the philosophy of language, the fact that this position has served as a focal point for other philosophers such as Searle (1969) has served to strengthen Austin's position, and has thus made speech acts an approach to philosophy of language by increasing its significance within the general paradigm to the point where it could be contended that the study of speech acts should be, itself, the paradigm for the philosophy of language.

What has been suggested here is illustrated in Figure 4 in terms of first order definition of the P-domain and the construction




Figure 4 Revised View of the Theoretical Context.

of a theory. The first order definitional paradigm is shown as a set of established positions on a continuum ranging from generality to specificity. Parts of this paradigm are utilized in order to define a P-domain from whatever underlying "reality" there may be. This P-domain provides the basic question or problem for the constructed position, shown here as a theory/no model position. While the construction of the position may involve the use of established positions, these are embedded within the paradigm in which they function, and when invoked, are applied by means of the constructed theory to the definition of the P-domain. The constructed theory itself, of course, is thus a comment not only upon the underlying reality, but upon the paradigm by means of which the P-domain is defined, and consequently is constructed in order to supplement the definitional paradigm.

In second and more complicated orders of definition, additional paradigms are invoked and the definition of the P-domain is obtained by means of a synthesis of the different established positions within the paradigms. The constructed theory can, in such cases, be intended either to establish a new paradigm (e.g., psycholinguistics, cognitive science, psychobiology) or may be intended to supplement one or more of the paradigms that are invoked in the definition of the P-domain.

The Position of the Present Study

While a general framework has now been described by means of which the present study can be considered, this framework has been articulated as a static view of the construction of theoretical positions and of the theoretical context. The construction of a theoretical position, however, is more often a process, as is the defin-

ition of a P-domain when defined by more than one order of definition; consequently, in applying this framework to the present study it is necessary to consider this framework as more dynamic in nature.

While different orders of definition of P-domains have been discussed, in cases such as the present study the description of a defined P-domain as being a particular order is the result of attempts to elucidate various aspects of a given P-domain. In the present study, the P-domain has been given a basic first order definition in the first chapter by invoking the field of reading, as a special aspect of the Education field. In terms of this first order definition, the problem that has arisen has been the nature of reading-as-communication. This problem has been interpreted in terms of the reader so that the basic question has been understood to involve the reader as recipient of meaningful communication. Associated with this problem is the identification of a functional approach to language as an important aspect of a view of communication.

Since the reading paradigm does not offer a useful view of the functional aspects of language, or meaningful communication, it is necessary for the purposes of the present study to invoke a different paradigm which can make available established positions that elucidate this functional approach. For the present purposes, theories from the philosophy of language will be considered in Chapter 3 of this study, making accessible the approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts. These established positions will be used to provide a basis for the construction of a theoretical position. In the course of considering these established positions, however, the importance of the communication situation and participants' knowledge of this situation will

become apparent. Since the clarification of this aspect is necessary in order to describe the reader as recipient of meaningful communication, the paradigm of speech communication will be used in Chapter 4 in order to elucidate this area. In order to clarify the view that results from the synthesis of philosophy of language and speech communication, the paradigm of cognitive science will be invoked in order to make available various positions embedded within it. This will result in a third order definition of participants' knowledge of communication situations, and the construction of a synthesized theory of the nature of human communication. An analog model of the nature of the knowledge that participants bring to bear in communication situations will then be given.

While the beginning point of this study has been the field of reading, the theory that will have been developed will be concerned with language communication in general; and a fourth order definition of the P-domain in Chapter 5 will involve a definition in terms of reading, and the application of this theory to the reader. This will take the form of a synthesized model presented as a tentative list of the ways in which a reader can contextualize a written text. This model is, of course, limited by the way in which the P-domain will have been defined, and further limited by the established positions that have been used. This is, however, the case with any synthesized model; for since such a model involves a synthesis of various theoretical positions, it will always be limited by the positions that are synthesized.

While this gives a general description of the method of the present study, it should be noted that the definition of the P-domain,

and the invoking of established positions, is actually more complicated than is suggested by the claim of a fourth order definition. This is the case since both the areas of speech communication and cognitive science are not yet far removed from n^{th} order definitions of their own P-domains. Also, use will be made of an area of rhetoric that has been defined by those in speech communication and those in the philosophy of language. For the purposes of describing the method of this study, however, the general description given above is sufficient since its purpose has been only to indicate the general method, not to give a specific account of the intricacies of a complex definition of the P-domain.

Summary

In this chapter, a view of constructed theoretical positions has been given that involves a consideration not only of the nature of theoretical positions themselves, but the relation of these positions to the theoretical context in which they are constructed. This framework has been applied to the method of the present study, and an indication has been given of the course of development of this study. This has served to justify the method of the present study, and to indicate the basis upon which it will be presented. The following chapter will begin the process of constructing a theory of language communication by invoking the paradigm of philosophy of language, and considering the approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts.

CHAPTER 3

TWO THEORETICAL APPROACHES FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

As was indicated in the introduction to this study, the communicative aspects of reading will be approached here by means of functional views of language. These functional views will provide a basis for considering the nature of linguistic communication, and will ultimately provide a basis for considering the communicative aspects of reading.

In this chapter, two functional approaches to linguistic communication will be considered: Gricean meaning, and speech acts. Both have received considerable recognition and comment in philosophy; and while objections have been made to particular accounts, the question has generally not been whether or not the two approaches identify important aspects of language, but rather how these aspects are to be accounted for and described. The consideration of both of these views is of interest here since the study of speech acts centers upon the description of linguistic utterances, while the study of Gricean meaning centers upon the participants who deal with such utterances. Thus, for the present purposes, the two approaches can be understood to complement each other such that together they provide a basis for a view of linguistic communication.

While it would be possible to present only a brief account of both Gricean meaning and speech acts here, it has been considered desirable to give a fuller account. This decision has resulted from the fact that the growing interest in these two approaches has led to some questionable interpretations and applications. For example,

Olson (1977) has argued that illocutionary forces can be considered to be the rhetorical aspects of utterances, and that in written language "this rhetorical aspect may disappear" (p. 20). While this contention does not seem out of place in the context of Olson's article, the suggestion that illocutionary forces can "disappear" in written language is inaccurate, and indicates that Olson has misinterpreted the nature of illocutionary forces and speech acts. Similarly, Olson reports that "Grice has recently developed a general theory of the relation between what one says and what one meant" (p. 20) and cites Grice's discussion of conversational implicatures as the source of this theory. While it is true that Grice has given descriptions of what is necessary for an utterer to mean something by an utterance, this theory is not given in the source cited by Olson; and the discussion of conversational implicatures that Olson does cite must be considered within the context of Grice's account of meaning in order for the relevance of these implicatures to be understood.

Since misinterpretations such as Olson's are not as infrequent as they should be, it is considered desirable to present in this chapter a fuller and more philosophically oriented account than is strictly necessary for the present study. This account is intended to clarify not only what the approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts describe but also what the major philosophical difficulties with these accounts have been. In doing this it will be necessary to present arguments and issues that may seem too obscure to be important for an educational application; but since both of these approaches seem to be gaining in prominence, it is necessary that educators be aware of the problems, as well as the substance, of positions that are based upon these

approaches.

In presenting these two approaches, however, it is important to recognize that both have evolved from an original position by means of criticisms and modifications. Thus, while Grice's (1957) early account of meaning has been revised and reformulated by both Grice (1969) and Schiffer (1972), the basis of these later accounts is still the early Grice (1957) position. In presenting each of these approaches, then, the original position will first be presented in some detail, and will then be considered in regards to the major objections that have been made, and the modifications that have been suggested.

Theoretical Positions in Regards to Non-Natural Meaning

The first theoretical approach to language communication that will be considered here is that of Gricean meaning, so called because the original analysis and formulation is by Grice (1957). The focus of this approach is upon a kind of meaningful communication that includes language communication as one possible realization. As a result, while much of the following discussion does not deal explicitly with language, the relevance of this discussion lies in the fact that the same principles are involved in communication with language as are involved in some other types of meaningful communication.

Natural versus Non-Natural Meaning

Grice begins his analysis of meaning by distinguishing between what he terms natural and non-natural meaning. The former refers basically to natural signs that are in some way meaningful in and of themselves, as in the following examples:

- (1) Those spots mean measles.

- (2) That cloud means rain.

In contrast to this type of meaning, Grice suggests that non-natural meaning involves the use of arbitrary or conventional signs in order for an utterer to mean something that is not implicit in the sign itself. This type of non-natural meaning is illustrated in the following examples:

- (3) When the bell rings, it means that class is over.

- (4) When the curb is painted red, it means that parking is not allowed.

In cases of non-natural meaning, the signs are arbitrary in regards to the meaning that they are intended to convey; and, as in examples (3) and (4), other signs could be used to mean the same thing. This is not, however, the case with natural signs, as in (1) and (2), where the meaning must be considered to be an inherent part of the sign itself.

The distinction between natural and non-natural meaning can be clarified by comparing the following two examples suggested by Grice:

- (5) Smith wants to suggest to Jones that Jones's wife is having an affair with Collins. Consequently, Smith shows Jones a photograph of Ms. Jones and Collins in a compromising situation.

- (6) Smith wants to suggest to Jones that Jones's wife is having an affair with Collins. Consequently, Smith draws a picture of Ms. Jones and Collins in a compromising situation, and shows the drawing to Jones.

According to Grice, (5) is a case of natural meaning since the photograph is natural evidence that can be used by Jones to draw his own conclusions. In (6), however, the drawing is not natural evidence in the same way that the photograph is since Jones must base his conclusions on the fact that Smith drew the picture with a particular intention, and presented it to Jones with the intention that Jones

should recognize that Smith thinks that Ms. Jones is having an affair with Collins. This differs from the case in (5); for in (5) Jones does not have to recognize Smith's intention, and does not, in fact, even need to know that Smith is aware that such a photograph exists. If Jones were to chance upon the photograph accidentally, it would still serve as natural evidence of the affair; but if Jones were to chance upon the drawing, it would only offer evidence that someone may think that his wife is having an affair with Collins.

According to Grice, linguistic communication must be considered to be a type of non-natural meaning rather than a type of natural meaning. This seems evident from the fact that if a linguistic utterance were considered to have a natural meaning, the natural meaning of an utterance type could not have different meanings when used upon different occasions. This point can be illustrated by noting that the utterance "It's raining" can have different meanings when used upon different occasions. In one situation it might mean "I'll need my umbrella," while upon another it could mean "The baseball game will probably be cancelled." If linguistic utterances were considered to be natural signs it would be difficult, if not impossible, to account for such diversity of meaning since the utterance would have to be natural evidence for a certain fact or state of affairs in the same way that a cloud can be natural evidence that means rain. This is not to suggest, of course, that there cannot be different interpretations of what a natural sign means, or that one cannot be wrong about the meaning of a natural sign; for it is perfectly possible to be wrong in thinking that certain spots mean measles or that a cloud means rain. The point here, however, is that the meaning of the spots

or the cloud, when considered as signs, will be a natural meaning since the spots and the cloud will be taken to be natural events, or evidence. This is not, however, the case with a linguistic utterance since the sounds or marks used to make such an utterance are arbitrary and do not have a meaning in and of themselves.

It is important to note here that in making this distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, Grice is not suggesting that these are the only types of meaning, or that all cases of meaning can be explained in terms of natural or non-natural signs. Thus, the kind of meaning suggested by the statement "Getting the job meant a lot to John" is not a case of either natural or non-natural meaning, but rather refers to a type of meaning that is not of concern to Grice's analysis since it deals not with the meaning of signs, but with the meaning of experiences. Grice's primary concern, then, is with the meaning of non-natural signs; and since most of the following discussion in this section will be concerned with this type of non-natural meaning, this is what the term "meaning" will, unless otherwise indicated, be used to refer to. When it is necessary to make this explicit, the terms "meaning_{nn}" (meaning--non-natural) or "Gricean meaning" will be used.

The Early Grice Account of Meaning

While the above discussion had distinguished between the meaning of natural signs and the meaning that is communicated by means of non-natural signs, it has not addressed the problem of what is necessary in order for an individual to mean something in this non-natural sense. Since language communication is one realization of this type of meaning, a description of what is necessary for an utterer to mean_{nn} something

will also be a description of what is necessary to mean something linguistically.

In order for an individual to mean something with a non-natural sign, Grice suggests that it is necessary that the sign be "uttered" in some way, with the intention of producing some response or belief in an audience. This is readily apparent in example (6) above, in which Smith draws a picture of Ms. Jones and Collins. Clearly this picture was drawn and shown to Jones ("uttered") with the intention of producing the response in Jones that Jones is to believe that (Smith thinks that) Ms. Jones is having an affair with Collins.

While this seems quite clear, it does not differentiate cases of meaning_{nn} from cases of natural meaning; for it can be argued that in showing Jones a photograph, Smith also has the intention of producing a response or belief in Jones. Grice notes that:

Clearly we must at least add that, for x to have meant anything, not merely must it have been "uttered" with the_{nn} intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an "audience" to recognize the intention behind the utterance. (p. 382)

Thus, in the example under consideration, Smith must not only intend to produce a belief in Jones by showing him the drawing, but must also intend that Jones recognize this intention to produce the belief. Unfortunately, this still does not suffice to exclude cases of natural meaning, such as the case of Smith showing Jones a photograph; for in this case, too, Jones can recognize that it is Smith's intention to produce a belief. Therefore, even these two conditions are not sufficient to distinguish cases of meaning_{nn} from cases of natural meaning.

Grice suggests that in order to resolve this apparent dilemma it is necessary to recognize that these two intentions of the utterer

(i.e., to produce a response, and for the audience to recognize this intention to produce a response) do not function independently. Rather, it must be specified that the utterer intends that the audience's recognition of the utterer's intention must serve as at least part of the reason for the audience's response. Thus, in the case of Smith showing the drawing to Jones, it is Smith's intention to produce a belief in Jones by means of Jones's recognition of Smith's intention to produce this response. In other words, Smith must intend the following: when Jones looks at the drawing of his wife and Collins, he must recognize that Smith intends him to believe that his wife is being unfaithful with Collins; and his recognition of Smith's intention in showing him the drawing must be at least part of the reason for his believing this.

In contrast to this case, when Smith shows Jones a photograph of Ms. Jones and Collins, he intends to produce a response in Jones, but intends that this response will result not from Jones's recognition that Smith believes that Ms. Jones is being unfaithful. Rather, he intends that Jones will come to his belief on the basis of the natural evidence of the photograph. Thus, Smith does not intend that part of Jones's reason for believing about the affair will be Jones's recognition that he (Smith) intends to produce this belief.

While this seems, perhaps, needlessly confusing, the result is that a set of conditions have been established which seem to distinguish cases of meaning_{nn} from cases of natural meaning. These conditions are necessary insofar as a case of meaning_{nn} must meet them, and they are sufficient insofar as a case that meets these conditions is a case of meaning_{nn}. Since linguistic communication is a type of meaning_{nn}, the meaning_{nn} of a linguistic utterance can be understood in terms of these

intentions of the utterer; and this provides a method of considering the meaning of a given utterance when uttered upon a particular occasion.

In order to clarify this description, and the distinctions that have been made, Grice's original conditions can be stated succinctly in a form similar to the one suggested by Strawson (1964). In the following definition, U can be understood to represent the utterer, A the audience, and x the actual utterance. The description can then be given as follows:

DEFINITION 1:

U meant something by x if and only if U intends:

- (1) to produce by uttering x a response r in A,
- (2) that A recognize U's intention (1),
- (3) that (2) shall function as at least part of A's reason for r.

It is notable that in this first definition of meaning, the meaning of the linguistic expression is not considered to be something apart from the intentions with which the expression is uttered. Rather, a linguistic utterance becomes meaningful only because it is uttered with the appropriate intentions to produce some type of response (often a belief) in the audience. For example, it was suggested above that the utterance "It's raining" can, upon different occasions, mean both "I'll need my umbrella" and "The baseball game will probably be cancelled." Whichever of these meanings the utterance has is determined not by the characteristics of the utterance itself, but rather results from the intentions with which it is uttered. Thus, the utterer can mean that he will need his umbrella if the utterance is made with the appropriate intentions, as follows:

U meant that (A is to believe that) he will need his umbrella by uttering "It's raining" if and only if U intends:

- (1) to produce by uttering "It's raining" a response in A such that A believes that U believes that he needs his umbrella,
- (2) that A recognize that U intends to produce this belief in A,
- (3) that A's recognition that U intends to produce this belief in A is at least part of A's reason for believing that U needs his umbrella.

When the meaning of "It's raining" is described in this manner, it is clear that in order for the utterer to mean by his utterance that "The baseball game will probably be cancelled" he would have to make this utterance with a completely different set of intentions.

Objections to the Early Grice Account

While Grice (1969) has contended that his early account of meaning was intended to serve only as a model for an account of meaning, not as that account itself, this was not made clear in his early article. Consequently, various objections have been raised against his description. For the present purposes, these objections can be considered in terms of two basic lines of argument.

Linguistic meaning versus utterance meaning. The first type of objection that has been made to Grice's account is that it denies the nature of linguistic meaning. This argument has been made by Ziff (1967), who contends that linguistic utterances have meaning in and of themselves which is independent of the particular occasion-meaning that results from the utterer's intentions to produce a response (see Appendix B). Thus, according to Ziff, the utterance "It's raining" should be understood to have a meaning that is independent of such occasion-meanings as "I'll need my umbrella." Basically, Ziff's argument is that a consideration of the formal properties of a linguistic utterance yields a linguistic meaning which is more fundamental than the occasion-meaning. Consequently, Ziff contends that Grice's account is a description of the use of language, and not an account of linguistic meaning.

Grice (1968) has responded to this type of objection by arguing that the formal properties are not basic, but that the formal linguistic meaning should be described as what one would normally mean by an utterance of a particular sentence type. Thus, there is a timeless meaning, or what one would normally mean by an utterance, and an applied meaning, which is the meaning that a timeless utterance has when uttered upon a particular occasion. This solution seems, however, to generate fresh difficulties; for as Searle (1969) suggests, it seems to become necessary for the utterer to intend that there be some recognized relationship between the nature of the utterance itself and the intended response (belief). Grice (1969) has, however, argued that this is not really the case, and that apparent counter-examples are not really counter-examples at all. The arguments advanced by Ziff and Searle, and Grice's responses, are considered in more detail in Appendix B.

Despite his denial, Grice admits that counter-examples of the type suggested above could be constructed by specifying the appropriate circumstances; and thus, in order to meet such an example if one were produced, he offers a revision to his account of meaning by suggesting that it is possible to distinguish feature(s), \underline{f} , of an utterance, which can be correlated through some mode, \underline{c} , with the appropriate response or belief. In order for an utterer to mean something in this revised sense, he must not only have the intentions stated in Definition 1, but must also intend that the utterance have certain features, and that his audience recognize these features and correlate them to the desired response. Reformulated, this can be stated as follows:

DEFINITION 2:

U meant something by x if and only if U intends:

- (1) A to think x possesses f,
 - (2) A to think U intends (1),
 - (3) A to think of f as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs,
 - (4) A to think U intends (3),
 - (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A to produce r,
 - (6) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (5), to produce r.
- (modified from Grice, 1969, p. 164)

It is notable that, as with Definition 1, this revised definition is given in terms of an utterer's intentions and an audience's recognition of these intentions, suggesting that in the case of meaningful communication some type of mutual understanding is brought about or realized. While the number of intentions necessary for U to mean something has increased in this second definition, a careful examination of these conditions indicates that this complexity is due to the fact that U is perceived as intending that his utterance have certain features that are correlated in a certain way to the desired response, and that he intends A to recognize that this is intended. Some of the features of a linguistic utterance will, of course, lead to the timeless meaning of an utterance-type; and while these features would generally be extremely important, they would usually not be the only features that the utterer would intend to be recognized; for there would also be features related to the situation in which the utterance occurs which would allow the utterance-type to be interpreted in an appropriate manner in order to yield the occasion-meaning.

While the formulation given here as Definition 2 seems adequate to account for the timeless meaning of utterances, and for difficulties that could arise in regards to this timeless meaning (see Appendix B), it raises a question as to the nature of the modes of correlation that an audience is intended to use to relate the distinguished features of

the utterance to the appropriate response or belief. While Grice has not elaborated upon this subject, a partial answer seems available in what Grice (1967) terms conversational implicatures. These implicatures are designed to account, in a general way, for the fact that in normal conversational situations there is a continuity that is not describable purely in terms of the formal structures of the linguistic utterances.

Conversational implicatures are, according to Grice, implications that can be drawn from a linguistic utterance, but which are not conventionally part of the timeless meaning of the utterance-type of which the utterance is a token. Central to such implicatures is some type of Cooperative Principle which the participants observe in conducting the conversation. This principle can be stated as the prescriptive rule: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 1967, p. 67). This general principle can, in turn, be divided into four categories, or maxims, which Grice terms quantity, quality, relation and manner.

The quantity maxim specifies that the conversational contribution should be as informative as is required, but should not be more informative than the situation calls for. The quality maxim demands that the contribution should be true, or that the utterer should have adequate evidence for asserting it. The relation maxim specifies that the contribution should be relevant to the on-going situation; and the manner maxim demands that the speaker avoid ambiguity or obscurity, and be orderly in his presentation.

Grice further suggests that these four categories of the Cooperative Principle should be understood only as tentative formulations, and that in addition to such maxims there are probably:

all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character) such as "Be polite," which are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures. (p. 67)

These implicatures must, then, be understood to be only examples of the types of maxims that operate in conversation, and which govern the communication between the utterer and his audience.

Implicatures such as these suggested by Grice can, it would seem, function as modes of correlation between the features of an utterance and the response (belief) that the utterer intends to produce in his audience. This is not to say, however, that these implicatures relate an utterance to its meaning; for in Grice's account, the meaning results from the complex set of intentions with which the utterer makes his utterance. This is, in fact, where Olson (1977) becomes confused, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter; for Olson contends that Grice's discussion of conversational implicatures is a theory of meaning, even though Grice has elsewhere (Grice, 1957, 1968, 1969) quite clearly stated that linguistic meaning is dependent upon the intentions of the utterer, as discussed above. Implicatures can, then, be understood to function as modes of correlation between features of an utterance and the intended response, but cannot be substituted for an intentional description of meaning.

The usefulness of conversational implicatures as modes of correlation is readily demonstrated by reconsidering the example suggested above in which the utterance "It's raining" can mean, in part, that "The baseball game will probably be cancelled." Since implicatures

deal with on-going situations, however, and the way in which utterances function within such situations, it is necessary to contextualize the utterance "It's raining" in order to understand how it implicates a meaning that is not readily obtainable from the timeless meaning of the utterance-type. Such a situation can be given briefly as the following exchange between Speaker A and Speaker B:

A: Are you going to the baseball game today?

B: It's raining.

In order for A to understand B's response he must assume that the utterance by B is not random, but is governed by the Cooperative Principle, and particularly by the relevance maxim. B does not state that he is not going to the baseball game because the game will probably be cancelled; but if his response is considered relevant, then it is implicated that he believes the game will be cancelled and therefore does not intend to go. While this implicature reflects a mode of correlation between the utterance and the belief that B wishes to produce in A, the meaning must still be considered to result from the set of intentions that B holds as an utterer, especially the intention that A will recognize this mode of correlation, and recognize that B intends for him to recognize it.

Conversational implicatures can, then, be considered one of the modes of correlation by means of which features of an utterance are related to the response (belief) that the utterer intends to produce in his audience. It must be emphasized, however, as Grice suggests, that these are not the only modes of correlation, or the only types of implicatures that are possible. Rather, the implicatures considered here represent one general mode of correlation that can supplement a mode based upon utterance-type meaning in order to account for an

occasion-meaning that differs from the timeless meaning of the utterance-type.

Objections to the sufficiency of the early Grice account. The second type of argument that has been made against Grice's (1957) account is that it is not sufficient to rule out cases that do not involve meaning_{nn}, but which do meet the criteria of Definitions 1 and 2. Counter-examples of this type have been suggested by both Strawson (1964) and Schiffer (1972), and are based upon situations in which the utterer deceives his audience in a particular way. This deception is not, however, the type that is to be expected from, for example, a used-car salesman, but rather is such that the utterer has one more relevant intention than he intends his audience to recognize. Thus, the utterer deceives the audience in regards to his intentions, and does not really mean_{nn} anything even though his intentions are sufficient to meet the conditions of Definitions 1 and 2. What makes such counter-examples troublesome, however, is that in order to exclude them from being cases of meaning, it seems necessary to add an indefinite number of meaning intentions (henceforth, M-intentions) such that the utterer must intend that his audience recognize more of his M-intentions. The specific objections and counter-examples that make up this line of argument are discussed in detail in Appendix C.

Grice (1969) has responded to the argument that an indefinite number of M-intentions may be necessary by contending that such examples quickly become unrealistic and could never be realized in actual conversation. According to Grice, an utterer could not really intend that his audience draw the complex inferences necessary in order to recognize a large number of M-intentions since such reasoning

quickly becomes impossible:

It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires those to whom communications or near-communications are addressed be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions. (p. 158)

Even granting the validity of some of the counter-examples, Grice suggests that a point is reached in communication situations such that it becomes impossible for an utterer to intend that his audience go through a complex process of inferential reasoning in order to produce the intended response since the situation will not justify the audience's engaging in such complex inferencing. In short, human limitations being what they are, at some point it becomes impossible for U to intend a complex set of intentions since he cannot honestly believe that A will successfully infer this complex set of intentions. Thus, according to Grice, there cannot be an infinite number of counter-examples of this type since it quickly becomes impossible for U to intend to mean something in such a complex manner.

While this argument suggests that there must be some limit upon the number of intentions that U can have, and the amount of reasoning he can reasonably expect of A, it does not indicate how to modify the definition of meaning. Grice offers two relevant suggestions in this regard. His first is that the number of intentions that U will have will depend upon the complexity of the situation, and will thus vary from one situation to another. Consequently, different definitions of meaning may be necessary for different types of situations. He concedes, however, that this solution is probably unacceptable, presumably because it suggests that meaningful communication must be described on a case by case basis. Also, such an analysis does not

rule out an infinite number of M-intentions, but rather suggests that the number of M-intentions that an utterer will have will be three or more. Such a vague analysis, however, almost amounts to not giving conditions for meaning at all; and if this position were accepted, it would suggest that an account would be required of how audiences recognize the appropriate number of M-intentions in a given situation.

Grice's second suggestion for dealing with this type of problem is to note that these examples become increasingly complex and impossible to realize in actual situations. Consequently, it is possible to impose a limit on the complexity of what an utterer may intend. This can be accomplished either by setting a limit to the number of relevant M-intentions that the utterer can intend his audience to recognize, or by adding a clause which states that U cannot intend A to rely upon some type of inferencing which A is also intended to think that U intends to be false. For the present purposes, the first of these two solutions (i.e., setting a limit) can be adopted and given as Grice's final account of meaning, as follows:

DEFINITION 3:

U meant something by x if and only if U uttered x intending:

- (1) A to think x possesses f,
- (2) A to think U intends (1),
- (3) A to think of f as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs,
- (4) A to think U intends (3),
- (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A to produce r,
- (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r,
- (7) A to think U intends (6).

(modified from Grice, 1969, p. 164)

As in Definitions 1 and 2, this definition is based upon a mutual understanding between U and A. In this revised account, however, it is notable that the mutual understanding is more complex than in the

original Grice account given in Definition 1; for not only must the utterer intend (and the audience recognize) the features of the utterance and their correlation to the response, but the utterer must also intend (and the audience recognize) that this is, in fact, the utterer's intention; and this intention too must be intended to be recognized by the audience.

Schiffer's Account of Meaning

While Schiffer is in basic agreement with Grice in regards to counter-examples such as those suggested by Ziff and Searle, he differs from Grice in regards to counter-examples that challenge the sufficiency of the description. Rather than denying that complex M-intentions can form a part of meaning something, Schiffer accepts the potentially infinite nature of such intentions and argues that it is necessary to posit a mutual knowledge between the utterer and his audience in order to account for such intentions.

The notion of mutual knowledge is, in itself, quite simple. Briefly, it is the knowledge that is involved when two or more individuals know something, and also know that the other individuals know it, and know that the other individuals know that they know it, etc. As an example, Schiffer suggests that if U and A are seated at a table with a candle between them, and if certain preparatory conditions are met (e.g., both U and A are awake; neither is blind; both are looking across the table so that the candle impedes their view, etc.), it can be concluded that both U and A know that the candle is on the table, and that each knows that the other knows that the candle is on the table. In such a situation, U would also know that A knows that U knows that the candle is on the table, and A would know that U knows

that A knows that the candle is on the table. Furthermore, both U's and A's knowledge can be extended indefinitely by continuing to posit further knowings about U's knowledge about what A knows, and A's knowledge about what U knows. Thus, at the next level of knowing, U knows that A knows that U knows that A knows that the candle is on the table, and also knows that A knows that U knows that A knows that U knows that the candle is on the table; and the same type of knowing can also be posited for A. In abbreviated form, if K stands for "knows," and Ku and Ka represent "U knows" and "A knows," and what is known is Q, then mutual knowledge can be represented as the two potentially infinite series:

KuQ	and	KaQ
KuKaQ		KaKuQ
KuKaKuQ		KaKuKaQ
KuKaKuKaQ		KaKuKaKuQ
.		.
.		.
.		.

These series could, of course, be extended indefinitely; and when such is the case, it is what Schiffer terms a case of mutual knowledge between U and A.

The use of the term "knowledge" in this context is, of course, somewhat questionable since U does not "know" as a certainty that A knows, etc.; and Schiffer acknowledges this special sense of the term by including an asterisk after the term, and suggesting that "belief" may be more appropriate. "Belief," however, does not really seem to be adequate either; for U does not believe that A knows, etc., in the usual sense of the term, but rather believes that he knows that A believes that he knows, etc. Thus, the knowings involved in mutual knowledge seem to be beliefs about what is known, and certainly do not

include the degree of certainty implied in the sense of the term "knowledge" when used in expressions such as "I know that when I drop this ball it will fall."

Another difficulty that arises with mutual knowledge is the potentially infinite number of knowings that can be posited. In the above example, U's knowledge about A's knowledge about the candle on the table can be continued indefinitely; and while it seems reasonable to say that such knowings could be extended indefinitely, such extensions would quickly become useless since, as in the example under discussion, the iterated knowings quickly become needlessly complex, and would probably not go beyond the third level in the series. The nature of mutual knowledge is discussed further in Appendix D.

It is Schiffer's contention that a notion of mutual knowledge such as this can be introduced into the description of meaning in order to exclude counter-examples that demonstrate the insufficiency of Definitions 1 and 2. Rather than having U and A mutually know U's intentions, however, which would be the simplest way to incorporate this knowledge, Schiffer suggests that what U and A must mutually know is not a set of intentions, but a state of affairs, SA, which he describes as follows:¹

Typically, SA will essentially involve the fact that U, a person having such-and-such properties, uttered a token of type X having a certain feature(s) f in the presence of A, a person having such-and-such properties, in certain circumstances, C. (p. 39)

¹Actually, Schiffer uses "E" rather than "SA" to designate the state of affairs. In order to avoid confusion later in this study when E is used in a different way, SA has been substituted in Schiffer's account, both here and in the following sections of the study. Also, Schiffer uses the term "speaker" (S) instead of "utterer" (U). For the sake of consistency in the present study, this has also been altered in Schiffer's account.

Since counter-examples aimed at the insufficiency of Grice's account rely upon situations in which the state of affairs is not mutually known between the participants, to demand that U and A mutually know the state of affairs serves to exclude such examples by eliminating the type of deception that these examples are based upon.

Schiffer's first suggested modification of Grice's account can, then, be represented as follows:

DEFINITION 4:

U meant something by x if and only if U intends to realize thereby a certain state of affairs SA which is (intended by U to be) such that the obtainment of SA is sufficient for U and a certain audience A mutually knowing that SA obtains and that SA is conclusive (very good or good) evidence that U uttered x intending:

- (1) to produce by uttering x a response r in A,
- (2) that A recognize U's intention (1),
- (3) that (2) shall function as at least part of A's reason for r,
- (4) to realize SA. (modified from Schiffer, 1972, p. 39)

It is notable that, as in the previous three definitions, Schiffer's account is based upon some type of mutual understanding between the utterer and his audience in order for meaningful communication to take place. In fact, in this definition this mutual understanding is overtly described as mutual knowledge of the state of affairs; and this mutual knowledge provides the basis for U's meaning something.

While Grice manages to eliminate these counter-examples without explicitly invoking either mutual knowledge or the state of affairs, it is notable that he has not entirely succeeded in formulating an account of meaning without an implicit need for this type of mutual knowledge. This seems apparent from a consideration of Grice's later account, given in Definition 3 above, and the use of his conversational implicatures as one means of correlating the features of an utterance

to the intended response. For example, one way that an utterance is correlated is through the maxim of relevance, which specifies that the conversational contribution must be relevant to the situation. In order for this relevance to be recognized, it is necessary to know what state of affairs exists; and in order for the utterer to intend that his audience use this maxim, he must intend not only that the audience recognize the maxim and the state of affairs, but also that the utterer intended him to recognize it. While such an intention aims at establishing only a third level of iterated knowings (i.e., KaKuKaQ), it does represent the beginnings of mutual knowledge. In addition, in order for U to intend that A use conversational implicatures as modes of correlation, it must be mutual knowledge between them that such implicatures exist and are relevant, and that the situation has certain features that allow for the appropriate use of the maxims. This seems to be necessary in order for U to intend that A make use of these; for as Grice himself argues, in order for an utterer to hold an intention, it must be necessary for him to have a reasonable expectation that it can be fulfilled. Thus, it seems that while Schiffer introduces the notion of mutual knowledge of the state of affairs in order to rule out counter-examples to the sufficiency of the description, this same type of knowledge is in some way implicit in Grice's solution to potential counter-examples based upon the timeless meanings of utterance-types.

In addition to adding mutual knowledge of the state of affairs to the description of meaning, Schiffer has suggested various other alterations to Grice's account. These modifications are discussed in detail in Appendix E, and include a restatement of Grice's notion of

modes of correlation in terms of a relationship, R, between the utterance and the intended response, and a distinction between an utterer meaning something and an utterer meaning that his audience is to do something. Also, Schiffer suggests that when the utterer means something, the intended response should be understood in terms of an activated belief rather than simply a belief or a response. This activated belief is a particular belief, P, for some truth-supporting reasons, p(t), which is, in effect, an elaboration of Grice's general notion of response (see Appendix E). In addition, Schiffer contends that an utterer's M-intentions can be divided into those that are of primary concern, and those that are secondary (see Appendix E).

Incorporating these modifications into the preliminary account of Schiffer's description of meaning, given above as Definition 4, yields what can be considered to be Schiffer's final account of an utterer meaning something:

DEFINITION 5a:

U meant that P by uttering x if and only if U uttered x intending thereby: (a) to realize a state of affairs, SA, and (b) that the obtainment of SA be sufficient for U and A mutually knowing: (i) that SA obtains, and (ii) that SA is conclusive (very good or good) evidence that:

U uttered x with the primary intention

- (1) that there be some p such that U's utterance of x causes in A the activated belief that P/p(t);

and intending

- (2) satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at least in part, by virtue of A's belief that x is related in a certain way R to the belief that P;
- (3) to realize SA.

(modified from Schiffer, 1972, p. 63)

When an utterer intends that his audience is to do something (or to D), then U must intend A to have reasons for doing this. It is to be noted, however, that in such cases it is not necessary for U to intend A to have an activated belief that he is to D. Rather, it

is sufficient for U to intend A to D for the reason(s) p; and since it is not a matter of belief, these reasons do not need to be truth-supporting. As in the case of U's intending to produce an activated belief, U's intentions in regards to getting A to D can be divided into primary and secondary, yielding the following description of what is necessary and sufficient for U's intending that A do something:

DEFINITION 5b:

U meant that A was to D by uttering x if and only if U uttered x intending thereby: (a) to realize a state of affairs, SA, and (b) that the obtainment of SA be sufficient for U and A mutually knowing: (i) that SA obtains, and (ii) that SA is conclusive (very good or good) evidence that:

U uttered x with the primary intention

- (1) that there be some p such that U's utterance of x causes A to D/p;

and intending

- (2) satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at least in part, by virtue of A's belief that x is related in a certain way R to (the act-type) D-ing;
- (3) to realize SA.

(modified from Schiffer, 1972, p. 63)

Definitions 5a and 5b can be considered to be Schiffer's final descriptions of meaning, just as Definition 3 can be considered to be Grice's final account. As with Grice's final account, Schiffer's description of meaningful communication is based upon a mutual understanding between the utterer and his audience. This is clearly indicated in Schiffer's account by the mutual knowledge of the state of affairs that is intended by the utterer to function as conclusive evidence for what the utterer means.

Understanding the Meanings of Utterances

While the final versions of both Grice's and Schiffer's accounts of meaning give descriptions of what is necessary for an utterer to mean something by a linguistic utterance, these accounts are formulated only in terms of the utterer, not in terms of the audience. Thus, while

the utterer's intentions are described in these accounts, neither Grice nor Schiffer has given an account of what is necessary for an audience to understand the meaning of the utterance. Strawson (1964) has, however, suggested that such a complementary account is necessary for a full view of communication; and since the ultimate focus of the present study is upon this receptive aspect of communication, it seems important to indicate, at least tentatively, what is required for an audience to understand an utterer's intended meaning.

Since both Grice's and Schiffer's accounts are formulated in terms of utterer's intentions, it would seem that a complementary account could be easily formulated by rewriting these intentions in terms of the audience's recognition of these intentions. This has, in fact, been noted by Searle (1969) in his discussion of such an intentional approach to meaning; for as Searle argues:

In speaking I attempt to communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him to recognize my intention to communicate just those things. I achieve the intended effect on the hearer by getting him to recognize my intention to achieve that effect, and as soon as the hearer recognizes what it is my intention to achieve, it is in general achieved. He understands what I am saying as soon as he recognizes my intention in uttering what I utter as an intention to say that thing. (p. 43)

By adopting this argument it is possible to avoid two problems that can arise in attempting to describe an audience's understanding of an utterance. The first of these concerns the audience's intentions; for since the utterer has been described as engaging in an intentional activity, it is tempting to use the same approach in describing an audience's understanding. To do this, however, is to raise some unwanted questions about the nature of intentions; for if A is walking down the street and hears the utterance "Stop, thief!" and understands the intended meaning of this utterance, it is questionable as to whether

or not it could be said that A intended to understand this utterance. While on some level it would seem that this is intentional activity, this level seems to be somewhat different than the one that has been discussed in terms of an utterer meaning something. By adopting Searle's view, then, it is possible to avoid this problem by specifying only that in order to understand, an audience must "recognize" the intentions of the utterer. This is not to deny that understanding may be an intentional activity, but is only to contend that in giving an account of understanding an utterer's meaning, it is not necessary to specify any intentions on the part of the audience.

Similarly, by accepting Searle's argument it is possible to avoid problems that would arise if it were specified that A must actually produce the intended response in order to have understood what was meant by an utterance. While there is the sense of response suggested by Grice that describes it as the audience's belief that the utterer believes what is meant, even this sense allows potential confusion in that an audience can understand what the utterer meant without actually believing that the utterer really believes it. For example, a used car salesman can tell a prospective customer that a particular car is in excellent mechanical condition, even though the customer can see that it is leaking oil; and the customer can understand what the salesman meant without actually producing any belief about what the salesman believes. While this difficulty may be more apparent than real, the distinction will be accepted here; and the following accounts will specify only that A must recognize that U intends to produce a particular response, not that he must actually produce that response.

With these distinctions, the early Grice account, given above

as Definition 1, can be formulated in terms of the audience's understanding as follows:

DEFINITION 6:

A understands that U meant something by uttering x if and only if A recognizes:

- (1) that U intends A to produce r,
- (2) that U intends to produce r in A by uttering x,
- (3) that U intends that A's recognition (2) is at least part of A's reason for recognizing (1).

Like the early Grice account, the later Grice account, given as Definition 3 above, is fairly straightforward and can be stated as follows:

DEFINITION 7:

A understands that U meant something by uttering x if and only if:

- (1) A thinks x possesses f,
- (2) A thinks U intends (1),
- (3) A thinks of f as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs,
- (4) A thinks U intends (3),
- (5) A thinks on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A to produce r,
- (6) A recognizes that U intends that A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (5), to produce r,
- (7) A thinks U intends (6).

In Schiffer's final account, given above as Definitions 5a and 5b, the distinction between primary and secondary intentions can, for convenience, be omitted in giving an account of A's understanding since it is not necessary for A to recognize this distinction in order to understand what U meant. As an account of A's understanding, then, Schiffer's definitions can be given as follows:

DEFINITION 8a:

A understands that U meant that P by uttering x if and only if:

- (1) A recognizes that U intended A to have the activated belief that $P/p(t)$,
- (2) A recognizes that x is related in a certain way R to P, and that U intends this recognition to be at least part of A's reason for the activated belief in (1),

- (3) A recognizes that U and A mutually know that a certain state of affairs SA obtains, and that U intends that SA be conclusive (very good or good) evidence for the activated belief in (1) and for (2).

DEFINITION 8b:

A understands that U meant that A was to D by uttering x if and only if:

- (1) A recognizes that U intended there to be some p such that U's utterance of x causes A to D/p,
- (2) A recognizes that x is related in a certain way R to (the act-type) D-ing, and that U intends this recognition to be at least part of A's reason for D-ing in (1),
- (3) A recognizes that U and A mutually know that a certain state of affairs SA obtains, and that U intends that SA be conclusive (very good or good) evidence for D/p-ing in (1) and for (2).

These accounts of what is necessary for A to understand U's intended meaning can be considered to complement the definitions of utterer's meaning given above, and each pair of descriptions provide an account of what is ideally necessary for meaningful communication between an utterer and his audience. It is notable that this account is not restricted to linguistic communication, and hence not to either oral or written language, but rather gives a general description irrespective of the medium. This account of meaning has, however, centered upon the participants, and upon the utterer's intentions in regards to his audience rather than upon the utterer's intentions in regards to his utterance. While such a focus has not been necessary in order to give an account of meaningful communication, a fuller account of linguistic communication can be obtained by considering the nature of the utterance itself, and its relationship to the utterer and the audience. This will be attempted in the following part of this chapter by considering the nature of a speech act. Together these two views should provide a fuller description of the nature of linguistic

communication according to the analysis of philosophers.

Theoretical Positions in Regards
to Speech Acts

Austin on Constatives and Performatives

While the basic position in regards to speech acts was formulated and presented by Austin in his William James Lectures at Harvard (Austin, 1962), in the introduction to these lectures Urmson notes that Austin's basic view was formed while he was working on an earlier lecture, "Other Minds" (in Austin, 1961).

In this earlier lecture, Austin is essentially concerned with examining what one means when one says that one "knows" something. In the course of this investigation, Austin compares what it means to say "I know" and "I promise," and from this comparison argues that there is a descriptive fallacy common in philosophy that consists in assuming that a linguistic utterance such as "I promise" is a description of a state of affairs. Austin claims, however, that the utterance of certain phrases is not necessarily descriptive of an action, but is often actually the doing of the act. While certain purely descriptive phrases may exist in the language, according to Austin such phrases were originally not descriptive at all, but were used to perform the acts that they have later been used to describe.

Once this distinction is recognized, it seems almost self-evident; for the utterance of "I promise" does not usually report or describe an act that is independent of the utterance itself; for the utterance of "I promise" is at least a part of the act of promising. To say that such utterances are descriptive of acts, then is incorrect; for they are, in this view, a part of the act itself.

While Austin does not pursue this aspect of language in his earlier lecture, it forms the basis upon which he develops his theory of speech acts in his William James Lectures (Austin, 1962). Austin begins these lectures by establishing a distinction between constatives and performatives. The former have the quality of being either true or false, while the latter are used to perform acts and do not have truth values. This distinction is readily apparent when examples such as the following sentences are considered:

(1) That table is round.

(2) He said that he would be there.

(3) I bet that he will not come.

(4) I christen this ship The Arkansas.

Examples (1) and (2) can be either true or false, and under the appropriate circumstances can be verified as being either one or the other. Examples (3) and (4), however, cannot be so verified. While it can be determined whether or not it is true that (3) or (4) was actually uttered upon a particular occasion, by a particular individual, the utterances themselves are not subject to the same truth conditions as are (1) and (2). Since they can be either true or false, (1) and (2) are constatives; and since (3) and (4) cannot be either true or false, but are used to perform acts, they are performatives.

Austin suggests that the basic difference between constatives and performatives can be understood by noting that in uttering a constative, one is saying something, while in uttering a performative one is doing something. In uttering (1) or (2), the utterer is saying that something is the case, while in uttering (3) or (4), the utterer is performing an act. In (3) this doing consists in offering a bet,

and in (4) the utterer is performing an act of christening.

In addition to this distinction between doing and saying, constatives and performatives can be contrasted in terms of their successful execution. While a constative can, as noted above, be either true or false, a performative is better described as being either felicitous (happy) or infelicitous (unhappy) since the successful execution of a performative results in the performance of an act, not a truth value. As Austin points out, however, the distinction between constatives and performatives ultimately seems to break down; for constatives and performatives actually resemble each other in many ways. This is particularly apparent when it is noted that constatives, like performatives, can be described as acts of doing something (e.g., as acts of stating, asserting, or declaring) rather than as descriptions of states of affairs. Thus, since there seems to be a performative aspect to constative utterances, the distinction between constatives and performatives seems to fail. The nature of performatives and the failure of the distinction between constatives and performatives are discussed in more detail in Appendix F.

Austin on Speech Acts

Since the distinction between constatives and performatives seems to fail when closely examined, Austin suggests that it is necessary to set this distinction aside and examine the basic nature of a speech act. Since both constative and performative utterances involve doing something, this sense of doing provides Austin with an approach to use in examining the nature of the speech act: determining what is done when an utterance is made.

According to Austin, the issuance of an utterance should not be

considered to be just the doing of a single act. Rather, making an utterance should be understood in terms of different levels, the first and most elementary of which is the issuing of sounds, or what Austin terms a phonetic act. In terms of the phonetic act, such sounds are not necessarily meaningful, but merely represent some type of vocalization. The second act that is performed in making an utterance consists, according to Austin, in the uttering of certain words which derive from a certain vocabulary and conform to a certain grammar. This type of act he terms a phatic act. The third act that is performed in the normal course of making an utterance is the rhetic act, which is the uttering of a phatic act with a certain sense and reference, or meaning. The type of meaning that is suggested by "sense and reference" is different from the sense of meaning_{nn} discussed above, for the sense of an utterance can be considered to be the meaning that the utterance has within the context of the language as a whole; and the reference of the utterance can be considered to deal with the way in which the utterance picks out, or refers to, entities within the real world. For convenience, the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts can be considered to constitute what Austin calls the locutionary act, which is the act of "saying something" in the sense developed above in regards to constatives.

It is important to note here that a normal, meaningful utterance includes the performance of all three of the acts that constitute a locutionary act. While the distinctions between these three different acts may seem somewhat arbitrary and artificial, Austin justifies this analysis by noting that they describe the ways in which a locutionary act can fail. These different types of failure are illustrated by the

following examples:

- (5) U opens his mouth to speak but chokes and no sound comes out.
- (6) U is an English speaker and utters to his English-speaking audience, "Krush ulgim."
- (7) U utters, "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously."

While in all three of these examples U fails to perform a locutionary act, the failure of (5) is at the phonetic level. Since each of the acts that constitute a locutionary act include the performance of the act that precedes it, the failure to perform a phonetic act necessarily results in a failure of the phatic and rhetic acts. Example (6) fails as a phatic act, presuming that the utterance is an attempt to say something in English. Here the phonetic act is successfully performed, but the performance of a rhetic act is impossible since the phatic act has failed by not conforming to an English vocabulary. Example (7) reports a failure at the rhetic level; for while this famous Chomskian example (Chomsky, 1957) conforms to the vocabulary and grammar of English, and is thus a successful phatic act, it fails at the rhetic level since the act is not performed with a meaningful "sense and reference."

As Austin admits, this classification of the acts that constitute a locutionary act is open to refinement. It is sufficient for Austin's purposes, however, to note these different acts and how they can fail in attempting to perform the locutionary act of saying something, thus making the point that in order to perform a successful locutionary act it is necessary that these three acts each be successfully performed.

While the performance of a locutionary act can be considered to be the sense of "saying something" that was identified above in regards to constative utterances, there is also, as was pointed out

above, a sense of doing something in making an utterance that was associated with performatives and eventually (see Appendix F) with constatives as well; and according to Austin what is done in uttering a locutionary act is an additional act, the illocutionary act, which refers to the force of the utterance. Thus, while a locutionary act is an act of saying something (meaningful), the illocutionary act is the specification of what is done in making this utterance (e.g., offering a bet, making a promise, etc.).

In addition to these two major types of acts, Austin suggests that it is possible to identify another act which is defined in terms of what is accomplished by saying something. This act he terms a perlocutionary act, which can be understood to refer to the consequential effects that result from having said something.

While the differences between these different acts seem somewhat obscure when described, the differences become more apparent when they are illustrated, as in the following examples given by Austin of the two utterances "Shoot her!" and "You can't do that":

Locution: He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to her.

Illocution: He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her.

Perlocution: He persuaded me to shoot her.
He got me to (or made me) shoot her.

Locution: He said to me, 'you can't do that.'

Illocution: He protested against my doing it.

Perlocution: He pulled me up, checked me. (pp. 101-102)¹

¹All citations from Austin (1962) are from the second edition, edited by J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà, and published by Harvard University Press, 1975.

It is important to note here that each set of locution/illocution/perlocution reports a single utterance upon a particular occasion. In the two examples of locutions, what is reported is the actual utterance of the rhetic act (and consequently the phatic and phonetic acts), and what was meant in terms of the sense and reference of these utterances.

In the examples of the two illocutionary acts, the emphasis is upon the force of the utterance in regards to the particular occasion upon which it was uttered; and the actual utterance itself is not reported since this is a part of the locutionary act. What is reported, then, is what was done in making the utterance, or the force of the utterance of a particular locution in a particular context.

The examples of the two perlocutionary acts demonstrate what was done by making the locutionary and illocutionary acts, and thus indicate the consequences that resulted from the utterances within the particular situational contexts. Each utterance, then, is reported as an act of making the utterance (locutionary act), as what was done in making the utterance (illocutionary act), and as what was done by making the utterance (perlocutionary act).

According to Austin, illocutionary acts are conventional in nature since some procedure must be established in the language or the society at large that permits the performance of acts with certain forces. This is, of course, similar to the description of performatives that was given in regards to their felicity conditions (see Appendix F); and, in fact, Austin suggests that the performative aspect of an utterance can be understood to be the illocutionary force of that utterance. In keeping with the felicity conditions which require that all participants in the situation act appropriately, Austin further suggests that

in order for an illocutionary act to be performed, there must be uptake on the part of the other participants in the situation. This is merely to require that in order for acts such as bets or promises to be made it is necessary that the person to whom the bet or promise is addressed must at least recognize the force of the utterance, otherwise the act will be infelicitously performed.

Since the performative aspect of an utterance is to be identified with the illocutionary force of the utterance, this force can be either implicit or explicit, just as the performative utterance was considered to be either implicit or explicit. Similarly, if the illocutionary force of an utterance is implicit, it must be possible to make this force explicit just as it was possible to make an implicit performative explicit. Since this performative aspect of a speech act is related to the situation, or occasion, in which the utterance is made, it is necessary that any locutionary act also have an illocutionary force; for utterances are always made upon particular occasions, and for particular purposes, and thus will always have some type of performative (illocutionary) force if they are felicitous. Thus, while the utterance "There is a bull in the field" can be understood to be a locutionary act insofar as it has an appropriate sense and reference, etc., the performative aspect of this utterance is the illocutionary force which relates the locutionary act to the situation and the intentions of the utterer in performing the locutionary act. This illocutionary force can be made explicit by adding specifications of the force such as "I hereby warn you that . . ." or "I hereby state (report) to you that . . ." Thus, Olson's (1977) contention (discussed in the introduction to this chapter) that the illocutionary force of an

utterance is a rhetorical aspect that can disappear in written discourse seems at variance with Austin's description of these forces. According to Austin, to perform a locutionary act is to perform an illocutionary act; and it thus becomes difficult to understand how Olson can contend that these illocutionary forces can ever disappear; for even if an utterance is truth-sensitive, or constative, it still has an illocutionary force such as asserting, declaring, or affirming.

While the illocutionary force seems to refer to such concepts as the "functions" or "uses" of language, Austin cautions that this is not the case since such terms as "functions" and "uses" are too general and vague to be applicable to the illocutionary force. For example, an utterance can be "used" or can "function" to make a joke; but this is an aspect of language that is not covered by the illocutionary act since joking is not what one does in making an utterance, and since it cannot be used to make an explicit performative (i.e., "I hereby joke that" is not an acceptable invocation). Consequently, this is an aspect of language that is not covered by the illocutionary act; and the illocutionary force cannot, in general, be used as an explanation of, or substitute for, the "functions" of language.

While the illocutionary act can be understood to reflect the performative aspect of an utterance, the distinction between constatives and performatives is not explained by this since, as has been suggested above, constatives seem to resemble performatives since both can be described in terms of doing something by means of an utterance. In regards to this question Austin suggests that "The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine of locu-

tionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the special theory to the general theory" (p. 148). Constatives and performatives are, then, to be considered within the general framework of the theory of speech acts; and the illocutionary force is to be considered as performative in nature. In regards to constatives, Austin notes that the notion of a "statement" that is either true or false is, in his theory, an abstraction or an ideal since his analysis of speech acts has suggested that the constative aspect must apply to the locutionary act, and more particularly to the rhetic act, since it is at this level that the utterance can be either true or false in terms of its reference. Thus, constatives must be considered to be a particular type of performative utterance; and the distinction between constatives and performatives can be made only by considering a certain class of illocutionary acts (performatives), which can then be delineated into performatives and constative aspects at the illocutionary and locutionary levels.

Searle on Speech Acts

One of the major difficulties that has been noted in regards to Austin's description of speech acts is his distinction between locutions and illocutions. While Austin admits that this distinction is troublesome, Cohen (1964) has suggested that the weakness is due to the fact that the notion of illocutionary force is redundant, and that what Austin attributes to such forces is really better understood as a part of the meaning, or the rhetic act. This basic difficulty has also been noted by Strawson (1964) and Searle (1968), and is illustrated by the fact that in an explicit performative, the force of the utterance may be exhausted by the locutionary meaning. Thus, in the

utterance "I (hereby) bet you ten dollars" the sense-and-reference meaning of the utterance includes the force of betting since this force is explicitly stated. Thus, the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts does not seem to establish two mutually exclusive aspects of a speech act since the force is sometimes describable in terms of the locutionary act. This difficulty, and the specific objections made by Cohen and Searle, are discussed in detail in Appendix G.

While Cohen notes the difficulty with Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and suggests that the notion of illocutionary force should be eliminated, Searle takes the opposite position and suggests that the difficulty lies not with the notion of illocutionary force, but in the way the locutionary act is defined.

In order to establish a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, Searle (1969) first makes three assumptions:

1. Whatever can be meant can be said. I call this the Principle of Expressibility.
2. The meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components.
3. The illocutionary forces of utterances may be more or less specific; and there are several different principles of distinction for distinguishing different types of illocutionary acts. (p. 415)

The principle of expressibility merely contends that a language can be infinitely expanded in order to accommodate anything that can be meant. This does not deny the finite nature of particular languages, however; for the principle does not claim that everything can be expressed by a language as it is constituted at a particular point in time. Searle's second principle is designed to include features such as the syntactic deep structure, the stress and intonation contours of an utterance, as

well as the words and the word order, as aspects of the meaning of an utterance. In his third principle Searle suggests that the names for illocutionary forces that exist in a language are, in a sense, accidental since the illocutionary forces that are actually specified could have been specified differently, or not at all. Specified illocutionary forces such as promising, betting, or reporting, must be seen as points or ranges on continua such that the particular points that are marked off on these illocutionary continua result in differing degrees of specificity for the illocutions. For example, "promising" has been marked off in English, although there is no reason that it had to be; but on the same continuum other points have also been marked off, such as "vowing" and "pledging." The principle of expressibility suggests that the language could be expanded so that any point on these continua could be marked off and expressed if there was a need or desire to do so.

As a consequence of these principles, Searle notes that there cannot be a general and mutually exclusive distinction between the locutionary meaning and the force of an utterance since it would, at least in theory, always be possible to state the force explicitly and thereby give it a particular locutionary meaning. Thus, it would always be possible to exhaust the illocutionary force by stating this force explicitly, and thereby making it a part of the rhetic or locutionary meaning.

Searle's description of speech acts. In order to salvage the notion of illocutionary force from this dilemma, Searle suggests that the rhetic act can be narrowed in scope so that it gives only the propositional content of the utterance. Thus, every speech act can be

considered to have an illocutionary force, F, and a propositional content, p. The whole utterance, then, can be described in terms of the force with which the propositional context is uttered, resulting in a representation of the utterance as F(p). Since the propositional content and the illocutionary force each represent only a part of each utterance, the two are mutually exclusive; and the confusion between locutionary and illocutionary acts is eliminated.

This analysis can be illustrated by considering the following examples:

(8) I will be there.

(9) I promise that I will be there.

(10) It is dangerous.

(11) I warn you that it is dangerous.

In these examples, (8) and (10) represent the implicit performative form of the utterances, while (9) and (11) represent the explicit form. In (8) and (10) the utterance, as stated, can be understood to represent the propositional content; and the illocutionary force is unstated. These two examples would, of course, provide no difficulty for Austin's analysis since the locutionary act would have a certain force derived from the context in which it was uttered, which would indicate what was done in making the utterance. Examples (9) and (11), however, cause difficulty for Austin's analysis; but Searle's analysis suggests that these utterances can be separated into their forces and their propositional contents, in the following manner:

<u>Force</u>	<u>Propositional Content</u>
I promise (that)	I will be there
I warn (you that)	it is dangerous

Thus, in explicit performatives the propositional content does not account for the whole utterance as Austin's rhetic act does, but only that part of the utterance that deals with the propositional content. Searle suggests that rather than calling this a rhetic act, a more accurate description can be obtained by terming it a propositional act; and since the locutionary act has been modified significantly, Searle suggests that it should be dropped entirely since it no longer reflects what Austin intended by the term, thus leaving the following constitutive acts of a speech act:

Phonetic act
Phatic act
Propositional act
Illocutionary act
Perlocutionary act

This analysis yields the further benefit that in this formulation constatives can be clearly seen to relate to the propositional act, which can be either true or false.

In his major work on speech acts, Searle (1969) suggests that this analysis can be further simplified by combining the phonetic and phatic acts into an utterance act. This act can be understood to be the uttering of words and sentences, and can be considered to be composed of other acts, such as phonetic, phonemic, etc., which can be defined in various ways depending upon the purposes for examining this aspect of a speech act. Of particular importance to the present study is the fact that Searle, unlike Austin, does not discuss an utterance act only in terms of oral language. Rather, in Searle's formulation, a speech act can be uttered in either oral or written language; and thus illocutionary acts can be performed in written as well as oral language. Although Searle does not specifically consider how

the nature of illocutionary acts are to be applied to extended written discourse, he has applied the notion of illocutionary acts to fictional discourse (Searle, 1975b), which seems to indicate that his analysis of speech acts should probably be understood as a general analysis of "language" acts rather than as a specific analysis of oral language acts.

The rule-governed nature of speech acts. In addition to suggesting basic revisions in regards to the component acts of a speech act, Searle claims that the structure that underlies a speech act should be understood in terms of sets of rules. While the contention that language is rule-governed is not a novel claim, Searle develops this notion by suggesting a distinction between constitutive and regulative rules.

According to Searle, constitutive rules are rules that indicate what an action is to "count as," in the sense that certain actions in a game count as scoring points, etc. Such rules are generally of the form "X counts as Y in context C" (p. 35), although this definition cannot be applied rigorously to distinguish constitutive from regulative rules. In explaining this notion, Searle suggests an analogy with games such as American football, where the constitutive rules define what actually constitutes a game of football. For example, it is a constitutive rule that each team shall have eleven players on the field at any one time; and it is also a constitutive rule that a touch-down is to count as six points. If such rules are allowed to be violated by the participants, then the game is no longer football but is, instead, a game of something else. Constitutive rules, then, define what is to constitute the game, or situation.

In contrast to constitutive rules, regulative rules can be considered to regulate the behavior of the participants, as in the game of football. For example, while it is perfectly permissible for a team to attempt a forward pass when it is fourth down, early in the game, and the ball is on the team's own one yard line, there are regulative rules that suggest that this behavior is not appropriate or advisable. These regulative rules govern behavior within a context created by the constitutive rules; but while constitutive rules cannot be willfully violated without changing the basic nature of the game, regulative rules can be disobeyed without affecting the basic constitutive structure.

The importance of this distinction between constitutive and regulative rules becomes apparent when Searle considers the structure of illocutionary acts. While Austin contends that illocutionary acts are conventional in nature, Searle suggests that what is meant by this conventionality is that there is a socially accepted set of constitutive rules that together define what is to count as the performance of a particular illocutionary act. In terms of such rules, Austin's felicity conditions (see Appendix F) can be understood as general constitutive rules that underlie the performance of any illocutionary act; but Searle suggests that particular illocutionary acts such as promising or betting can be understood in terms of a particular set of constitutive rules as well.

The value of this description of illocutionary acts is demonstrated by the fact that it allows for the description of indirect speech acts by means of a further set of rules that relate directly to the constitutive rules of illocutionary acts. Thus, in the

appropriate context the utterance "Can you reach the salt?" can be understood as an indirect speech act that is not primarily intended to question the audience's ability, but rather to function as a request that the salt be passed. Since requesting can be described by a set of constitutive rules, the indirect speech act can be explained by further rules which relate the utterance to the constitutive rules of the act that is indirectly performed. Thus, in the example above, the requesting nature of "Can you reach the salt?" can be accounted for by a rule that relates this utterance to the constitutive rules of requesting. This is discussed in more detail in Appendix H.

Speech Acts and Meaning_{nn}

In Austin's account, the meaning of a speech act is considered in terms of the sense and reference of the utterance at the rhetic level. As was indicated in the discussion of Cohen's objections to Austin's account (see Appendix G), this notion of meaning seems to suggest that the illocutionary force is not a part of the meaning of the utterance, except in cases of explicit performatives. In Searle's reformulation, however, the rhetic act is replaced by a propositional act; and this act is supplemented by the illocutionary force, which indicates what the utterance counts as in the context in which it is uttered. Since in Searle's analysis the whole utterance is not considered at any level beyond the utterance act, it would seem that either the sense-and-reference definition of meaning must apply to the utterance act, or some other type of meaning must be used in order to account for the meaning of a speech act. Since the utterance act consists only in "uttering words (morphemes, sentences)" (Searle, 1969, p. 24), it does not seem that the qualities of sense and reference are

appropriate in regards to this act, and thus that some other type of meaning is required.

This is, in fact, the position that Searle takes; for he suggests that what is meant by a speech act should be considered in terms of Grice's notion of meaning_{nn}. This is not, however, an original suggestion on Searle's part; for Strawson (1964) has also suggested that the meaning of a speech act can be described in terms of intentional Gricean meaning. Strawson justifies this by observing that Austin contends that in order for there to be a successful performance of an illocutionary act there must be uptake on the part of the audience. This uptake is, Strawson argues, similar to the response that an audience is intended to produce in Grice's account of meaning; for while the utterer of an illocutionary act must intend that his audience recognize that he intends to perform a certain type of act, the audience in Gricean meaning must have this same type of recognition.

Searle, however, raises two major objections to Grice's early account (Definition 1), the first of which concerns the sufficiency of Grice's account in regards to the meaning of linguistic utterances. As discussed above, this objection has been taken into account in Grice's later account and in Schiffer's account.

The second objection that Searle makes to the early Grice account of meaning is that this account does not describe the performance of an illocutionary act, but the performance of a perlocutionary act. This is due to the fact that in Grice's account what the utterer intends to produce is a response (belief) in his audience; and since this response is a consequence of the utterance, it is perlocutionary in nature rather than illocutionary. According to Searle, however, many

illocutionary acts do not have perlocutionary consequences that distinguish them from other illocutionary acts. For example, the illocutionary act of greeting by uttering "Hello" does not, Searle argues, have an intended perlocutionary consequence that can be explained in terms of a response that an utterer intends to produce in his audience. In such a case, the utterer intends that his audience recognize the intended illocutionary act that the utterer is performing, but does not intend to produce a belief. Similarly, Searle argues that in making a statement it is not always the utterer's intention to produce a belief in his audience; for an utterer may not care whether the audience believes the statement to be true or not.

It should be noted again that what Searle is objecting to is the early Grice account; and since Grice (1969) has modified his notion of response, and since this has been even further clarified by Schiffer, it does not seem that the problem is as real as it was in regards to the original Grice account. There is, however, a fundamental difficulty that Searle seems to ignore; and this is the proper relationship between meaning_{nn} and speech acts.

As was discussed above, Grice's analysis of meaning is concerned with communication between an utterer and an audience by means of non-natural signs; and language communication must be considered to be only one realization of this type of meaningful communication. In addition, as was pointed out in regards to Austin's original formulation of speech acts, illocutionary acts do not account for all of the functions or uses of language. Thus, the theory of speech acts neither accounts for, nor attempts to account for, all of linguistic communication; and consequently it cannot account for all that an utterer

may intend by a linguistic utterance. In order to illustrate this, it is helpful to consider one of the examples that Grice (1967) uses in discussing conversational implicatures:

- A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girl friend these days.
 B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
 (p. 70)

In this example it would seem that what B is doing is performing the illocutionary act of reporting, yet what B means_{nn} by this utterance is that Smith has or may have a girl friend in New York. B accomplishes this by insinuating that there is a reason for Smith's visits to New York, and that, from the context (by means of conversational implicatures as modes of correlation), this reason may be that Smith has a girl friend there. "Insinuating" is not, however, an illocutionary act, but is one of the functions or uses of language that Austin considered beyond the scope of illocutionary acts. What B means here, then, is different than the illocutionary act he performs; and thus the illocutionary act is only a part of what B means by his utterance. The only way to avoid this conclusion would seem to be to contend that B's utterance is in some way an indirect speech act; but if so, it would seem to be based upon different constitutive rules than those outlined by Searle in his own discussion of such indirect speech acts (see Appendix H).

It can also be noted that for the performance of at least some illocutionary acts, the utterer does intend to produce a certain perlocutionary response in his audience. This would seem to be the case, as Searle notes, in cases of "ordering," and would also seem to be the case in instances of "asking" or "entreating." While recognition of the illocutionary force would be a part of what the utterer would

normally mean in making utterances of these types, this illocutionary meaning would not necessarily exhaust what the utterer means_{nn} by an utterance.

The point to be noted here is not that the meaning of illocutionary acts cannot, or should not, be accounted for by means of meaning_{nn}, but rather that the limits of the theory of speech acts must be recognized so that an utterer's intended meaning is not confused with the illocutionary act he intends to perform. Understood in this way, the meaning that an utterer intends in performing an illocutionary act can be considered in terms of the meaning_{nn} of that act. Since both the later Grice and the Schiffer accounts were considered to be final versions of meaning_{nn}, it is in regards to these two theories that the performance of a speech act can be considered.

In the later Grice account, the audience is intended to recognize certain features of an utterance that are correlated in a certain way with the intended response. In the performance of an illocutionary act, it would seem that both the propositional (or locutionary) act and the illocutionary force must be recognized as features of the utterance and correlated to the response. Since, however, the illocutionary force is normally dependent upon the circumstances in which the utterance is made, it would seem that part of the means of correlation would be intended to be knowledge of these circumstances. In Searle's analysis, this knowledge of the circumstances would evoke certain sets of constitutive rules which would be intended by the utterer to be recognized by the audience as an additional basis of correlation. Since both the utterer and his audience know that the other knows these constitutive rules, or that procedures for performing

the act, exist, it would seem that the utterer and audience must mutually know not only that the procedures or constitutive rules exist, but also that the circumstances are appropriate for the act to be performed.

Similarly, in Schiffer's account, mutual knowledge is intended to serve as a basis for the utterer's meaning something; but the utterer and audience must mutually know not only the state of affairs, or circumstances, in which the utterance is made, but also the state of affairs that is realized by the utterance. Thus, the utterer and audience would also mutually know the nature of the utterance itself and the constitutive rules evoked by the interaction of the situational circumstances and the actual utterance. Mutual knowledge of the conventional constitutive rules, or the illocutionary type, would provide a basis for the utterance being related to the response (activated belief, or the doing of something); and thus these conventional rules could be intended to serve as a part of the basis for the audience's coming to a belief, or for doing something.

While detailed accounts by Facione (1975) and Schiffer (1972) have shown how meaning_{nn} and speech acts can be combined in the ways indicated above, it is sufficient for the present purposes to note that the two approaches can be related in these ways to provide useful descriptions of linguistic communication. Also, it should be noted that by adopting meaning_{nn} as an account of the meaning of a speech act, the difficulties that were inherent in Austin's formulation do not arise; for by considering the illocutionary force to be a part of the intended meaning of the utterance, it is no longer necessary that it be something that is in addition to the meaning of the utterance.

Summary and Conclusions

In both of the approaches to linguistic communication that were considered in this chapter, the situation in which the utterance was made was seen to be of fundamental importance. This was the case in the later Grice account in terms of the modes of correlation between the features of an utterance and the intended response, especially in regards to such modes as conversational implicatures. In terms of Schiffer's account, mutual knowledge of the state of affairs was understood to involve not just knowledge about the utterance, but knowledge about the situation in which the utterance was made as well. The importance of the situation was of importance in Austin's account in regards to both the felicity conditions for the successful performance of a performative utterance, and the conventional nature of the illocutionary force. In Searle's analysis, the importance of the situation was even more clearly seen in his analysis of the conventional constitutive rules that structure and define the illocutionary act.

While the nature of the situation, and participants' knowledge of this situation, was seen to be a central aspect in all of the theories discussed in this chapter, it was only vaguely indicated what was meant by a situation. Since knowledge of the situation is of such importance in linguistic communication, yet has been so vaguely defined, the following chapter will be concerned with elucidating this situational aspect and indicating how participants' knowledge of this situation contributes to linguistic communication. This elucidation is especially important here since it is not readily apparent what is to count as a situation in written language communication, or how knowledge of such a situation may be useful to a reader in recognizing or obtaining the meaning of a text.

CHAPTER 4

THE STRUCTURES OF COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS

While the previous chapter has provided a basis for considering the communicative aspects of reading, it has also indicated that the state of affairs that is brought about by the making of an utterance is of fundamental importance for the communication of meaning. To indicate the importance of the state of affairs is, however, easier than to give an account of it. This is due not only to the vagueness and generality of the concept that is being considered here as the "state of affairs," "circumstances," or "communication situation," but is also due to the fact that this is not a single type of situation, but a wide variety of what seem to be differently structured situations. For example, the structure of a psychiatric interview differs in basic and significant ways from the conversation that takes place during an office coffee break, and both seem very different from the situation in which a reader reads one of Shakespeare's plays. An attempt to describe these different types of situations under a single heading would, consequently, appear to lead inevitably to difficulties.

In addition to the difficulty that arises from the fact that there are many different types of communication situations, a further problem is rooted in the fact that such situations are complex and can be described in various ways, focusing upon different aspects and features. Even in a simple exchange of information, the fact that human participants are involved suggests differing degrees of complexity; for as Barnlund (1962) reports:

Someone once said that whenever there is communication there are at least six "people" involved: The person you think

yourself to be; the man your partner thinks you are; the person you believe your partner thinks you are; plus the three equivalent "persons" at the other end of the circuit. (p. 203)

Obviously, the state of affairs could be described in terms of all of these combinations of "persons"; and the resulting description would still be limited only to the participants in isolation, rather than in regards to each other. In short, the P-domain that has been defined in terms of what can be termed the communication situation is exceedingly complex, with innumerable features and a variety of potential perspectives. When this is coupled with the fact that situations vary widely, as already noted, and that they can be described with varying degrees of specificity, the problems involved in giving a thorough and complete account of the situational aspects of meaningful communication become enormous.

To note the difficulty of giving a thorough and complete account of the communication situation is not, however, to say that an account cannot be given. Rather, it suggests that any account will not succeed in being exhaustive, and that it should therefore be considered with these limitations in mind. In approaching this complex problem it thus becomes necessary to determine the type of description that is desired in order to avoid confusing the account with extraneous elements and perspectives, and to insure that an appropriate degree of specificity is obtained. Since the ultimate purpose of the present study is to apply this description to the reader, and to indicate how readers' knowledge of situational aspects is relevant in understanding the meaning of a text, it would seem that a description of communication situations in general would be of value here, especially since it is not yet even clear as to what is to count as a reading situation. As

a result, a detailed description of particular situations would probably not be useful; for it has not yet been determined how a general description should apply, and extraneous details could only serve to confuse the issue. A general description of the structures would, however, at least provide a basis upon which more specific questions could be asked. Similarly, what is desired here is not an account that relies heavily upon interactive situations since it has not been demonstrated that interaction is in any way an appropriate concept for understanding reading situations.

While these observations indicate what is not wanted here, it only vaguely suggests what should be sought. In order to clarify this issue and provide a basis for examining communication situations, it is helpful to note that in the Gricean analysis of meaningful communication, the situation is interpersonal in nature; and as Schiffer suggests, the situation includes the participants and the utterance. This can be considered in terms of an utterer (U) who utters something (x) and means something by it, and in terms of an audience (A) who recognizes that U uttered x and meant something by it. This is, basically, just a restatement of the complementary conditions that were given in Chapter 3. To note this, however, is to note a fundamental aspect of the communication situation: the transmission of a meaningful signal, which can be considered to be a basic view of the communication situation. This can be stated as "SA-1," or the first state of affairs, as follows:

SA-1: U utters x, meaning something.
 A understands what U meant by uttering x.

While this does not, of course, deal with the whole communication situation, it does isolate one important aspect of this situation so

that it can be examined independently of the other parts.

It is not, however, just in terms of the transmission of a meaningful signal that the situation can be described; for this transmission takes place within a particular context, or situation. By incorporating this situational aspect, the second perspective on the general notion of communication situations can be obtained, as follows:

SA-2: U utters x, meaning something, in situation s.
A understands what U meant by uttering x in s.

This is, in a sense, only a restatement of the problem since the situation that is posited in this description is the situation that is being inquired about in terms of communication situations. This is, however, only a means of stating the problem; for in SA-1 the concern is with the meaningful transmission aspect of the situation, while in SA-2 the fact that this transmission takes place in the context of a situation is being considered.

A third description of the situation is obtained by noting that SA-2 takes place at a particular moment in time, thus giving the following description:

SA-3: U utters x, meaning something, in situation s at time t.
A understands what U meant by uttering x in s at t.

Just as SA-2 incorporates SA-1, so SA-3 seems to include SA-2. This is, of course, the case; but while SA-2 is concerned with describing the utterance in regards to the immediate situation, SA-3 serves to contextualize SA-2 by adding a temporal dimension so that it now includes what has preceded it and, perhaps, what will succeed it.

As indicated above, this description of the communication situation is hierarchical; for SA-2 includes SA-1, and SA-3 includes both SA-1 and SA-2. The purpose in isolating these different aspects is to

make it possible to consider each in its own right, without the obscuring influence of the full description of SA-3. This is not, of course, to contend that these three descriptions exhaust the communication situation. The intention in making these distinctions is to provide bases for examining the general structures of the situation in a way that is consistent with the descriptions of meaningful communication given in Chapter 3; and it should also be noted that while each of these states of affairs will be interpreted in a particular way in this study, they could be described in very different ways. This is, however, only to reiterate that the communication situation is exceedingly complex and offers the possibility of multiple interpretations.

The main purpose of this chapter, however, is not only to give a description of the communication situation and how it operates in meaningful communication, but also to provide a view of the participants' knowledge of the situation, and how this knowledge allows them to understand the meanings of utterances. Since this is, however, also an aspect of the communication situation, participants' knowledge will be considered in the course of examining the three different states of affairs that have been identified here.

The Nature of Message Transmission (SA-1)

The first, and perhaps most fundamental, view of the communication situation has been described above as SA-1. As indicated, this view involves the transmission of a meaningful message from an utterer to an audience by means of a non-natural utterance; and if this transmission is not in some way realized, it would seem that meaningful

communication cannot take place.

In order to describe the communication situation by means of SA-1, it is helpful to examine the classic theory of information transmission presented by Shannon & Weaver (1949); for as Thayer (1970a, 1970b, 1972) has pointed out, much of the current work in communication is based, either explicitly or implicitly, upon the assumptions posited by this work. By examining the Shannon & Weaver view, then, it is possible to obtain at least a preliminary description of this situation, which can provide a basis for a fuller examination.

The Shannon & Weaver View of Communication

The Shannon & Weaver work consists of a technical description of electronic communication by Shannon, and of an application of this view to human communication by Weaver. As a basis for his mathematical description of communication, Shannon first describes the basic components of the communication system. This system, according to Shannon, can be described essentially in terms of a transmission source, a channel that allows the transmission of an emitted signal, and a receiver. In a television transmission, for example, there must be some transmission source which provides the "information" to be transmitted to the transmitter. This information is not, in itself, meaningful, but is rather the information about the picture and sound features that is to be transmitted, or broadcast. The transmitter encodes this information and transmits it as a signal by means of a particular channel. This channel is, Shannon notes, "merely the medium used to transmit the signal" (p. 5) and in the case of a television transmission would be the particular VHF or UHF frequency that is used for the transmission. The signal that is emitted and transmitted by

means of the channel is received by a receiver which decodes the signal and provides the transmitted information to the destination. A television signal is, then, received by the television set which decodes the signal, then passes this decoded information on to the system that uses it to construct the picture and reproduce the sound.

While this is, in itself, a simple description of communication, it is complicated somewhat by the fact that the transmitted signal that bears the information can be interrupted or distorted along its route. This interference is termed "noise" by Shannon, and can result in a distorted signal reaching the receiver. This noise can, Shannon suggests, be corrected by some type of monitoring system which makes appropriate corrections in order to compensate for the distorted message. This model is presented diagrammatically in Figure 5.

The applicability of this model to human language communication is readily apparent; for a speaker or writer (transmitter) encodes the linguistic information he wishes to communicate and transmits it by means of coded acoustic or visual signals that the hearer or reader (receiver) must distinguish from the other aspect of the environment (noise) and decode, compensating for any distortion which may have taken place during transmission (e.g., obscuring noise from a ventilation system, or printer's errors).

In Weaver's commentary upon Shannon's basic model, the application to human linguistic communication is made more exact; for Weaver notes that a particular communication system can be considered in terms of three different problems that arise in regards to communication: (1) the technical problem, (2) the semantic problem, and (3) the effectiveness problem. The technical problem refers to the




Figure 5 A Model of Information Transmission.

accuracy of the transmission of the symbols, or the distortion of the signal itself by means of noise. The semantic problem refers to the question of how the transmitted symbols convey the meaning, and the effectiveness problem refers to the question of how effectively the meaning affects conduct in the way the transmitter desires. These three aspects of communication that Weaver suggests are, in terms of language, similar to the analysis of speech acts that was considered earlier. What Weaver terms the technical problem seems to correspond to what Austin termed the phatic and phonetic acts, and what Searle termed the utterance act. While Weaver's semantic problem seems to deal with what Austin termed the rhetic act, and Searle the propositional act, it would seem that this could be expanded or supplemented to take into account the illocutionary force as well. The effectiveness problem is, clearly, quite similar to the perlocutionary act in both Austin's and Searle's analyses.

When Shannon's information transmission model of communication is considered in terms of these different aspects, it is apparent that his concern is entirely with the technical problem, and that his model does not touch upon the semantic problem at all, and deals with the effectiveness problem only in terms of its technical aspects. This difficulty with Shannon's model can be clarified by positing a distinction between signals and messages such that the signal is considered to be the actual utterance that is emitted by the utterer, and the message is understood as the meaning that the signal is intended to convey. In terms of this distinction, Shannon's model can be seen to be concerned with the transmission of signals, not with messages; and in terms of human communication this concern can be understood to represent a

state of affairs that is both more basic and narrower in scope than that given as SA-1, and which can be represented as a special case of SA-1, as follows:

SA-1': U utters x, transmitting a signal.
 A recognizes the information of the signal that U
 transmitted by uttering x.

As indicated above, this appears to correspond to Austin's phatic and phonetic acts, and to Searle's utterance act; but the difficulty that arises here is in attempting to account for semantic aspects of language communication (i.e., rhetic or propositional acts, and illocutionary forces) by means of a model that is concerned with signals rather than with messages. As Caton (1969) suggests, "The model may of course be perfectly appropriate for certain limited purposes, say, in Bell Telephone Laboratories, where it seems to have originated. The question concerns its adequacy as an explanation" (p. 34), especially in regards to meaningful human communication.

The Nature of Messages and Message Communication

If a message is considered to be the meaning that the utterer intends to communicate to his audience, it would seem that both Grice's and Schiffer's accounts of meaning deal with message communication since both are written in terms of what the utterer M-intends, and the response that he intends to produce/activate in his audience. In both of these accounts, however, what the utterer means has been given only in terms of the vague descriptions that "U meant something" or that "U meant that P"; and thus neither of these accounts is helpful in giving a description of the message itself. Similarly, while speech acts have already been shown to be helpful in regards to the distinction between signals and messages, it was shown in Chapter 3 that what

an utterer means by performing a speech act may not exhaust the utterer's intended meaning. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the speech act can be used to give an adequate description of messages.

Any attempt to give a complete account of a message would, of course, be subject to the same difficulties that were suggested in regards to describing communication situations; for to account for all aspects of messages would be to specify all the possible meanings that can be M-intended, and it is not clear how limits could ever be established such that it was definitely determined that all possible meanings were described. In attempting to describe messages, then, it would seem that the description must be assumed to be incomplete, and to represent only selected aspects, in terms of certain perspectives on the nature of messages.

One way to describe messages has been suggested by Parry (1967), who argues that messages generally entail some combination of both a content and an affective component. The content aspect of a message is, according to Parry, the cognitive aspect, which he seems to suggest is the rational and perhaps propositional content of the utterance. A factual answer to a question would, for example, rely predominantly upon the content component. The affective component of a message is, according to Parry, that part that conveys "the quality of moods, preferences, values, emotions, hedonic tones, strivings, pleasant and unpleasant conditions (physical and mental), volitions and attitudes" (p. 65). The affective component of a message can, Parry suggests, sometimes cause confusion by conflicting with or obscuring the content or cognitive message; but generally the content and affective components will be consistent with each other in constituting the full

message. As an example of how the affective message can operate,

Parry cites the following example:

Conder: Good morning, Mr. Whistler. I'm Conder.

Whistler: In that case, Mr. Conder, good morning. (p. 66)

While the content message of Whistler's reply is a greeting, the affective message that is conveyed by this utterance indicates that Whistler is not favorably or agreeably impressed by Conder's presence. Thus, while the content message is appropriate for the situation, the affective message results in an insult.

According to Parry, all messages are combinations of content and affective components, although messages vary in regards to which of these components is dominant. Scientific discourse, he contends, closely approximates a message that is purely content; but other messages are so strongly affective (e.g., the utterance "Ouch!") that the content or cognitive message is used only as a structure for the presentation of the affective message. Unfortunately, however, Parry does not consider this relationship between content and affect in a systematic way, and is content to give only a general indication of these two aspects of a message; and this makes it somewhat difficult to relate this distinction to the signal/message distinction. That there is, however, at least a potential affective component in messages seems evident from the example cited above, and from the argument that the selection of any signal to convey a message involves at least some decision that is based not just upon the cognitive or rational aspect but upon the subjective feelings and attitudes of the utterer as well.

Another distinction that has been suggested in regards to messages is one that Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson (1967) suggest between

the content and the relational aspects of the message. According to Watzlawick et al., "Every communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter classifies the former and is therefore a metacommunication" (p. 54). By the content of a message they mean the informational content of the utterance itself, or what is uttered. The relational aspect of a message deals with the relationship between the participants; and according to Watzlawick et al., this relational aspect serves to indicate how the informational content is to be understood within the particular context in which it is uttered, and consequently can be considered to be a kind of metacommunication, or a communication about the communication.

While Watzlawick et al.'s discussion is concerned primarily with the psychiatric interview, in which the relational aspect can be quite clearly seen when the patient is evasive or indicates his feelings toward the analyst, the importance of the relational aspect of an utterance can also be seen in more mundane situations, such as in the following example, which is used by Grice (1967) to illustrate conversational implicature:

A: I'm out of gas.

B: There's a gas station around the corner.

The informational content of A's utterance is the fact that his car has run out of gas. His utterance also, however, suggests that he wishes to know where some additional gasoline can be obtained in order to allow him to continue on his journey. B's reply gives him the information that there is a gas station around the corner and, by implicature, that gas is available there. According to Watzlawick et al., however, each utterance in this conversation also contains a relational message which is communicated. A's utterance attempts to

establish a conversational relationship with B which can be described as needs-help/helping. By responding as he does, B implicitly communicates that he accepts this relationship. If B were to shrug and walk away, however, his relational message would be that he did not wish to involve himself in the conversation, or adopt a helping role toward A. Similarly, if A were to follow B's directions and find that the gas station around the corner had gone out of business five years ago, he would be justified in returning and angrily confronting B with this fact since B had led him to believe, by means of both the information of his utterance and its relational message, that he had accepted the relationship that A had suggested in initiating the conversation. Since Grice's implicatures seem to operate upon the basis of this relationship between the participants, the relational content of the message conveyed by the utterance can be understood to be an important basis upon which the conversational maxims operate. Thus, only if the relational message indicates that the utterer accepts the relationship that allows the use of conversational implicatures can the audience rely upon such implicatures as modes of correlation to obtain the meaning of the utterance. In the case of B walking away instead of answering, it seems evident that B is not accepting the relationship offered by the relational content of A's message, and consequently his non-verbal reply obtains its meaning from the violation or spurning of these maxims.

In addition to this demonstration of the relational aspect of a message, Grice's example also seems to provide an illustration of Parry's affective component of the message. For while A relies predominantly upon the content and relational aspects of the message, B

demonstrates his sympathy for A by replying as he does.

While this does not, of course, exhaust the description of messages, it is sufficient for the present purposes since it gives an indication of the scope that must be considered when dealing with the communication of a message. While these three aspects of a message (i.e., content, affect, relation) can be considered to be major components of an intended message, since messages were defined above in terms of speech acts, the component acts of a speech act should be consistent with this partial analysis of a message. Since the rhetic and illocutionary acts deal with the nature of the utterance itself, and its force in the context of its utterance, it would seem appropriate that these two acts should be included as part of the content of the message.¹ The perlocutionary act, however, does not deal with the content, but with the intended effect; and as such it seems to be beyond the scope of the three aspects of messages that have been identified. In addition, it must be remembered that in terms of Gricean meaning, more can be meant by a message than is accounted for by the analysis of speech acts. Since the content, affective and relational components of a message are not claimed here to be a complete description of the components of a message, allowance must be made for other meanings that have not been identified. Such intended meanings would, of course, be a part of the intended message, and could include such acts as making an insinuation or making a joke.

¹While these distinctions are useful, it must be noted that these three aspects of a message are often closely related. For example, an insult conveys an affective and (perhaps) relational message which is due primarily to the content of the utterance, and thus to the rhetic/propositional and illocutionary acts.

With this brief examination of a message, then, it is possible to give a tentative description of signals and messages, as follows:

SIGNAL

UTTERANCE ACT

Phonetic act

Phatic act

MESSAGE

CONTENT

Rhetic (propositional) act

Illocutionary act

AFFECT

RELATION

Perlocutionary act

(other intended meanings)

While this is, of course, an incomplete description of the distinction that has been made between signals and messages, it is sufficient to consider the communication of messages in terms of SA-1.

Intersubjective Understanding and Mutual Knowledge

The communication situation as defined by SA-1 can be understood to include SA-1', and to be describable in terms of Gricean meaning. As indicated above, the M-intended meaning of an utterance can be considered to be the message that the utterer intends to communicate; and consequently some type of mutual knowledge of the state of affairs is necessary, as indicated in Chapter 3 in regards to both Grice's and Schiffer's accounts, in order for an utterer to communicate his message. This mutual knowledge of the state of affairs amounts, of course, to knowledge of what has been termed the communication situation, and includes knowledge not only of SA-1, but of SA-2 and SA-3 as well.

A difficulty arises here, however, in regards to the use of mutual knowledge in this context. In Chapter 3, mutual knowledge was described as an utterer knowing that an audience knows that . . ., etc., and the audience knowing that the utterer knows that the audience knows

that . . ., etc. What the participants mutually know, however, is something about the communication situation; and what is known about this situation is not readily apparent from the notion of mutual knowledge. In order to clarify SA-1, then, it is necessary to examine the bases upon which mutual knowledge can be posited; for the notion of mutual knowledge is not a sufficient description of participants' knowledge since it describes only the way in which this knowledge is mutually recognized and does not deal with the nature of this knowledge itself, in regards to the individual participants. In examining the nature of the knowledge that participants have, then, it should be possible to obtain a fuller view of the communication situation as defined by SA-1; for to describe this knowledge is, of course, to describe a part of this state of affairs.

One useful beginning point in examining this aspect of SA-1 is Parry's (1967) contention that communication can fail if the participants in a communication situation have significantly differing schemata. Parry's notion of schemata encompasses such things as "attitudes" and "sets" that individuals have in regards to understanding their environments: "In brief, people approach life with varying expectations and reaction patterns, which lead them to build contrasted pictures of the environment and to interpret phenomena accordingly" (p. 100). According to Parry, in order for participants to communicate it is necessary for their personal schemata to match sufficiently so that the uttered message can be understood. This suggests, of course, that in order for there to be communication the various personal schemata of the individual participants must in some way match, or be compatible. If this is not the case, then, the

communication will fail since the signal that the utterer transmits is intended to convey a message not solely by virtue of the information contained in the signal, but also by virtue of the significance of this signal when considered within the appropriate schematic context.

While participants in communication situations can be assumed to have particular sets or attitudes which make up their personal schemata, the sets/attitudes are not necessarily permanent features of the participants in the same way that their capacity for reception on certain channels is. Since attitudes and the ways in which individuals perceive and understand the world are subject to change with experience, mood, etc., the schema by means of which an individual understands the world must be considered to be flexible. As Swanson & Delia (1976) have pointed out, this flexibility is essential to understanding the nature of message communication itself. To deny this aspect, they claim, is to invite an object view of messages such that messages can be compared to billiard balls that have a clear impact in any situation. Swanson & Delia argue that this is not the case with messages, and that whatever impact they may have is not a feature of the message itself, but the particular interpretation that is given to the intended message by the way in which an audience contextualizes and understands the message through his personal schematic view.

Although Parry's notion of compatible schemata has been used here in order to identify an aspect of message communication that is missing in the information transmission model given above in Figure 5, this same basic concept has been noted and interpreted in various ways by other writers. Rommetveit (1974), for example, describes this aspect

as the establishment of a temporarily shared social world between the participants. This is established, he suggests, by an unspoken contract that creates a shared basis upon which and by means of which the participants can communicate. This amounts, he contends, to agreement about a meaningful context which can serve to determine the intended meanings of the utterances of the participants.

In order to consider these two aspects (i.e., compatible schemata and shared social world) together, it is useful to note that both can be subsumed under the more general and broader notion of intersubjectivity, and the intersubjective understanding that exists between an utterer and his audience. In introducing this concept, however, it is necessary to note that it has been used in various ways by different writers in order to account for various phenomena, and that the term will be used in this study in a particular way, with a particular application to language communication.

Intersubjectivity is based upon the contention that an individual's understanding of his environment is basically subjective since his interpretation of this environment, and the establishment of what is to count as reality, is the result of his past personal experiences. Since individuals cannot escape from, or transcend, their own experiential interpretations, their perspectives are limited to their own subjective points of view; and according to Schutz (1967), this can be described as the meaning-context by means of which individuals interpret their environments.


While there seems to be an obvious sense in which each individual's view of reality is based upon his past experiences, and is therefore unique, a difficulty arises in accounting for how two or more individuals can arrive at any type of common understanding. In

other words, the problem is to account for how subjective worlds are bridged intersubjectively. The fact that in the normal course of everyday life people do seem to communicate by means of such bridges suggests that such mutual or intersubjective understanding is a common part of social life. In fact, if intersubjective understandings were not established, joint or communal effort, and meaningful communication, would be all but impossible. The problem, then, is how individuals with subjective meaning-contexts that are peculiar to themselves (including their attitudes and their resulting sets) can relate to each other and establish shared social worlds that allow communication.


It has been suggested in a general way by Schutz, and in a more detailed way by Percy (1958, 1961), that the use of symbols in communication demands or presupposes some type of intersubjective understanding. Underlying this contention there is, for Percy, a distinction between signs and sign-use, and symbols and symbol-use. Signs, he contends, can be understood to function as stimuli for behavior. For Percy, a sign is used in much the same way that words are used when speaking to animals. If uttering the word "walk" evokes an energetic display in a dog, it can be said that the word is a sign that is understood by the dog to mean that it is to be taken for a walk. This use of words as signs is, however, different from the way in which people usually use words in communicating with each other. According to Percy, this other way in which words are used can be considered to be symbol-use, and differs from sign-use since "the symbol does something the sign fails to do: it sets the object at a distance and in a public zone, where it is beheld intersubjectively by the community of symbol-users" (1961, p. 46). A sign is not, per se, a part of a system since

it is used as a particular stimulus. A symbol, on the other hand, is not intended to have the same direct relationship with any behavior, but rather is a part of a system that aims at setting the system itself apart from its referents in order to place the system in a public zone. When placed in this public zone, it can be intersubjectively understood by the community in order to provide a basis for establishing a public domain of meaning that allows intersubjective understanding between the subjective meaning-contexts of the members of the community. This is not, however, to say that words are not also used as signs; for the shouted warning "Stop!" may well operate as a sign. But in addition to this sign aspect, the audience that has responded to the sign can also understand it as a symbol within the system of an intersubjectively understood public meaning-context. This distinction between signs and symbols should not, however, be confused with the distinction that Grice makes between natural and non-natural signs; for neither signs nor symbols, as discussed here, provide natural evidence for something in the way that spots can provide evidence for measles. Thus, both signs and symbols are what Grice would consider to be non-natural signs.

What Percy is suggesting is illustrated in Figure 6. In this figure, a triangle based upon the one suggested by Ogden & Richards (1938) is shown as Figure 6a and depicts the relationship between sign, sign-user and referent; but Percy uses this triangle in order to illustrate the nature of signs. The sign is related by the interpreter to the object, and the relationship between the sign and the object itself is what is imputed by the sign-user. In Figure 6b, the use of a symbol is depicted as a tetrad in which the relationship between



6a Semiotic Triangle



6b Symbol Tetrad

Figure 6 The Understanding of Signs and Symbols.
(modified from Percy, 1961, p. 45)

the symbol and the object to which it is related is determined by the intersubjective understanding of the community. While a sign can have only a unique private meaning, a symbol is public in nature; and its meaning is determined not by an individual's private meaning-context, but by community agreement as to what the symbol is to represent. According to Schutz, what Percy terms a symbol would be interpreted within the meaning-context of the symbol system of which it is a part; and thus its meaning would be understood in terms of the intersubjectively known system.

It is not, however, only the symbol, or symbol-system, that is intersubjectively known by the participants in a communication situation. According to Taylor (1971), intersubjective knowledge also includes the procedures by means of which things are done, and the way that social activities are conducted. While Taylor's concern is with political and social behavior rather than with communication, since communication is a part of this behavior his discussion can be considered to be relevant here. One of the examples that Taylor considers is the possibility of negotiation between villagers from a small village in Japan where Western style negotiation is unknown, and Western negotiators. While the villagers and negotiators may have intersubjective understanding of a symbol system that allows them to communicate, this is not, according to Taylor, adequate since what the Japanese villagers do not have is:

the set of ideas and norms constitutive of negotiation themselves. These must be the common property of the society before there can be any question of anyone entering into negotiation or not. Hence they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individuals, but rather intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act. (p. 27)

In order for there to be communication, then, more is required than an agreement about a symbol system. What is also required is agreement about other procedures, such as the methods and purposes of communication. Such intersubjective understanding seems to be similar to what was suggested above as the relational aspect of the message, and also seems to correspond to what Rommetveit discusses as a shared social world. It is also, of course, a part of what Fraser (1977) terms communicative competence.

While this description of intersubjective understanding has been brief, the main point here is that this notion can be used as a basis for describing what is mutually known by utterers and audiences about the state of affairs. As Schutz has pointed out, this understanding involves not just the meaning of the symbols within a symbol system, but also the "in-order-to" motive, or plan, of the utterer. This plan would seem to include the utterer's M-intentions, and also whatever illocutionary and perlocutionary acts the utterer may intend to perform by his utterance. Schutz suggests, however, that interpretations of plans are made by audiences on the bases of their own personal meaning-contexts and in terms of what they would mean by an utterance were they the utterers. Consequently, in order for an audience to interpret the utterer's intentions, or plan, correctly, there must be some intersubjective meaning-context which allows the audience to interpret the motives of the utterer accurately. Similarly, the utterer must intend that the audience have this intersubjective understanding, and thus must intend that this intersubjective understanding serve as a basis for the audience's recognition of the M-intended message.

Thus, intersubjectivity functions in much the same way as mutual knowledge was shown to operate in terms of both Schiffer's and Grice's accounts. Mutual knowledge, however, is a description of participants' knowing that other participants know that they know, etc., and is not a specification of the substance of this knowledge. Since the notion of intersubjective understanding seems to offer the possibility of such specification, it would appear that mutual knowledge of the state of affairs would be either a part of the intersubjective knowledge that the participants in communication situations have, or a description of how such understandings are established.

The Rhetorical Situation (SA-2)

The second description of communication situations that was given in the introduction to this chapter, SA-2, involves the transmission of a message within the context of an immediate situation. This situation is non-developmental since the evolution of the situation over time is not considered to be a factor. In examining the nature of the situation as posited in SA-2, it is important to remember that the communication situation has been posited as being descriptively inexhaustible. If the present study were concerned with a particular situation such as the classroom behavior of grade seven Indian students, then it would be possible to pay close attention to the details of the situation, and to describe such a situation in terms of a specific environment. Since the purposes of the present study are more general, however, and ultimately aimed at the general elucidation of the reading situation, what is needed is not a specification of particular entities or elements within an environmental situation, but indications of the

structure.

While the structure of a situation can be described in various ways, for the present purposes it is useful to consider the situation in SA-2 as being rhetorical in nature. There are two major reasons why a rhetorical perspective is appropriate for the present study. First, rhetoric is often concerned with discourse in both oral and written forms. Since the ultimate purpose of the present study is to examine written discourse in regards to the reader, this offers an opportunity to relate the nature of communication situations directly to written communication. The second reason for considering a rhetorical perspective here is that rhetoric is often (and perhaps usually) concerned with extended discourse, as opposed to interactive discourse; and this type of situation will ultimately be of primary concern in this study.

Bitzer's Rhetorical Situation

In a seminal article, Bitzer (1968) notes that "No major theorist has treated rhetorical situation thoroughly as a distinct subject in rhetorical theory; many ignore it. Those rhetoricians who discuss situation do so indirectly" (p. 2). Bitzer, however, suggests that the situation in which rhetorical discourse takes place is of crucial importance in understanding the discourse itself; for, as he pointed out, Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" would have had a different meaning if it had been uttered upon a different occasion than it was; and if it were uttered inappropriately, it would have been judged to be inferior discourse. This point is, of course, similar to the one that was made in Chapter 3 in regards to Gricean meaning, where the meaning of an utterance was understood to be determined by the

situation in which it was uttered. Bitzer's concern, however, is not to give an account of meaning, but rather to give a description of the situation and its relationship to rhetorical discourse; for Bitzer argues that "Virtually no utterance is fully intelligible unless meaning-context and utterance are understood; this is true of rhetorical and non-rhetorical discourse" (p. 3). Thus, Bitzer's basic position seems to be in accord with the position that was established in Chapter 3; but his major concern is with the particular situation, or meaning-context, of rhetorical discourse.

Since Bitzer's focus is upon rhetoric, it is useful to note that he considers rhetorical discourse to be discourse that is directed toward producing change or action "not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action" (p. 4). This is, of course, a very general definition of rhetoric, and is subject to various interpretations in regards to what is to count as "change" and "reality." This will, however, be considered more carefully after Bitzer's view of rhetorical situations has been discussed.

From this basic definition of rhetoric, Bitzer proceeds to define the rhetorical situation (henceforth, R-situation) as follows:

Rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence. (p. 6)

Of central importance in this definition is, of course, the notion of exigence, which he describes as "an imperfection marked by urgency" (p. 6). Such exigences can, according to Bitzer, be considered rhetorical only when they are capable of being improved by relevant

discourse. Thus, issues such as pollution and birth control can be considered as potential bases for rhetorical exigences; but natural disasters such as hurricanes and tornadoes cannot, although the need for appropriate emergency planning in the event of such disasters could produce rhetorical exigences.

Since the R-situation is defined in terms of its intended effect upon an audience, an audience is a necessary part of the R-situation. A rhetorical audience differs, however, from other audiences; for "a rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and being mediators of change" (p. 8). The rhetorical audience is one of the constraints of the R-situation, for any R-situation is constrained by those factors which limit the possibilities of action in regards to the exigence that controls the situation. An R-situation, then, is based upon an exigence; but the possible responses to this exigence are limited by such factors as "beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives and the like" (p. 8). As Jamieson (1973) has suggested, another constraint may well be the genre of rhetorical discourse that the audience expects on the particular occasion.

In Bitzer's description, the R-situation is isolable from the utterance itself, although it is intimately related to it. This relationship comes from Bitzer's claim that "Rhetorical discourse is called into existence by situation; the situation which the rhetor perceives amounts to an invitation to create and present discourse" (p. 9). This often results in more than an invitation, however; for what the situation demands is a fitting response to the exigence and the constraints of the situation, and what is to count as fitting is

determined by the nature of the situation itself. Thus, what is basic is not the rhetorical discourse, but the R-situation; and it is this situation which not only invites or announces the need for appropriate discourse, but actually determines to a certain extent the type of rhetorical response that is appropriate.

That Bitzer's view of R-situations is compatible with what was described in terms of message communication, or SA-1, seems readily apparent. In Bitzer's view, what would be intersubjectively understood by the utterer/rhetor and the audience would be the nature of the exigence and the basic constraints of the situation. Such constraints could include factors which would make some aspects of the message inappropriate in the circumstances. Consequently, it becomes necessary for the utterer and his audience to understand intersubjectively the constraints and exigences of the R-situation since this understanding is necessary in order for the audience to recognize what the utterer intends to accomplish by his utterance (i.e., his "in-order-to" motive).

While Bitzer's analysis of the R-situation seems to be consistent with the view of message communication given in SA-1 in regards to intersubjective understanding, it is not entirely clear what is to count as rhetorical discourse. In his discussion of R-situations, he includes as rhetorical both cases of interactive communication, such as the exchanges that take place between Trobriand Islanders while fishing with nets, and extended discourse such as Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address." He also suggests that plays and novels can sometimes be understood as instances of extended rhetorical discourse, but that scientific and poetic discourse is often non-rhetorical

since "the scientist can produce a discourse expressive or generative of knowledge without engaging another mind, and the poet's creative purpose is accomplished when the work is composed" (p. 8).

This problem of what is to count as rhetorical discourse, and what as non-rhetorical, has been further considered by Larson (1970), who suggests that Bitzer's analysis shows "the ubiquitousness of rhetorical discourse in the lives of readers and listeners" (p. 168).

Larson, however, disagrees with Bitzer in his exclusion of scientific discourse from being rhetorical; for as he points out:

Most scientific discourse aims at removing exigences that are constituted by gaps in our knowledge of the world; such articles seek their effects through revision in the thinking of other scientists (clearly a form of action, if to think is to act) and, perhaps, through the encouragement of readers to better focused research that will further reduce the number of gaps in knowledge. (p. 167)

In this sense, poetic as well as scientific discourse could, at least in some instances, be considered rhetorical; for poems such as Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey" can certainly be understood to address an exigence that lies in the meaning of life and urban versus rural living. In fact, as Larson points out, by following Bitzer's definition of rhetoric it is possible to include most types of discourse as being rhetorical, ranging from the leaving of a note for the milkman to the writing of a novel. What cannot be rhetorical, Larson suggests, is discourse "in which the speaker is simply putting some features of himself on display" (p. 166); and this must be divided into at least two subclasses of non-rhetorical discourse: discourse presented as an object of aesthetic contemplation, and discourse intended only to display some feeling. In addition, it would seem that Bitzer's own suggestion about scientific discourse could indicate a third type of

non-rhetorical discourse; for besides exhibiting feelings, it is possible to exhibit information or facts without rhetorical intent, especially in written discourse.

The difficulty with Larson's distinction is that it is still not always apparent whether the discourse should be considered to be rhetorical or non-rhetorical. This can be recognized in the case of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey"; for while it can be read as rhetorical in nature, it can also be considered as an object for aesthetic contemplation, or as a display of Wordsworth's personal feelings and experiences. In the latter case, "Tintern Abbey" would be non-rhetorical, or expressive, in nature; and since it is possible to interpret the poem in either way, it appears that the poem could be, at once, both rhetorical and expressive.

This difficulty can result, however, from Bitzer's basic view of the R-situation; for rhetoric is concerned with the utterer/rhetor's response to a situational exigence. In considering rhetoric, then, the utterer's intentions and purposes (or his "in-order-to" plans) are assumed; and the concern is with the adequacy of the discourse in regards to the situation. While this may be sufficient for the study of rhetoric, for the present purposes it is inadequate since the present study is ultimately concerned with the understanding of the audience. It is, then, necessary to bridge this gap between an utterer-centered rhetoric and the audience's understanding.

One means of accomplishing this has been suggested by A. Miller (1972), who has elaborated Bitzer's notion of exigence. Rather than assuming, as Bitzer does, that the exigence consists of "objective and publicly observable historic facts" (p. 11), Miller suggests that

exigences are only given in a general way and that it is incumbent upon the rhetor to develop and interpret this exigence. Since rhetors' perceptions are based upon their own subjective experiences, their interpretations of exigences will be based upon these perceptions; and since audience's perceptions are also subjective, it will not necessarily be the case that there will be intersubjective agreement about the nature of the exigence. As Miller states:

When a speaker's constraints combine with his perception of an action, phenomenon, or fact, the result is the speaker's perceived exigence. This perception becomes the basis of the speaker's intentions towards his hearers as revealed in his speech to them. On the other hand, when a hearer's constraints combine with his perceptions of actions, phenomena, or facts, the result is the hearer's perceived exigence: the basis of his expectations as he listens to the speaker. (p. 117)

Since both speakers/writers and hearers/readers are constrained by their own personal subjective meaning-contexts, their perceptions of exigences may differ. This can result, of course, in a communication failure due to what Parry describes as incompatible schemata; but what is important to note here is that failure to establish intersubjective understanding of the significance of the exigence may not result in a total failure to communicate, but in what can be called miscommunication. This would seem to be a particular danger in non-interactive communication situations, such as when the writer and reader may be separated not only in space and time, but by social class, culture, and historical epoch as well. Miscommunication can result, however, from causes other than these; for in the case of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, it was Sinclair's avowed intention to address an exigence of social inequality, and to advocate socialistic reform. The majority of his readers, however, failed to perceive this exigence, and consequently failed to understand his full message.

Instead, they perceived the book as addressing an exigence that existed in regards to the meat-packing industry. This failure to understand the exigence that was being addressed did not result in a total misunderstanding, however; for Sinclair certainly did intend to indict the meat-packing industry. Rather, what resulted was a case of miscommunication; for even though Sinclair's audience did not recognize his intentions, they did understand a part of his message.

This use of the term "miscommunication" suggests a range of possible understandings from accurate communication to non-communication with varying degrees of miscommunication in between. This provides, however, a description of the problem of communication rather than a solution; for it is sometimes difficult to determine what is to count as accurate communication even if the utterer's intentions are known. For example, one interpretation of Shakespeare's Hamlet is that the play was intended by Shakespeare as an argument to convince the Duke of Essex to revolt against Queen Elizabeth I. While this interpretation is conjectural, if a "lost" letter of Shakespeare's were found that stated that this was, in fact, his intention in writing the play, the question could arise as to whether anyone who had previously read the play without understanding this intent could really be said to have understood it. In a less extreme case, but one still quite relevant, the question could be asked as to what would constitute someone's accurately understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus or Joyce's Finnegans Wake. In fact, there seems to be no reason why the same question could not be meaningfully asked about any other piece of discourse, with the same difficulty arising.

The problem that has been raised here lies, of course, at the

basis of the whole question as to what is to count as communication; for the question can be restated in terms of what is to count as the understanding of an utterer's message, or his M-intended meaning. In regards to this basic problem, Schutz has pointed out that since individuals have subjective meaning-contexts based upon their unique past experiences, intersubjectivity will always be less than perfect since it will never be possible to understand with complete accuracy the subjective meaning-context of another individual. This amounts, of course, to saying that it is never really possible to understand completely the intentions of another individual; and this again raises the question of how accurate the understanding must be in order to receive an adequate approximation of the intended message. This is not, of course, to bring into question the Gricean view of meaning that was presented in Chapter 3; but it is to question whether, and to what extent, this view is ever realized in terms of actual communication situations.

While this question is fundamental to a full understanding of communication, it is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to answer this perhaps unanswerable question. Instead, the present study will attempt to circumvent this problem; but before this is done it is necessary to elaborate further the basic description of R-situations that has been given thus far.

Before considering criticisms of Bitzer's view of the R-situation, it is helpful to illustrate how his view elucidates rhetorical communication. Such an illustration will serve not only to illustrate Bitzer's position, but will also provide a means by which to consider the implications of alternate views of the R-situation that will be

examined. A highly appropriate R-situation that can serve as a paradigmatic example is found in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (Act III, scene ii) when Brutus and Antony speak to the people of Rome after the assassination of Caesar. After Brutus has pleaded the case of the conspirators, and convinced the Romans of the justness of the execution, Antony is allowed to speak "to bury Caesar, not to praise him." While burying Caesar, however, Antony manages to persuade his audience to seek revenge against the conspirators.

According to Bitzer's description, this R-situation can be explained by noting the exigence and the constraints of the situation. The rhetors and audience are apparent, and the exigence is clearly the meaning that is to be assigned to Caesar's death. That this is a real exigence is demonstrated by the fact that the people of Rome must decide whether to sanction the execution, or condemn the assassins. The exigence of the R-situation, then, calls for discourse aimed at directing the future course of the Republic; and it is constrained by the Roman citizens themselves. If Brutus were to address the people and speak of something entirely unrelated to Caesar's death, it is obvious that his speech would be highly unsatisfactory. He must, then, speak to the exigence within the constraints of the beliefs of his audience; and he does this quite successfully. Antony's masterful speech addresses the same basic exigence that Brutus's does, but the constraints of the situation are different, for the people have been swayed by Brutus and now believe that the assassination was justified. Antony must, then, recognize this additional constraint while persuading the people to a different course of action. It is obvious that if Antony were to begin his speech with a clear condemnation of the conspirators he would be violating the constraints of the situation,

and would find himself with an even more hostile audience. In the cases of both Brutus and Antony, then, the situation can be understood to call for particular types of responses. Each speaker is, of course, directed by his own beliefs and his own view as to how the exigence brought about by Caesar's death should be resolved; but both must speak within the constraints, and meet the exigences, of the R-situation.

Vatz's View of R-situations

While Bitzer's analysis of R-situations seems to explain the structure of the R-situation in Julius Caesar, Vatz (1973) has charged that Bitzer's view is based upon erroneous assumptions about the nature of such situations. According to Vatz, Bitzer's view is based upon the contention that events are, in themselves, meaning. Vatz, however, contends that:

Fortunately or unfortunately meaning is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or "situations" nor are facts "publicly observable." Except for those situations which directly confront our own empirical reality, we learn of facts and events through someone's communicating them to us. (p. 156)

In Vatz's view, then, exigences and situations do not exist in any meaningful way apart from the interpretations of individuals' subjective meaning-contexts. This is, of course, the same point that was introduced earlier in regards to Parry's matching schemata; but according to Vatz, this implies that R-situations cannot call for a particular type of response from a rhetor since it is by means of interpretive discourse that such situations and their exigences are brought into existence.

Basically, Vatz's point is that meaning-contexts are interpretations of individual experiences, and that information that is beyond the scope of an individual's own meaning-context can be introduced

only through some linguistic medium. Such a report is, however, itself an interpretation; and this report must be understood to create the situation and the exigence by means of the selection and interpretation that is involved in constructing such a report. As an example, Vatz cites the case of the Vietnam war, which at one time constituted an exigence. But, Vatz argues, the "situation" in Vietnam was subject to limitless interpretation such that "No one understands or understood the 'situation' in Vietnam, because there never was a discrete situation. The meaning of the war (war?, civil war?) came from the rhetoric surrounding it" (p. 159).

According to Vatz, rhetorical discourse does not respond to a clearly defined situation, as Bitzer suggests, or to exigences in such situations, but actually creates an R-situation and exigence by interpreting complex experiential situations and distilling from them R-situations and exigences. What Vatz seems to be denying is that there is any intersubjective understanding between the participants in regards to the situation in which they are involved. Unfortunately, Vatz does not consider the nature of situational constraints, or how these may operate; but it seems evident that there is nothing in his argument that would prevent the rhetor from recognizing such potential constraints as a part of his own subjective meaning-context, and his own subjective interpretation of the situation.

One difficulty that arises in regards to Vatz's position is that there do seem to be situations that demand a particular type of rhetoric. Since Vatz wants to contend that situations are not intersubjectively defined but result solely from rhetoric based upon subjective meaning-contexts, he is forced to resort to a type of covert

intersubjectivity. Thus, he contends that:

The creation of salience for certain types of events . . . may be so ritualized that it is uninteresting to analyze it rhetorically. This does not mean, however, that the situation "controlled" the response. It means that the communication of the event was of such consensual symbolism that expectations were easily predictable and stable. (p. 160)

Such "consensual symbolism" and predictability, however, suggest some type of intersubjective understanding to account for the consensus; for it is only upon some such basis that ritualistic events can be posited.

In regards to the example from Julius Caesar given above, Vatz would contend that it was not the case, as Bitzer suggests, that the situation called for particular types of responses from Brutus and Antony. Rather, according to Vatz, Brutus and Antony each respond to a complex situation and interpret it by means of their rhetoric in order to identify exigences and to create an R-situation. While each rhetor may identify certain constraints, these are a part of his interpretation rather than a part of the situation itself. Thus, the situation that Brutus creates is superseded by the situation that Antony creates; and Antony is simply more successful in persuading the audience to adopt his interpretation of the events.

The strength of Vatz's position lies in the fact that in many cases the discourse does seem to create an exigence and to provide an interpretation of a complex situation that is not readily apparent to the audience before the utterance of the discourse itself. This does not, however, seem to be the case with the example from Julius Caesar; for in that case the exigence is clear: the rhetors must speak to the situation created by the assassination of Caesar; and the audience is not prepared to accept a different interpretation of the situation, or

different exigences. As Bitzer notes, however, exigences are not always clearly defined; and in complex situations there may even be competing exigences. In such cases, it would seem that Vatz's interpretation would be more acceptable since it would be necessary for the rhetor to establish the essential nature of the exigence in order to address it.

The difference between Bitzer's and Vatz's positions is not, however, as great as Vatz seems to suggest; for Vatz seems to confuse the exigence of a situation with the rhetor's advocacy of a particular course of action. While these two aspects must be related, there is a difference between contending that a rhetor addresses a particular exigence, and contending that he advocates a particular interpretation of that exigence and a particular course of action. Thus, Brutus and Antony could be understood to address the same exigence, although with different interpretations of it. The point to be obtained from Vatz's position, however, is that exigences are not always intersubjectively understood, or mutually known, by audiences and rhetors, and that in some cases rhetorical discourse can function to create an exigence by interpreting a complex situation which may or may not be recognized by the audience before the rhetor's discourse.

Consigny's View of R-situations

A position between the extremes suggested by Bitzer's and Vatz's positions has been advocated by Consigny (1974), who suggests that it is impossible to contend either that the R-situation demands a particular response or that the rhetor is free to create an interpretation.

As Consigny states:

The rhetorical situation is an indeterminate context marked by troublesome disorder which the rhetor must structure so as to

disclose and formulate problems . . . But the rhetorical situation is not one created solely through the imagination and discourse of the rhetor. It involves particularities of persons, actions, and agencies in a certain place and time; and the rhetor cannot ignore these constraints if he is to function effectively. (p. 178)

In this view, the R-situation is characterized by certain constraints, and by indeterminacies that must be clarified into exigences and resolved by means of the advocacy of a course of physical or mental action. There is, then, in Consigny's view, an R-situation which in some way constrains the rhetor; but the exigence is only potentially a part of the situation and must be interpreted and formulated in some meaningful way before it can be addressed.

Consigny's view is obtained by a weakening and synthesis of both Bitzer's and Vatz's positions. While the R-situation does not demand a particular response, as Bitzer suggests, it does have inherent indeterminacies that invite resolution. While these must be articulated and defined by the rhetor, as Vatz suggests, the rhetor is limited both by the indeterminacies inherent in the R-situation and by the constraints that are imposed by the situation.

In terms of the example from Julius Caesar, Consigny would contend that the R-situation contains certain indeterminacies brought about by the death of Caesar. These do not, however, amount to a clearly defined exigence. In addition there are certain constraints inherent in the situation, such as the expectations of the audience in regards to the general topic of the discourse. Thus, both Brutus and Antony are faced with the problem of interpreting the indeterminacies in the situation and identifying exigences that they can address; and one part of their discourse must be their interpretations of what constitutes the exigence of the R-situation, and another part must be

their response to this exigence. Neither is free to interpret the situation in any way they please since both are limited by the R-situation, yet neither is presented with a clear exigence that demands to be addressed. Consequently, the difference between Brutus's and Antony's responses to the situation lies not only in the action they are advocating, but also in the interpretation that they give to the indeterminacies in order to create an exigence. According to Consigny, then, both Bitzer's and Vatz's analyses of the R-situation would overstate the case since the situation does not have clear exigences except insofar as these are interpreted by Brutus and Antony; yet Brutus and Antony do not create these exigences freely since there are indeterminacies in the situation which are, presumably, recognized by both the rhetors and their audience, and which must be addressed.

A Synthesis of Views of the R-situation

While Bitzer's, Vatz's, and Consigny's positions in regards to R-situations each seems to explain at least some types of R-situations, as suggested above, these positions seem to contradict each other, and to leave a confused view of the nature of R-situations. This difficulty can, however, be resolved if it is remembered that situations in general, and thus R-situations in particular, represent a range of possible occasions that differ in complexity and structure. Thus, a single explanation of R-situations may be too restricted to account for the whole range of possible situations, but may, instead, account adequately for a particular type of R-situation. What is being suggested here, then, is that the range of R-situations is too great for any one of the descriptions discussed above to be adequate, but that each of these positions may be correct for particular types of situations

within this range. It is, however, important to note that while these positions differ in regards to the nature of exigences and how they are defined, there seems to be a general agreement about the basic constituents of the R-situation; for all of these positions focus upon the participants, the exigence, and the constraints of the situation.

While each of the positions considered in regards to the R-situation claims to account for all R-situations, then, there is no reason to assume that this is the case. In fact, it would seem that there are some situations in which exigences are clearly defined and others in which the rhetor is free, in varying degrees, to interpret indeterminacies and exigences as he pleases. Viewed in terms of a range of R-situations, Bitzer's, Vatz's, and Consigny's positions can be considered to represent different positions within that range. This is illustrated in Figure 7, by considering the exigence of the R-situation to range from the case in which the exigence is mutually recognized and accepted by the audience and the rhetor, to the case in which the exigence is created by the interpretation of the rhetor. The amount of interpretation needed on the part of the rhetor will, of course, vary depending upon how clearly the accepted exigence is defined without this interpretation; but the net result of interpretation and accepted situational exigence will be the rhetorical exigence that the rhetor addresses. Since this is the main issue about which Bitzer, Vatz and Consigny disagree, it would seem that by admitting a range of rhetorical situations it is possible to bring these positions into basic agreement with each other.

In applying this perspective to the paradigmatic illustration from Julius Caesar, however, the difficulty of this synthesized position




Figure 7 The Definition of Situational Exigences.

becomes evident; for in order to determine how particular R-situations are to be described, it is necessary to determine to what extent the exigence is a part of the mutually recognized R-situation, and to what extent it is defined by the rhetor. In the example from Julius Caesar, the situation is simplified since the occasion of Caesar's death is an obvious feature of the situation; and the manner of his death obviously calls for some type of comment from the people responsible for his death. Thus, it would seem that for Brutus the exigence is to a large extent a feature of the situation that is mutually recognized and accepted by Brutus and his audience. In this case, a certain type of response is clearly called for from Brutus, and similarly from Antony; consequently the situational exigence must be understood to lie somewhere between Bitzer's position and Consigny's. It is, however, difficult to indicate more precisely how the exigence is defined; for in order to determine this it would be necessary to know how closely Brutus's and Antony's views of the exigence correspond to the audience's views, and consequently how much interpretation has been given to the exigence by Brutus and Antony.

This difficulty is, of course, similar to the one noted above in regards to miscommunication; for in both cases the issue involves determining the utterer's exact intentions and the extent to which the audience succeeds in recognizing these intentions. While this problem underlies the view of communication that has been developed here, it is not necessary to resolve it in this study. Rather, the problem can be understood to have arisen in the present discussion as a result of the fact that an omniscient perspective has been used in order to describe the R-situation. This omniscience has been

assumed in order to obtain a view of the communication situation as represented by SA-2; but the ultimate purpose of this description is not to give an omniscient view of R-situations, but to consider what a reader must understand in order to obtain the intended meaning of a text. Since the main purpose of the present study is to obtain a description that centers upon the reader and the reader's perspective, it is not necessary to give a complete omniscient account. Whether the reader's perspective is correct or not in regards to the writer's intentions is not a major concern here; and consequently, the problem of miscommunication is beyond the scope of the present investigation.

In terms of the reader's perspective, then, it would seem that the reader must first determine whether or not the utterance/discourse is to be understood as rhetorical or expressive in nature. From the reader's point of view this can, of course, be determined without reference to the utterer's intentions. For example, while Upton Sinclair's The Jungle is obviously rhetorical in intent, it can also be viewed as an aesthetic object presented for contemplation, and thus as expressive in nature. This is not, however, only a possibility when written discourse is being considered; for it is entirely possible for an oral language audience to take a similar attitude toward a discourse, and thus to consider it in a non-rhetorical manner. Similarly, it is possible for a reader to ascribe a rhetorical intention to discourse that is not clearly rhetorical. For example, it is questionable as to whether or not Gerard Manley Hopkins had any rhetorical intentions in writing his poetry since his poems were not published until after his death. A reader, however, is not necessarily constrained by whatever Hopkins' intentions may have been, and is free

to interpret the poems as being rhetorical in nature if he chooses.

If a reader perceives a piece of discourse as rhetorical in nature, it would seem that he would have to recognize some exigence that the discourse addresses. This exigence may not, however, be perceived by the reader in the same way that it is perceived by the writer; for the situational exigence may be different for the reader than it is for the writer. For example, while Wittgenstein in his Tractatus seems to have intended to address an accepted exigence, a reader who is not knowledgeable about philosophy will most likely not be aware of this exigence. For such a reader the discourse will be understood as creating an exigence in the way that Vatz describes, and it may be immaterial to such a reader whether Wittgenstein was intending to address an accepted exigence or to create one.

As has been suggested above, even in regards to Vatz's view the rhetor must generally recognize some constraints in constructing his discourse. Such constraints would seem, however, not to constitute a part of the rhetor's M-intended message, but rather would function to constrain the types of discourse that he could utter, and the particular message that he intends to communicate. As such, these constraints would be a part of the structure of the state of affairs, or communication situation; and if they were mutually known and intersubjectively understood they could serve as a basis for the audience's understanding of the intended message.

While this gives a general view of how understanding the nature of the R-situation can contribute to a reader's understanding of what he takes to be the writer's intended message, this view must ultimately be considered within the context of SA-3, which has not yet been

discussed. Before proceeding to an examination of SA-3, however, it is necessary to indicate how R-situations are related to the approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts. While it seems readily apparent that recognition of the exigence that an utterer is addressing can serve as a basis for correlating features of an utterance to an intended response, or will function as a part of the state of affairs that is mutually known and which serves as a basis for understanding the utterer's intentions, it is not entirely clear how extended discourse is to be understood in regards to such intentional views of meaning. In regards to this issue, it can be noted that extended discourse can be viewed either as a single utterance, or as a set or collection of separate utterances. Thus, Antony's speech can be considered as a single utterance, or it can be viewed as a collection of utterances that together constitute the speech. This distinction can also, of course, be given in terms of speech acts; for Antony's oration can be considered as a whole to be an illocutionary act of "urging," "arguing," or some similar designation, or it can be considered as a set of separate speech acts with, perhaps, varying illocutionary forces. This suggests, of course, a synergistic principle such that the intention of the whole utterance is, in some way, greater or at least different than the sum of what is intended by each composite act. This seems to fit the case of Antony's oration, for his overall perlocutionary intention to convince his audience to condemn Caesar's assassins would seem to be describable as something different than the collection of acts by means of which he attempts to accomplish this overall purpose. This type of interpretation, or application, to the whole of a piece of discourse can be considered to be a broad

interpretation/application, while an interpretation of the isolable acts that comprise this extended discourse can be considered to be a narrow interpretation/application. A problem arises here, of course, in regards to how the elements of a narrow interpretation are to be distinguished; but an analysis of this type of segmentation is beyond the scope of the present study since the purpose here is to give only a general indication of the structures of communication. For the present purposes, then, it is sufficient to note that both Gricean meaning and speech acts can be considered to have broad and narrow applications in regards to extended discourse, although it is not entirely clear how these different applications relate to each other.

The Developmental Situation (SA-3)

The third state of affairs, SA-3, that is of concern in this study involves the communication situation as it develops over time. Thus, while SA-2 was described in terms of expressive or R-situations, what is required here is a description of the ongoing progression of such situations.

A major feature of the communication situation that was first described in terms of SA-1, and which was understood to operate in SA-2, is the intersubjective understanding between the participants. The aspects of this understanding that have been of concern thus far have been the intersubjective understanding of symbol systems as a shared meaning-context, and also the procedures and ways of doing things that are understood by the participants. In considering SA-2 it was not necessary to elucidate either of these aspects of intersubjectivity since the R-situation was viewed as being basically static

at a given point in time. In considering the developmental aspects of communication situations, or the D-situation, it is necessary to elucidate the procedural aspect of intersubjectivity since SA-3 focuses upon the doing of things over time. Before examining the structures that become apparent through a temporal view of the communication situation, then, it is helpful to clarify the notion of intersubjective understanding in this regard; for a preliminary understanding of this will be useful in interpreting the structures of D-situations.

The Intersubjective Understanding of Procedures

By inquiring into the types of understanding that allow an individual to recognize and utilize certain procedures for doing things, one is not inquiring into the whole of intersubjective understanding, but rather just those aspects that are of importance in determining the conversational procedures that are involved in communication. This problem can be understood in terms of the act/action distinction discussed briefly in Chapter 2, which is concerned with distinguishing between actions that are performed, or behavior, and acts that are accomplished by means of this behavior. According to Schutz (1967), action is essentially meaningless behavior which can be interpreted by an actor or an audience in terms of meaningful acts. For example, swinging a foot is action, or behavior, while kicking a field goal in a football game is an act that is accomplished by means of such an action. Similarly, the action of uttering certain vocables can be interpreted to be an act of, for example, promising or betting. An act is not, however, necessarily performed by a single action, but can be performed by a series of actions temporally sequenced, as in the actions of swinging an axe which produce the act of chopping down

a tree.

Within this act/action perspective, then, it seems apparent that an utterer performs a series of actions with the intention of performing act(s), and that he also intends that his audience will recognize the act(s) that he is performing. Since acts are not behaviors, they must be a part of the individual's personal meaning-context; for it is only by means of this meaning-context that behavior is understood. Also involved in interpreting acts is, of course, the ignoring of irrelevant behaviors; for if an utterer happens to be tapping his foot while uttering vocables that he intends to be understood as an act of promising, it is a part of the audience's interpretation that the foot-tapping is meaningless behavior and irrelevant to the act. Thus, given the phenomena of the utterer's behaviors, the audience must recognize what behaviors are relevant to the performance of the act that the utterer intends to perform.

The question that arises from this distinction concerns the basis for the intersubjective understanding of acts, and the procedures by means of which these acts can be performed. Since this indicates that both the utterer and the audience have a certain type of knowledge about the relationship between actions and acts, the term "intersubjective knowledge" will be used here in order to indicate the knowledge that each participant has about acts that allows him to understand actions as acts in particular situations.

For the present purposes, the distinctions that have been suggested by Scheflen (1973) can be used to obtain a basic conceptualization of the general structures of this intersubjective knowledge about actions and acts. Although Scheflen's basic concern is with

the psychiatric interview, there seems no reason why his basic interpretation of the bases of this knowledge needs to be restricted to this class of situations. According to Scheflen, then, the recognition of acts, or what he terms "meaning," is culturally based:

Representational behaviors are not universal in form and meaning; rather, they are culturally specific. A given tradition has a characteristic repertoire of words, gestures and structural arrangements for the communication of meaning, and the meanings of these behavioral forms are culturally specific. The term "emic" has been used to describe the system of forms and referents which are used in some given cultural tradition. (p. 45)

According to Scheflen, these cultural meanings are learned by the members of a society; and the system of shared emic meanings that result provides the basis for their understanding of the actions of other members of the culture. A part of this cultural heritage will, of course, be knowledge of the system of symbols that constitute the language(s) of the culture, and also how to use such symbol system(s) in order to perform particular illocutionary acts, and in order to mean_{nn} something.

While it seems almost self-evident that at least some aspects of an individual's subjective meaning-context result from cultural experiences, the difficulty with this contention is that the term "culture" represents such a general notion that it seems to require a notion of sub-cultures in order to account for the diversity which can flourish within a given culture. This notion of sub-cultures is, for Scheflen, accounted for by what he terms "institutions"; and as he suggests:

The evolution of an emic system and the institutionalization of certain of its meanings must have occurred together. In some cases, the emic meanings of a culture and the special institutional meanings are the same or virtually the same . . . But in other cases a particular emic meaning has been

institutionalized in a variety of different institutions, so that it has multiple connotations in the same society. (p. 87)

While Schefflen seems to suggest that institutional meanings are realized in some way that is distinct from the culture as a whole, it is perhaps more realistic to contend that the general emic meanings may consist of similarities between various institutions that exist within the culture. In the case of a "simple" culture, there may be clearly defined institutions; but in the case of "complex" cultures (and perhaps any culture with a large population), the basic underlying or synthesized culture may not be readily apparent since the diversity of institutions may preclude a clear delineation of what is to count as institutional and what is to count as cultural. This does not mean, however, that a theoretical distinction cannot be made; for it seems obvious that while an individual may be a member of various institutions (e.g., family member, club member, office worker, IBM employee, golfer, etc.) it would generally be possible for members of entirely different institutions to communicate with each other. By the same token, however, membership in different institutions can lead to failures in communication. For example, if Bernstein's (1971) distinction between social classes is considered as a broad type of institutional classification, the difference between elaborated and restricted language codes can lead to the failure of a member of one institutional group to understand the behavior of a member of the other since different behaviors are allowable in particular situations for members of each group. Similarly, the differences may deal with the symbol system itself, as Halliday, McIntosh & Stevens (1964) seem to suggest in terms of their notion of various social registers that are employed by different institutional groups, or in different institutional

settings.

The difficulty in giving a clear distinction between cultural and institutional meanings is further complicated by the fact that the understanding of institutional meanings is often a part of the cultural meaning. For example, it is entirely possible for an individual who has never been a member of a military institution to understand the basic meaning-context that is appropriate to such an institution. This will, of course, be obtained partly by analogy with institutions with which the individual is familiar; but there would also seem to be a sense in which the knowledge of the military institution and its particular procedures is a part of the general cultural knowledge that an individual learns as a member of the society. Similarly, if an individual is placed within an institutional context with which he is unfamiliar, he would be expected to rely upon his knowledge of other institutions and the culture as a whole in order to communicate effectively; and since members of this institution would belong to other institutions, and certainly to the culture as a whole, they would probably be able to understand the acts intended by an uninitiated individual even if his behaviors did not conform to the appropriate institutional procedures.

While the potential complexity of the relationship between cultural and institutional meaning-contexts has only been suggested, what is important to note here is that the interpretation of behavior as an act is not necessarily a simple or straightforward matter. An act can be performed in different ways, by performing different actions, not only in different cultures but in different institutions within a culture as well. Thus, an audience must interpret on the basis not

only of general cultural knowledge, but must sometimes choose between various institutional interpretations, or meaning-contexts, in order to determine which is appropriate. Even this, however, is further complicated, as Scheflen suggests, by the influence of the individual's personal meaning-context:

The various participants will enact customary parts in traditional programs in "their own" way. Some differences in forms and style reflect their institutional memberships and emic backgrounds. Others reflect "personal" contexts which a participant carries in his mind, or characteristics of his personality or mood. These differences carry connotations of meaning. (p. 91)

While this personal definition of procedures for carrying out an act seems similar to the affective aspect of a message that was identified in regards to SA-1, this similarity is only apparent. While the affective aspect of a message was considered to be a part of the intended meaning reflecting the affective state of the utterer, this personal meaning-context, by means of which the individual understands the procedures for performing acts, deals not with the particular communication act but with the way in which a particular individual will perform or understand an act which may be communicative in intent, and which may entail a message with an affective component. While the cultural and institutional meaning-contexts can be considered to result from recurring experiences which lead to an understanding of social procedures, the personal aspects result in part from the fact that the experiences that each individual has are unique to that individual, and will not be identical with those of any other individual.

The Negotiation of Meaning-Contexts

From the above discussion of the distinctions suggested by Scheflen in regards to sources of knowledge for the recognition of

acts, it seems apparent that the description of communication situations requires some account of how the participants can be understood to discover a common ground for communication. This is, in fact, a major concern of Cushman & Whiting's (1972) in their attempt to describe interpersonal communication. In their view, the understanding of acts should be described in terms of rules that are known to the participants in a communication situation:

We believe there is a class of human actions whose significance is largely dependent on consensually shared rules. These rules control the unfolding of the action over time and constitute its meaning. The rules, it seems to us, are of two basic types: (1) those which specify the action's content (its meaning, what it is to count as) and those which specify the procedures appropriate to carrying out the action. It is these rules which assure the success of complex, interdependent transactions in society. The constitutive rules govern, the procedural rules guide. (p. 217)

This is, of course, basically the same distinction that was considered in Chapter 3 in regards to Searle's description of speech acts except that Searle's "regulative" rules are termed "procedural" rules; and, in fact, Cushman & Whiting acknowledge this source. In Chapter 3, the distinction was presented in a general and abstract way, primarily in regards to illocutionary acts. Cushman & Whiting's use of these rule types, however, has a broader application in terms of social acts.

According to Cushman & Whiting, both constitutive and procedural/regulative rules are cultural in nature, and thus should be shared by the participants in a communication situation. In a particular interpersonal context, however, the particular set of rules that is to be used in conducting the transaction must be negotiated between the participants:

We would suggest that what an individual brings to a communication situation are a set of rules. Other individuals bring somewhat different sets of rules. The process of

developing sufficient accuracy in understanding the rules being applied and perhaps of achieving consensus on them so that information can be extracted "properly" is a transactional process. It involves the projection of one's rules, their testing in the crucible of interaction, and the emergence of understandings on rules leading to understanding of information. (p. 235)

In Cushman & Whiting's basic position, then, the structure of acts can be understood in terms of sets of constitutive rules and sets of procedural/regulative rules that govern the performance of appropriate acts; and these sets of rules are a part of the cultural/institutional intersubjective knowledge that an individual uses as a part of his personal subjective meaning-context in order to understand events. In encountering another individual, however, it cannot be assumed that the encountered individual will have the same institutional experiences or knowledge; and, consequently, any encounter involves a certain amount of negotiation in regards to the rules that will be followed in transacting the business of the encounter. According to Cushman & Whiting, this results in two different levels of meaning in communication situations: the personal, and the interpersonal. The personal level is "developed by direct transaction with one's environment and embodying all the idiosyncracies of the individual's unique experiences" (p. 220).¹ This is basically the same, of course, as the subjective meaning-context that was considered to be the individual's basic perspective. The interpersonal level of meaning involves at least two people and "is rule-governed but the rule may be understood or apply only with

¹This personal meaning has also been considered by Cushman & Florence (1974) in terms of self-concept, which they consider to be created from the interaction of the individual with his environment, and by Cushman (1977) in terms of the relationship between roles and self-concepts.

a particular dyad" (pp. 220-221). In other words, since the experiences of each individual are unique, and since this results in a personal meaning-context, the intersubjective understanding by means of which participants bridge their personal meaning-contexts may also be unique. According to Cushman & Whiting, this interpersonal level is the creation of the participants, and is brought into being through the negotiated understanding that results from the mutual desire to transact some type of business; but this interpersonal level of meaning represents only one end of a continuum of meaning levels that stretches through small group understanding and finally to even more generalized cultural understandings. This is, of course, similar to Schefflen's personal/institutional/cultural levels, as discussed above.

For the purposes of the present study, the difficulty with Cushman & Whiting's view is the lack of definition that is given to what is constituted by the rules. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that Cushman & Whiting's concern is not with the developmental aspect of communication, but rather with the relationship between the individuals; and it is sufficient for their argument to suggest an initial negotiation which results in some type of interpersonal or intersubjective understanding that may be unique to the situation but which is based upon cultural and institutional knowledge. While it is helpful to note this in order to help establish a basis for considering the intersubjective knowledge of acts, further clarification is needed in order to elucidate the relationship between acts and rules in order to determine what should be examined in terms of the D-situation, as described by SA-3.

The Nature of Conventions

While Cushman & Whiting suggest that interpersonal communication should be described as rule-governed behavior, it is not clear from their description what types of rules or behavior should be described. This issue can be partially clarified by noting that there is at least a similarity between rule-governed behavior and conventional behavior. The benefit that is obtained from noting this resemblance is that Lewis's (1969) analysis of conventions can be considered; and since this analysis is in terms of situations, it is highly appropriate for the present discussion.

According to Lewis, conventions can be understood as regular or accepted solutions to coordination problems; and these solutions provide members of a population with a means of coordinating their behavior in recurring types of situations. This basic perspective is borrowed from Schelling (1963), whose concern is not with conventions, but with bargaining and the need to create a perspective by means of which cold war negotiations can be understood.

The notion of coordination as presented by Schelling involves the anticipation, and hence an understanding, of what other participants in a situation will do. As an example, he cites the case in which two individuals have parachuted from an airplane and need to be rescued. Their chances of being rescued are better if they can find each other, but neither knows where the other has landed. Both have maps of the area, which show various buildings, a pond, roads, and a river that is crossed by a single bridge. The two parachutists must, somehow, coordinate their activities in order to find each other even though they cannot communicate directly. As Schelling notes, after

having conducted an informal survey, "7 out of 8 respondents managed to meet at the bridge" (p. 56).

It is Lewis's contention that conventions can be understood to arise in a population when recurring coordination problems lead to the need for an accepted and mutually recognized solution. Such solutions must, of course, work to coordinate the activities of the participants in a mutually acceptable manner. In the parachutists example, for instance, if both members know where the other individual has landed, and know, furthermore, that the other knows that he knows, etc. (i.e., it is mutually known), then the solution to their situation will be a meeting place that requires an equal amount of walking for both.

It is this need to coordinate behavior that Lewis sees as the basis for the establishment of conventions; for such conventions, once established, provide a mutually recognized solution to a recurring situation in which it is desirable for the participants to coordinate their behavior in order to arrive at a suitable outcome. In the case of being cut off on the telephone, for example, if there exists a convention mutually recognized by both parties that the person who originally placed the call is to call back, the coordination problem is solved by the use of this conventional solution. It is not important to either of the participants who places the call. What is important, however, is that one person call while the other waits so that contact can be reestablished.¹

¹Although Lewis does present a description of what is required for a regularity to be a convention, this description is too detailed to be helpful here. A brief discussion of Lewis's basic position is, however, included in Appendix I.

If conventions are to be understood in terms of regularities of behavior, it seems evident that conventions themselves can be described in terms of rules such as those suggested by Searle and Cushman. This is not to say, however, that all regularities or rules are conventions; but it would seem that all (or at least nearly all) constitutive rules are conventions, and that some regulative rules may also be conventional.¹

In terms of this perspective, a communication situation can be considered to involve an encounter between participants which results in a coordination problem that needs to be resolved. Cushman's discussion of negotiation deals with the need for the participants to settle upon a particular set of rules, conventional or otherwise, that allows them to conduct the conversation. Since the rule-governed shared procedures that are negotiated will vary depending upon the type of coordination situation that is perceived to exist, a description of specific procedures (i.e., rules and/or conventions) would not be helpful in the present study; for what is desired here is not a description of particular types of coordination problems, but a general description of the structure of coordination situations and the understanding that the participants must have in order to recognize such situations. This amounts, of course, to a description of the situation in which acts and actions take place, and not a description of the acts or actions themselves. This situation can be understood to involve the negotiated resolution of the coordination problem; and

¹This contention is based upon Lewis's definition of conventions and his discussion of rules. A more thorough discussion of this point could be given; but since such a discussion would not further the purpose of the present study, it has not been included here.

this resolution will provide a partial basis for the participants' understanding of acts. This will be the case since the resolution of the coordination problem will involve an agreement in regards to the particular intersubjective knowledge that will be considered appropriate as a basis upon which to conduct the business of the communication situation; and this will involve the utilization of cultural and institutional knowledge of acts, and the constitutive and regulative rules that describe these acts and the actions necessary to perform them.

The initial negotiation of rules that are to constitute and govern the communication situation does not entirely solve the problem; for each utterance by a participant changes the nature of the situation, calling for a further act on the part of at least one of the participants. Coordination, then, requires a constant monitoring as an initial coordination situation evolves and is shaped by the actions/acts performed by the participants; for it is generally not a single coordination problem that is encountered in communication but a series of problems related together by the evolution of the coordination situation. As Hawes (1973) has emphasized, interactive communication situations involve a concatenation of interconnected acts such that "each communicative act affects and is affected by the entire stream of communicative acts" (p. 13). There is, however, an overriding sense in which the coordination situation can be understood in terms of the overall purpose of the communication situation itself. This is similar to the problem that was noted above in terms of the meaning_{nn} of particular utterances within the context of extended discourse, and the meaning_{nn} of extended discourse as a whole; for the coordination

situation can be described in terms of its state at a particular moment in time, or it can be understood in terms of the overall problem that provides the basis for the situation. Thus, participants can anticipate the course of the evolution of the D-situation by means of their knowledge of the underlying coordination situation. This is exemplified by a board meeting that has progressed to a certain point at which new business is being discussed. The overall coordination problem involves the coordination of activities in terms of the purposes and goals of the meeting (e.g., discussion and resolution of problems, transmission of information, etc.); and knowledge of this overall structure allows the participants to anticipate the acts of other participants since this knowledge leads to understanding of the nature of the rules/conventions that govern the encounter and the execution of particular acts. In addition, there is the coordination problem involved in the discussion of a particular item of new business within this overall context; and this involves understanding the specific coordination problem that is of central concern at that moment in time.

This view suggests, of course, that some type of hierarchical structure must be posited in order to describe D-situations such that the focus can be upon either the evolution of the overall D-situation to a particular point (and problem) in time, or a particular immediate situation itself. Even though these two aspects are isolable, they are not unrelated; and an account of the structure of D-situations would, consequently, necessarily involve some indication of how these different levels are related.

While this seems to indicate the type of description that is desired here in terms of SA-3, this indication has been obtained by

considering interactive communication situations; and it is not apparent how this analysis of the problem may apply to situations involving extended discourse. While the D-situation could be approached in terms of either of these types of situations, for the present purposes it is more expedient to consider interactive situations. This is due to the fact that the structure of the communication situation is more readily apparent in interactive communication since it is difficult to determine, at this point in the study, how the D-situation should be described for non-interactive situations. In order to describe these situations in terms of communication, then, the structure of interactive situations will next be examined; and the resulting description will, in Chapter 5, be applied specifically to written language communication involving extended discourse.

Harré's Description of Episodes

A general description of the structure of what has been termed the D-situation has been offered by Harré (Harré, 1974; Harré & Secord, 1972). Like Cushman and Searle, Harré (1974) argues that social behavior can be understood in terms of the implicit or explicit following of two types of rules: constitutive and strategic. By strategic rules he seems to mean what Searle calls regulative rules, and what Cushman terms the procedural rules. While this difference is, in a sense, only terminological, it can be noted that the term "strategic" brings out a more positive sense of rule-governed behavior than was suggested in the examination of either Searle's or Cushman's notions; for in this formulation rules can be understood to describe procedures that allow individuals to perform acts by exhibiting certain behaviors, thus making the rules permissive as well as restrictive.

According to Harré, social behavior cannot be described in terms of a single set of rules; rather, this behavior must be described in terms of different levels within a hierarchy of rule systems. Of concern here are the sets of rules that Harré terms "etiquettes" and those that he terms "situations."¹ Etiquettes deal with the actions that can be considered to be acts, and rely upon mutually understood cultural or institutional understandings between the participants. For example, an outstretched hand can be the means for executing various acts (e.g., as a greeting, as a move in a wrestling match). In order to determine what etiquette is being performed, the audience must have knowledge of the situation in which it occurs. This is, of course, only to restate what was pointed out in regards to the importance of the situation in Chapter 3. According to Harré, however, situations can be described in terms of their forms, ranging from games on the one extreme to rituals on the other. Game situations can be considered to be in some way competitive, and involve a somewhat freer choice of etiquettes than do rituals, which are cooperative in nature and will generally be more tightly bound by rules. Both games and rituals are, however, rule-governed since both are structured by the constitutive rules that make the game or ritual possible, and also include regulative rules that govern the performance of the etiquettes, or acts.

According to Harré, participants in a communication situation have some type of goal-oriented plan. These plans may be culturally ritualistic in nature, or they may be peculiar to the particular goals

¹In addition to these two levels, Harré also posits a "dramaturgical" level. Since this level is concerned with a psychological position that is not of importance in the present study, this level is not considered here.

that a participant has in a specific situation. In order to understand participants' acts, it is necessary to understand their utterances as etiquettes that are performed in order to enact the plan that the participant has in regards to the situation, which may be described as either a game or a ritual. This game/ritual distinction would seem, however, to represent some sort of continuum that ranges from loosely structured, highly competitive situations in which each participant has a wide choice in the variety of etiquettes he can perform, to highly ritualistic situations such as a marriage ceremony in which each participant's range of appropriate etiquettes is highly restricted. Even in a highly competitive situation, however, such as a debate, there must still be constitutive rules which define what is to constitute an acceptable etiquette; and thus the game/ritual continuum seems to refer to the amount of structure that is imposed by the situation in regards to the range of choice that is available to the participants. To term an utterance an "etiquette" in a game situation, however, seems somewhat inappropriate and misleading; and if the situation is to be described in regards to the game/ritual continuum, this distinction should be reflected in the description of the utterance as well. In order to reflect this difference, then, utterances will be understood here in terms of a gambit/etiquette continuum that reflects the value that the utterance has in the context of a situation described in terms of a game/ritual continuum.

There are, however, more serious difficulties with Harré's notion of the situation. The first of these arises from his identification of the game/ritual continuum with a competitive/cooperative continuum. As indicated above, both games and rituals involve a

certain amount of cooperation insofar as both are defined by constitutive rules which determine the structure of the game or ritual. There is also at least the possibility of ritualistic competitions; and such competitions could be considered to be either games with a highly structured and restrictive set of constitutive rules, or rituals of games. Such troublesome cases would, apparently, lie towards the center of the game/ritual continuum in terms of the degree of structure, but would be at the game end in terms of competition/cooperation. In order to avoid this confusion, it would seem that the two continua should be considered as separate aspects of the situation such that it could be described in terms of a game/ritual continuum in regards to the restrictiveness of the constitutive rules, and in terms of a competition/cooperation continuum in regards to the goals or plans that the participants have. Together, these two continua can be considered to describe the structural aspects of the situation.

Another difficulty that arises in regards to Harré's description of the situation results from the positing of a further construct of the communication situation: the episode (Harré & Secord, 1972). The episode is, however, described in terms of the same structural aspects as the situation. Consequently, the distinction between situations and episodes is somewhat nebulous in Harré's analysis; for he states that "By the definition of the situation possible actions, with their social meanings, come to be understood as parts of well-defined social episodes" (Harré, 1974, p. 156). This is, however, unilluminating since it does not succeed in discriminating between what is to count as a situation and what is to count as an episode.

In order to avoid this difficulty, it is possible to suggest

that a distinction be drawn between episodes, situations, and etiquettes in terms of their scope. This seems, in fact, to be Harré's intention, although this is confused by his vague description of the relationship between situations and episodes. An utterance can be considered, then, to take place within a situation which is a part of an overall episode. The utterance can be described by a gambit/etiquette continuum that reflects the situational intent of the utterer's message. This message, however, takes place within the context of a situation; and this situation is similar in scope to the situation described in regards to SA-2, or the R-situation. In the narrow application of R-situations, however, these situations were understood to take place within a larger context, which can now be termed the episode, typified to some extent by the structural aspects discussed above.

Before proceeding to a further elucidation of this general hierarchical structure of the D-situation, it is helpful to demonstrate the applicability of even this preliminary formulation by reconsidering the paradigmatic example from Julius Caesar that was discussed above in regards to R-situations. As was pointed out, Brutus and Antony both face different R-situations in making their speeches, in which the exigence is to a large extent accepted. In terms of the gambit/etiquette continuum of the utterance, it would seem that Brutus's speech can be considered basically as a series of etiquettes since he is addressing a situation that is highly structured. While Antony's speech can be described as a series of gambits, it is delivered in a different R-situation than is Brutus's, and has the appearance of being a series of etiquettes since his avowed purpose is to conform to the strict constraints of the situation. It is, however, by means of

a clever use of apparent etiquettes that Antony offers his gambits, and thereby takes advantage of the audience's perception of his utterances as a set of etiquettes. Both of these speeches, however, take place within the context of an episode that can be considered to be ritualistic in nature. This episode is, however, subject to different interpretations, from different points of view. For example, Brutus certainly perceives the episode as being more cooperative than Antony does since Antony, despite his promise, obviously perceives the episode as highly competitive in nature.

This difficulty in applying this view of D-situations cannot be fruitfully considered until the nature of this situation has been further clarified. From this example, however, it does seem that the nature of the episode in which the R-situation occurs can be perceived in different ways by different participants, and that for the participants to understand each other completely it would be necessary for them to agree intersubjectively about the nature of the encounter. As indicated, however, intersubjective understanding of episodes does not always seem to be a simple matter of agreement or disagreement, but rather may involve varying degrees of misunderstanding.

Frentz & Farrell's Language-Action Paradigm

A helpful description of the nature of the relationship between episodes, situations and utterances has been given by Frentz & Farrell (1976). Like Harré, Frentz & Farrell are concerned with describing communication from an omniscient point of view, with the emphasis upon the description of communication rather than upon the knowledge that the participants must have in order to understand the situation. Rather than drawing distinctions in terms of episodes, situations and

utterances, Frenzt & Farrell distinguish between contexts, episodes, and symbolic acts. The context is considered in terms of two components: form of life, and encounters. The form of life consists of what has previously been discussed as cultural and institutional knowledge, consisting of knowledge of the procedures or actions that constitute the performance of acts. It is, according to Frenzt & Farrell, through this type of knowledge that form is given to communication, as they explain:

The world of communication acquires form through its shared differentiation. The concept of communication itself demands a common ontology which is accessible to its participants through form. This ontology includes the total conceptual, aesthetic, and cultural knowledge which a society shares and which is recreated and expressed through the overall structure of that society's language. (pp. 334-335)

This shared knowledge has, of course, previously been described as intersubjective knowledge. As was also discussed above, it is by means of this knowledge that participants in communication situations interpret actions as acts and thereby perceive the situation as meaningful.

The general form of life knowledge must, however, be applied to particular situations; and this application is what Frenzt & Farrell call encounters. Encounters are the realization of particular forms of life in order to meet the demands of the particular situation, which is a part of the intersubjective understanding that is negotiated by the participants in order, as Cushman suggests, to create a mutual understanding of the rules and procedures that will be used. In most instances, this amounts to agreeing upon institutional procedures and constraints in order for the participants to have a basis upon and means by which to conduct the business of their encounter.

These two aspects of what Frentz & Farrell call the context of the communication do not seem to relate to any of the levels suggested by Harré, but rather seem to add an additional hierarchical level to his description. What Frentz & Farrell term an episode, however, seems to conform to what the same term means in Harré's analysis; but while Harré considers episodes only in terms of the two continua discussed above, Frentz & Farrell examine episodes more specifically. They define episodes as "a rule-conforming sequence of symbolic acts generated by two or more actors who are collectively oriented toward emergent goals" (p. 338). The unity of an episode is, then, provided by the goal orientation of the participants. It is important to note here that episodes are not defined in terms of the individual plans of the participants, but rather are defined on the basis of the mutual understanding and agreement of the participants. Episodes differ from encounters in that episodes are the specific structure of the actual temporal sequence of acts that are performed, and do not refer to the utilization of form of life knowledge. That episodes are dependent upon this form of life knowledge, however, is apparent from the fact that they must be mutually directed, or goal-oriented; and this mutual goal-orientation is derived from the individual plans of the participants, negotiated and intersubjectively understood through the utilization of cultural/institutional form of life knowledge. Episodes, then, take place within the confines defined by form of life knowledge, realized by the nature of the particular encounter. This results in what Frentz & Farrell consider the definitional imperative of the episode, or the aspect of the episode that becomes dominant due to the plans and goal-orientation

of the participants. Episodes can be dominant in terms of either their structural, relational, or informational aspects. Structurally dominant episodes are basically ritualistic in nature, exemplified by episodes such as formal introductions, or turn-taking procedures. Informationally dominant episodes are concerned primarily with the disclosure of knowledge or information in order to accomplish the purposes set forth by the mutual goal-orientation. Frenztz & Farrell suggest that such activities as essay-writing and bomb-defusing exemplify this type of episodic dominance. Relationally dominant episodes are characterized by an emphasis upon the relationship between the participants, and are illustrated by activities such as demonstrations of power, intimacy, and disclosure about the self.

While Frenztz & Farrell suggest that these three types of episodes can be considered to be analytically distinct, they also suggest that "it is quite possible for some composite of the above types to be defined and for the resultant interchange to run smoothly" (p. 338). In fact, it is important to note that the definition of an episode in terms of one of these types does not mean that the episode is characterized exclusively by that aspect, but means only that the emphasis of the goals can be typified by one of these types. Relationally dominant episodes will, generally, also involve the communication of information; and this will take place within some mutually agreed upon structure defined by the encounter. Thus, the dominance of these types must be considered to be one of degree; and it may, in fact, be the case that different parts of an episode will be dominated by different aspects.

In addition to the definition imperative, episodes can be

described in terms of the developmental structure of the episode; for Frentz & Farrell argue that the structure "is composed not of surface stylistic variations, but rather a recurrent analytic base" (p. 338). This base consists of a series of episodic developments that conform to the following pattern: initiation, definition, rule-confirmation, strategic development, and termination. Each episode must, they contend, begin with some type of initiation during which the participants signal their willingness to communicate. After this initiation is accomplished, a definitional stage follows during which the participants negotiate the structural basis of the type of encounter episode that is to take place. It is at this point that the episodic dominance is established in accordance with the individual plans and mutual goals of the participants. This is followed by a period of rule confirmation during which the definition is tested so that the participants can confirm their intersubjective understanding of the episode. While Frentz & Farrell suggest that this is followed by a stage of strategic development, or the actual conducting of the business that has been agreed upon, it would seem that the rule confirmation and strategic development stages may well overlap since the rules may be tested and confirmed in the course of an attempt to develop the episode in accordance with the mutual goals. In fact, it would seem that the definitional stage may well be accomplished by means of a participant's attempt to develop the episode. This is, however, only to suggest that the full development of the episode may be condensed so that definition and rule-confirmation may be accomplished by means of attempts at strategic development. Once the episode has been suitably developed, there must be some type of termination which occurs when the defined

goals have been fulfilled. As Frentz & Farrell suggest, however:

The termination imperative may simply function as a transition to a new episode in the total encounter time-span the actors share together. When this occurs, the termination phase may simultaneously constitute the initiation phase of a new episode still to be defined. (p. 340)

Thus, one episode may lead into another since the termination stage of one episode may be the initiation and/or definition stage of another. A single encounter may, then, have more than one episode; but when there is an episodic transition it would seem to be at least potentially necessary for the participants to renegotiate the relevant form of life knowledge that is pertinent to the encounter. For example, if the participants in an encounter first engage in an episode about when a business contract will be signed, then begin discussing an upcoming football game, it would seem that while the same encounter is being realized, the difference in the two episodes requires a shift in the relevant form of life knowledge since different institutional structures are being evoked.

It is important to note that what has been described above is an idealized view, and that in actual practice episodes may be altered or redefined without being fully developed, or may be interrupted and resumed. Thus, the encounter must be considered to be dynamic rather than static in nature; for it is continually open to renegotiation.

Unlike Harré, Frentz & Farrell do not posit a situation level in their model, but consider the symbolic act to be the next level below the episode. In considering symbolic acts, or utterances, Frentz & Farrell posit four different forces, the first three of which are similar, if not identical, to the different components of a speech act, particularly as defined by Searle. While Frentz & Farrell contend

that their description of acts differs from speech acts since speech acts are defined "independent of the episodes in which they occur" (p. 340), it has been demonstrated above, in Chapter 3, that this is not the case since the performance of a speech act is highly dependent upon the context or circumstances in which it occurs. Consequently, Frentz & Farrell's definition of a symbolic act can be related to Searle's formulation of a speech act in the following way:

<u>Frentz & Farrell</u>	<u>Searle</u>
propositional force	propositional act (force?)
expressive force	illocutionary act/force
consequential force	perlocutionary act (force?)
episodic force	?

Since the first three aspects of a symbolic act seem to be derived from the description of speech acts, the more traditional speech act terms will be retained here. The fourth aspect of a symbolic act, the episodic force, does not seem to have a corresponding term in the theory of speech acts and thus requires a closer examination. Frentz & Farrell explain episodic forces as follows:

When placed in the context of an episode, symbolic acts acquire a fourth feature--namely, episodic force. Episodic force completes the explanation of symbolic acts by specifying the communicative function of acts within the overall sequential structure of an episode. (p. 340)

Thus, Frentz & Farrell suggest that in addition to the other aspects of a speech act there is an episodic force which furthers the development of the episode. As an example of a clear episodic force they suggest the example of a child who requests a glass of water not because he is thirsty, but because it is a way of avoiding going to bed. If this intention is recognized by the parents, then they have recognized the

episodic force of the utterance. This type of force seems to be beyond the nature of indirect speech acts, as discussed in Appendix H, and seems to refer to what was considered, in regards to SA-1, as "other intended meanings" of a message. To incorporate this force within the framework of speech acts would, however, raise the same type of problem that was discussed in regards to Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts; for it would seem that the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts could exhaust the episodic force, as in the case in which a child requests a glass of water because he is thirsty and genuinely wants a glass of water to drink.

While episodic forces are a questionable addition to the theory of speech acts, they do seem to provide a means of describing some of the "other intended meanings" that can be a part of a message. But this, too, presents difficulties; for in the example of the child attempting to trick his parents by asking for a glass of water, it is not necessarily a part of the child's M-intended message that his parents recognize the episodic force of his utterance. The basis of this deception, however, seems to be related to the gambit/etiquette continuum that was suggested in regards to Harré's description of utterances; for while the child in this example is offering a gambit, he is intending that it be understood as a particular etiquette; and while the episode is perceived by the child as being competitive in nature, he intends that his parents perceive it as being cooperative. This is, of course, similar to the example of Antony's speech in Julius Caesar, discussed above. For the present purposes, then, the episodic force can be considered to deal with the relation of the gambit/etiquette to the episode/situation in which it occurs; and this can be considered

to be an aspect of the message that is in some way in addition to the aspects defined by the components of a speech act.

This synthesized model suggested by Frentz & Farrell can be synthesized with the basic structural model suggested by Harré in order to give a more detailed description of the D-situation. Since the different levels of the description have been considered to be hierarchical in nature, this results in a preliminary taxonomy of the D-situation, and is given in Figure 8. Since the purpose of this preliminary taxonomy is only to indicate the result of synthesizing Harré's and Frentz & Farrell's descriptions, the R-situation and message components are not elaborated here, even though the message component has now been modified by the addition of an episodic force and a gambit/etiquette continuum. Continua are represented in this figure by extended dashes (-----); and the episode is defined in terms of the structural aspects, the dominance aspects, and the developmental sequence. Before filling out this taxonomy in regards to the position taken above in regards to form of life, R-situations and messages, it is helpful to examine another view of the D-situation in order to elucidate some of the features suggested in Figure 8.

Levin & Moore's Dialogue-Games

Unlike Harré's and Frentz & Farrell's models, the description suggested by Levin & Moore (1977) is based upon the analysis of a definite set of data. These data come basically from the communications between computer operators by means of on-line terminals, and thus concern interactive written language communication. Also unlike Harré's and Frentz & Farrell's descriptions, the one given by Levin & Moore has served as the basis for a simulation model and has thus been tested in

CONTEXT

form of life
encounter

EPISODE

```
structural aspects:  game ----- ritual
                    competition ----- cooperation
```

```
dominance aspects: structural  
                    informational  
                    relational
```

```
developmental sequence:  initiation
                        definition
                        rule-confirmation
                        strategic development
                        termination
```

SITUATION (Rhetorical or Expressive)

UTTERANCE (MESSAGE)

Figure 8 A Preliminary Taxonomy of the D-situation.

an objective way.

Although there are two aspects of the Levin & Moore model, only one of these is useful here. In presenting their theory, Levin & Moore first give a general description of the overall structure of dialogues; then they present detailed analyses of some particular types of dialogues.¹ Since these particular games are admittedly not in any way exhaustive, these specific types are too detailed to be of interest here; for what is required here is not a list of possible interactive dialogue structures, but a general understanding of communication situations that can be applied to extended written discourse, and more particularly to the reading of this type of discourse.

Levin & Moore assert that the structures of dialogic communication must be understood in terms of the plans and goals of the participants. Although they do not elaborate this aspect, it would seem that they would be in basic agreement with the description given above. According to Levin & Moore, the structure of dialogue-games can be described as follows:

A Dialogue-Game consists of three parts: a set of Parameters, the collection of Specifications that apply to these Parameters throughout the conduct of the DG (Dialogue-Game), and a partially ordered set of Components characterizing the dynamic aspects of the DG. (p. 402)

The parameters are, basically, those entities that can be identified in the situation. For the specific dialogue-games that Levin & Moore describe, they report that they have needed only three parameters: the two participants and the subject or topic of the communication. Of more

¹The different types of dialogue-games considered in detail by Levin & Moore's simulation model are: (1) helping, (2) action-seeking, (3) information-seeking, (4) information-probing, (5) instructing, and (6) griping.

interest here are the parameter specifications, which are basically what has been described above as the cultural and institutional knowledge of acts and sequences of acts, and the procedures for behaving appropriately in particular situations. Levin & Moore describe this type of intersubjectivity as follows:

We claim that these Specifications are known to the participants of the dialogue, and the requirement that they be satisfied during the conduct of a DG is used by the participants to signal what DGs they wish to conduct, to recognize what DG is being bid, to decide how to respond to a bid, to conduct the DG once the bid is accepted, and to terminate the DG when appropriate. (p. 403)

This amounts, of course, to a negotiated intersubjective understanding of the rules by which the communication is to be conducted.

While it is somewhat difficult to determine how Levin & Moore's rather vague notion of parameters relates to the preliminary taxonomy suggested in Figure 8, the parameter specifications obviously relate to what is described at the encounter level of the context. In this regard, the parameters that are being specified can be understood to be, in effect, the parameters of the communication situation itself; for such specifications indicate the appropriate institutional/cultural constitutive and regulative rules that are agreed upon by the participants as definitions of what is to count as an appropriate gambit/etiquette in the situation. According to Levin & Moore, this mutual agreement about the parameter specifications of the situation are negotiated; for one participant makes a bid to initiate a particular type of situation, and the other participants are free either to accept or reject this bid. This bidding/acceptance aspect is, however, not a part of the parameter specifications, but is a part of the actual components of the situation, although it can be suggested that the

parameter specifications will indicate the content of bids and acceptances.

Levin & Moore's description of the dynamic aspects, or components, of dialogue-games is similar to the developmental sequence suggested by Frentz & Farrell, and can be compared to this model as follows:

<u>Levin & Moore</u>	<u>Frentz & Farrell</u>
nomination } recognition }	initiation, definition
instantiation	-----
-----	rule confirmation
conduct	strategic development
termination	termination

While some differences exist between these formulations, these differences seem to be more terminological than substantive. While Frentz & Farrell specify an initiation stage, this is assumed within Levin & Moore's notion of nomination, which consists of one participant offering a bid in regards to the rules and goals that are to constitute the purpose and structure of the encounter. This nomination, and the recognition by the other participants, are both subsumed under Frentz & Farrell's notion of definition, and seem to specify particular aspects of this definition. Levin & Moore's instantiation phase is actually quite similar to Frentz & Farrell's rule confirmation, except that Levin & Moore's emphasis is upon the acceptance of the rules as intersubjectively understood and agreed upon, while Frentz & Farrell suggest that this is followed by a period of testing in order to confirm this understanding. Both agree that once the rules and procedures

are established, the affair itself is conducted in accordance with these rules; and both agree that the episode ends with some type of termination. Since both of these descriptions of the development of encounters are concerned with the same process of negotiation and agreement, and the conducting of the affair, it would seem that what Levin & Moore describe as components of the episode are what has been described as the development of the episode by Frentz & Farrell. This means, however, that Levin & Moore's lowest or most basic level is not the utterance, or even the situation, but the episode. It can be noted, however, that since the different levels are hierarchical, the various stages of the episode have been used by Levin & Moore in place of a particular description of these lower levels.

These additional aspects suggested by Levin & Moore can be added to the taxonomy given in Figure 8. This taxonomy can also, of course, be expanded by incorporating the aspects of communication situations discussed in terms of SA-1 and SA-2, and by the previous discussion of SA-3. This expanded taxonomy is given in Figure 9, and can be considered to be the final version of the taxonomic description of the D-situation. In terms of this taxonomy, an utterance can be understood in regards to the various aspects of its message. This understanding can, however, also be contextualized in terms of the R-situation (or the expressive situation) as defined in terms of SA-2. Situations, however, can also be understood within the context of episodes, which in turn can be understood in terms of the overall encounter. Encounters themselves can, however, be understood within the context of general form of life knowledge. The context and episode levels can, then, be recognized as the contribution of SA-3

CONTEXT

form of life

intersubjective understanding of recurring coordination situations

intersubjective knowledge of: constitutive and
regulative rules for performing acts and
sequences of acts, in terms of cultural,
institutional and personal aspects

encounter

parameter specifications (selected from form of life)

EPISODE

```
structural aspects:  game ----- ritual
                    competition ----- cooperation
```

```
dominance aspects: structural  
                    informational  
                    relational
```

```
developmental sequence: initiation
                        definition
                        nomination (bid)
                        recognition (acceptance)
                        instantiation
                        rule confirmation
                        strategic development
                        termination
```

SITUATION (Rhetorical or Expressive)

```
For R-situations: constraints
                  exigence
                  accepted ----- created
```

MESSAGE

```
content
    rhetic (propositional) act
    illocutionary act
```

affect
relation
perlocutionary act
gambit ----- etiquette
 episodic force
(other intended meanings

Figure 9 Final Taxonomy of the D-situation.

to the description of communication situations.

D-situations and Intersubjective Knowledge

While the taxonomy given in Figure 9 describes the basic structures of the D-situation, it does not represent participants' knowledge of this situation; for to say that participants have knowledge of what is represented in this taxonomy is different than saying that the taxonomy itself represents this knowledge. This taxonomy can, however, be interpreted in terms of participants' knowledge by considering the framework suggested by Kjolseth (1972).

Kjolseth's view of participants' knowledge of communication situations is similar to the view that has been developed above. According to Kjolseth, the participants must have shared knowledge such that "(1) it is possessed and sanctioned by a more or less inclusive population of members, (2) it is known in a particular mode of relevance, and (3) it has a socio-temporal locus of relevance" (p. 61). This is, of course, similar to the claims that have been made above in regards to participants' knowledge of communication situations. Kjolseth's concern is not with the situation, however, but with the shared knowledge itself, which he describes in terms of four bases of knowledge: background, foreground, emergent ground, and transcendent ground.

To say that participants in communication situations must share a certain background knowledge means, according to Kjolseth, that they share knowledge that is "equally relevant to any episode in any setting in society" (pp. 61-62). What Kjolseth is concerned with describing in terms of background knowledge is not, however, what has been suggested above in terms of form of life, but is rather the background competence that participants must have in order to understand utterances.

Thus, Kjolseth does not perceive background knowledge as including the appropriate procedures, as was suggested above, but only the meaning of symbols within the meaning-context of the symbol system. This is, however, too narrow an interpretation of background knowledge for the present study; and it seems permissible to reinterpret Kjolseth's notion of background as including not just knowledge of the symbol system, but knowledge of the different cultural/institutional conventions and other rule-governed regularities of behavior as well.

Kjolseth's notion of foreground is, however, more appropriate for the view of communication situations developed here. Knowledge of the foreground is defined by Kjolseth as "what anybody knows is categorically relevant for the duration of this setting" (p. 62). That is, the foreground includes the knowledge that is utilized in order to contextualize within a particular cultural/institutional meaning-context. While this seems to offer an application to both the encounter and the episode aspects of the taxonomy presented above, foreground knowledge seems more appropriate in terms of the episode since episodes seem to have categorical relevance while encounters are better described in terms of parameters. Bridging the foreground and the background, then, is the encounter; for it is by means of the encounter that diverse background knowledge is selected and made available as a particular foreground.

In describing the emergent ground of a conversation, Kjolseth suggests that:

When in a real conversation . . . one is always in the vivid present of a unique, actual, occurring, and on-going episode in the course of an unfolding interaction chain. To say that members are at a point in social time, or to feel that one is with someone somewhere, is synonymous with noting that there

is shared knowledge of this terrain--and I will call this type of knowledge the "emergent ground." (p. 65)

The emergent ground, then, deals with the actual conversation as it has unfolded to the present moment. Complementing the emergent ground is the transcendent ground, which is much like the emergent ground except that "whereas emergent knowledge is real and objective, transcendent knowledge is yet unrealized and potential" (p. 67). The emergent and transcendent grounds, then, represent the knowledge that the participant has of how the episode has evolved to the present moment, and the predictions or anticipations that the participants have of what will emerge as the encounter unfolds. Such knowledge is, of course, based upon the foreground knowledge of episodes; but while foreground knowledge deals with general cultural/institutional conventions and rule-governed procedures, the transcendent and emergent grounds deal with the actual realization of this ground in terms of the unique situation that is unfolding in time. At any moment in this episode, the participants will have specific knowledge of what has gone before, interpreted partly by means of the meaning-context provided by understanding at the foreground level, and will also have anticipations about what will occur as the encounter develops, also based upon foreground knowledge. In terms of the taxonomy suggested above, it would seem that these two grounds are realized by means of the situation, to encompass the uttered message which occurs at the point at which knowledge of emergent ground and the transcendent ground meet.

The knowledge that participants have of the communication situation is represented as an analog model in Figure 10, where only the major elements from the taxonomy are included. In terms of this model, participants in communication situations can be understood to have




Figure 10 A Model of Intersubjective Knowledge.

certain cultural/institutional background knowledge which allows them, by means of a particular encounter, to utilize an appropriate part of this knowledge in order to establish an intersubjective meaning-context by which to understand the nature of the encounter. This knowledge is applied, by means of a constantly evolving situation, to the actual utterances in order to understand the message. This interpretation of utterances by means of background and foreground knowledge results in a knowledge of the emergent ground, or how the particular situation has evolved to the present moment, and knowledge of the transcendent ground, or how the situation will most likely evolve in the future. It is important to note that this knowledge is not rigidly structured; for the demands of each unique situation will create a unique emergent ground which may evoke different background knowledge, resulting in a reinterpretation of the transcendent ground. Thus, while participants' knowledge of communication situations is viewed here in terms of a top-down model, the application of this knowledge to a unique situation can result in a bottom-up demand for modification of the foreground by means of different background knowledge. This is indicated in the model by double-headed arrows.

Goals, Plans, and Scripts

While the model of intersubjective knowledge presented in Figure 10 gives a basic description of how this knowledge is utilized, it seems to suggest that communication situations are interpreted only in terms of known structures and are thus highly ritualistic in nature. Since individuals are, however, capable of understanding in situations that are unfamiliar to them, and are capable of learning new cultural/institutional structures, the understanding of D-situations cannot

always be considered to be as automatic as the model seems to suggest.

This aspect of intersubjective knowledge can be elucidated by considering Schank & Abelson's (1975, 1977) work with the understanding of texts. While this work is concerned with the processing of short narratives, Schank & Abelson contend that the type of knowledge that they discuss is not specific to understanding such stories but is, rather, an application of the type of knowledge that people use in conducting their everyday affairs in the social world. The main advantage in considering this particular explanation of the utilization of knowledge is that it has provided the basis for a successful computer simulation model of the understanding of particular types of stories, and has thus succeeded in proving itself in terms of this type of test.

The Schank & Abelson position is the result of the convergence of two lines of independent research. Schank's (1969, 1972, 1973, 1975a, 1975b) basic position is concerned with representing utterances in terms of the underlying concepts. Abelson's (Abelson, 1973, 1975; Abelson & Carroll, 1965) position deals with the simulation of interactive communication. Since both theories have been directed toward producing simulation models, both have been presented in highly detailed and technical terms. Since only a general survey of the combined position is necessary for the present purposes, the technical aspects of this position will not be considered here; and only those technical terms that are necessary to the understanding of the position will be introduced.

Schank & Abelson's description of interactive social knowledge can be understood in terms of three aspects: scripts, plans, and

goals.¹ Scripts can be considered to be specific knowledge about how particular types of encounters are conducted. As Schank & Abelson (1977) explain:

We use specific knowledge to interpret and participate in events we have been through many times. Specific detailed knowledge about a situation allows us to do less processing and wondering about frequently experienced events. We need not ask why somebody wants to see our ticket when we enter a theater, or why one should be quiet, or how long it is appropriate to sit in one's seat. Knowledge of specific situations such as theaters allows us to interpret the remarks that people make about theaters. Consider how difficult it would be to interpret 'Second aisle on your right' without the detailed knowledge about theaters that the patron and the usher both have. (p. 37)

Schank & Abelson contend that such scripts are learned as a part of the cultural and institutional heritage of the society. Since the participants in encounters mutually know that the other participants are aware of such scripts it is possible for them to conduct affairs in highly regular, orderly and abbreviated fashion. As such, scripts represent collections of constitutive and regulative rules that dictate, within the limits of the script, how the participants are to behave in a scriptal situation. In terms of the previous discussion, scripts seem to apply to the episode, or foreground, level of knowledge. This is particularly apparent when it is recognized that one of the major scripts that Schank & Abelson have elucidated is a restaurant script that indicates how participants in restaurant encounters are expected to behave. Since scripts such as a restaurant script must, however,

¹Actually, Schank & Abelson identify five different aspects: conceptual chains, scripts, plans, goals, and themes. Only the three that have been indicated are of concern here, however; for conceptual chains are too specific to the input to be relevant here; and themes are only vaguely defined by Schank & Abelson, and are too general to be useful in the present study.

represent a wide range of possibilities (e.g., cafeteria, short order, coffee shop) it is to be expected that there will be various options in the script. Similarly, specific scripts must give the options that are open to participants in the event of various contingencies. For example, the script must specify the different options open to a customer in a restaurant who order something that is not available (e.g., selecting something else, leaving the restaurant).

While such flexibility is necessary, the script still specifies in detail the behavior that is expected of a participant, and thus allows a participant to view the situation as being ritualistic in nature. This is not, of course, to say that scripts must be followed, or that extraneous acts cannot be performed, but only to suggest that for particular types of encounters there are definite expectations that arise on the basis of the cultural knowledge of the way that such affairs are conducted.

Just as Lewis suggests that conventions arise in response to recurring coordination problems, Schank & Abelson suggest that scripts are learned in response to recurring situations. As they point out, however, people can deal with situations that are new, and for which they do not have appropriate scriptal knowledge; and they can do this "because they have access to the mechanisms that underlie scripts" (p. 70). These mechanisms are, Schank & Abelson contend, goal-oriented planning. When a script is available to an individual, it is not necessary for him to plan a means to achieve his goal since he possesses a script that gives him a socially accepted means of accomplishing this. When such a script is lacking, however, the individual must plan his actions in order to achieve his goal. Thus, if a particular type

of communication situation is repeatedly encountered by an individual, he will probably develop a script that allows him to achieve his goals in a regular way. Thus, if an individual wishes to raise a point at a formal meeting and is aware of the rules by means of which the meeting is being conducted (i.e., the script), then he will have specific knowledge about how to accomplish this act. If, however, he does not possess such scriptal knowledge, he will have to plan on a more general level.

According to Schank & Abelson, plans can be understood in terms of sub-goals that specify the different goals that together lead to the accomplishment of an overall goal. For example, in order to purchase a book it is first necessary to go to a bookstore, find the book on the shelf, take the book to the cashier, etc. While it is likely that there would be a script for this particular example, if the individual is not accustomed to buying books (or perhaps is from a different culture that handles such matters in a different way) then he will have to plan each stage of the procedure. Each of the steps mentioned above will, consequently, be sub-goals of the overall plan. Such sub-goals, or delta goals (D-goals), are unimportant in themselves but function to advance the overall plan of which they are a part. These D-goals are not necessarily relevant only to a particular type of situation, but may be more generally based upon the cultural/institutional ways of doing things. As examples of D-goals, Schank & Abelson suggest such general instrumental goals as achieving possession (of something), bringing an object (or person) into proximity, or acquiring knowledge.

A plan, then, can be described in terms of a sequential set of

D-goals that together specify how an individual intends to accomplish the overall goal that motivates the plan. Each D-goal contains what Schank & Abelson call a planbox, which is the set of cultural/institutional/personal ways that the individual knows for achieving a particular D-goal. Planboxes can, of course, contain scripts as well as more general specifications of different approaches that can be taken. A restaurant script is useful in understanding how to obtain food in a restaurant; but the use of a script in a conventional way presupposes a certain type of goal on the part of the person using the script. A customer who enters a restaurant but who is not hungry and does not want something to eat or drink is at variance with the script; but on the other hand, people do not generally obtain a hunger goal upon entering a restaurant. Rather, the desire to eat is the goal that leads to a plan to satisfy this hunger. Part of this plan will involve a D-goal that contains in its planbox a script for how to obtain food in a restaurant; but this D-goal can only be fulfilled if the individual has achieved other D-goals, such as getting to the restaurant. Even when involved in a script, however, the individual still has choices to make and particular aspects of the unique situation to interpret. The cultural/institutional script that he knows allows for such deviation, however, and describes the situation only in general structural/procedural terms. Thus, it makes no difference in terms of the script whether the individual orders chicken or steak as long as the particular realization of the script is appropriate to the situation (e.g., one would not normally expect to be able to order chicken in a steak house, or steak in a vegetarian restaurant).

The use that Schank & Abelson make of scripts and plans is

similar to the use that has been made of intersubjective knowledge in the present study; for the purpose of both scripts/plans and intersubjective knowledge is to describe the cultural/institutional knowledge that an individual possesses that allows him to coordinate his activities with other participants in encounters. Thus, for the present purposes, Schank & Abelson's notion of scripts and plans can be interpreted as descriptions of the structures of intersubjective knowledge. As such, parts of intersubjective knowledge can be described in terms of ritualized scripts which are highly structured by constitutive and regulative rules. Other parts, however, may be better described in terms of D-goals and their planboxes. Like scripts, planboxes are based upon past experience and cultural/institutional knowledge of the society. Thus, it is necessary for the plans of the individual participants in an encounter to be mutually recognized in order that some cultural/institutional structures can be agreed upon as a basis for the encounter. This basis may, of course, be highly ritualized as a script, or it may be a looser collection of social rules and/or methods or tactics. For example, while there are scripts for the marriage ceremony, or for the christening of a ship, there does not seem to be the same type of script for informal conversation during a coffee break. Thus, while a marriage ceremony can be understood in terms of the general script that governs such situations (and its particular realizations), conversations during a coffee break are probably better understood in terms of the plans and D-goals of the various participants.

This distinction between scripts and plans seems to be related to the game/ritual continuum that was discussed above in Harré's

description of episodes. Scriptal episodes would, of course, be highly structured in terms of constitutive and regulative rules, as are rituals. Plan-based episodes, on the other hand, would rely more upon the strategies of the individuals in achieving their goals than upon the formal structures of the situation itself, and thus would seem to be games since in games the participants have more freedom in the choice of their actions, or gambits.

The view that results from this consideration of Schank & Abelson's theory, then, is of individuals who each have background knowledge of certain cultural/institutional social scripts, and background knowledge of planning by means of the concatenation of D-goals. In encounters such as communication situations which require social coordination, the shared knowledge of scripts and D-goals provides a basis for establishing an intersubjective understanding; for the participants not only know the cultural/institutional scripts and D-goals (and how they are constructed into plans), but also know that other members of their society have similar knowledge. This provides a basis for negotiation of the basis for the encounter. If appropriate scriptal knowledge is available, the use of such a script provides an efficient and easily negotiated basis; for if such scripts do not exist, or are not mutually known, then concatenations of D-goals and selections from planboxes are required. The transition from one episode to another within an encounter can be understood either as a change in the overall goals of the participants, or as a transition from one D-goal to another. Since D-goals can be realized by scripts from their planboxes, a ritualistic episode can be followed by a more game-oriented episode; and both can be a part of the same encounter, and the same

shared goal of the participants.

Intersubjective Knowledge of D-situations and Meaning_{nn}

While the nature of SA-3 has now been considered, it remains to be seen how knowledge of SA-3 as discussed here is related to obtaining the intended meaning of the utterer. Also of concern is the applicability of the structures described in regards to SA-3 to cases involving extended discourse.

In Chapter 3, mutual knowledge of the state of affairs was considered to be necessary for the audience to understand the utterer's intended meaning. This was expressed in regards to Grice's account in terms of correlating the features of an utterance with the intended response, and in regards to Schiffer's account in terms of a state of affairs which serves as very good or good evidence that the utterer made his utterance with a particular set of intentions. The usefulness of knowledge of D-situations is readily demonstrated by considering one of Grice's (1967) examples of conversational implicature, cited earlier in this study:

A: I'm out of gas.

B: There's a gas station around the corner.

Assuming that A and B are strangers, A's utterance can be understood as a bid for an episode of the needs-help/helping type. Such an episode is informationally dominant, highly cooperative and ritualistic in that it takes the structural form of question-followed-by-answer. From A's personal meaning-context, the encounter can be understood as part of a larger plan to obtain gasoline so that he can refuel his car and proceed on his journey. Thus, the episode is, for A, governed by a D-goal and its accompanying planbox. This planbox specifies different ways for A to obtain information, one of which is to request this

information from someone who is likely to know. The fulfillment of this D-goal is necessary before A can bring himself into proximity with the gasoline, which is another of his D-goals.

A's statement is intelligible to B only because of B's social knowledge, for A's utterance does not specifically state that A wishes to bring himself into proximity with some gasoline that is for sale. It is only by recognizing that what A is uttering is a bid for a certain type of episode governed by A's D-goal that B can understand the utterance and the intended response. Since B responds appropriately, he is telling A that he accepts the bid and the needs-help/helping relationship and is assuming the proper role. If after the termination of this episode A were to go around the corner and find an empty dead-end street, he would be justified in feeling betrayed; and this feeling would result from B's implicit acceptance of the social meaning of the episode. If B's information is incorrect, A can assume either that B is misinformed, or that he intentionally deceived A about his acceptance of the episode and perceived it as being competitive rather than cooperative.

Knowledge of D-situations thus seems useful in determining the basis upon which audiences can understand an utterer's intended message; and, in fact, it can be asserted that it is necessary for the audience to understand the D-situation in order to understand the intended meaning. This is true even in highly information dominant episodes in which the utterer M-intends the explicit propositional content, with the illocutionary force of asserting; for the audience could not understand that this is the case without reference to the episode in which it occurs. Thus, even in this apparently context-

independent example, the audience's recognition of the message still depends upon his knowledge of the communication situation.

Since knowledge of D-situations can be understood to be applicable to audiences' recognition of intended meanings in the narrow application of meaning_{nn}, it would be expected that it would also apply in the broad application, and in the case of extended discourse. More specifically, it would seem that knowledge of the D-situation would be relevant to audiences in reading situations that involve extended discourse. The description of encounters and the utilization of foreground knowledge in regards to different types of episodes seems similar to the position adopted by Adler & Van Doren (1972), who discuss different ways of addressing written texts. Not only do they suggest that the reader must in some way negotiate an understanding of the goals of the writer, but that he must also recognize that books on such diverse subjects as imaginative literature, history and mathematics involve different types of encounters and that such texts should be approached in different ways. This is, of course, basically the same position that has been suggested here; for in terms of the present study, in order to obtain the intended meaning of a text the reader must contextualize the discourse in a particular way. This will, however, be examined more closely in Chapter 5, when communication situations will be considered specifically in regards to the reader as recipient of meaningful communication.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has been concerned with the elucidation of communication situations, and participants' knowledge of such situations

as an important aspect of meaningful communication. The examination of three related descriptions of communication situations has resulted in a theory and an analog model of the communication situation, and has also resulted in a model of participants' knowledge.

Although the applicability of the discussion in this chapter to the view of meaningful communication presented in Chapter 3 has been briefly indicated, the description in this chapter has been general in nature, directed toward the structure of what is intersubjectively understood by participants in order to allow meaningful communication to take place. It remains, however, to apply the general structures indicated here specifically to the reader and the reading situation; for while brief applications have been given at various points in the chapter to indicate how SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3 are relevant to the situation of the reader, these applications have been only suggestive and have not yielded a clear view of the reader in an encounter with a writer/text. From the description given here, however, it would seem that for the reader to obtain the writer's message, more is required than the recognition of the formal aspects of the utterance, or an understanding of the utterance-type. The reader must, in some way, contextualize the discourse in order to establish some type of mutual understanding with the writer/text in regards to the situational exigence and perhaps the constraints. Also, the reader must recognize the particular type of episodic structure that the writer intends as the basis for mutual understanding of the nature of the encounter. Thus, the states of affairs described as SA-2 and SA-3 become a part of the intersubjective understanding that was described in terms of SA-1 as a difference between signal and message communication. What

is not yet clear, however, is how such things as episodes and scripts are to be understood in terms of the reader and his encounter with the writer/text. The elucidation of these issues is the task of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5
READING AS COMMUNICATION

The Description of Reading Situations

While the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 has served to develop a position in regards to language communication, the application of this perspective to written language communication has been indicated only in a general way. Since the focus of the present study is, however, reading-as-communication, or the reader as recipient of meaningful communication, it is necessary to apply the general language position to the specific situation of the reader. In approaching this question, it is necessary to determine first the type of answer that is desirable and appropriate here. Since the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 has dealt with the general structure of meaningful communication within particular communication situations, the application of this position to the specific P-domain of the reader can result in only a general description of the form that constitutes a reading situation. This does not, of course, mean that this structure cannot be elaborated; but it does imply that the application of the position previously developed in this study is only capable of elaborating this structure in a general way.

In applying the view of language communication presented in Chapters 3 and 4 to reading and the reader, there are at least two relevant applications. First, there is the communication between the writer/text and the reader; and second, there are the conversations between characters in stories, which must be comprehended by a reader. That both of these applications are relevant is readily apparent; for when a reader reads Brutus's and Antony's speeches in Julius Caesar,

the reader must understand not only the nature of the communication situation that exists between the reader and the text, but also the communication situation that is reported in the text. Also, the reported communication situation is, itself, a part of the text that must be understood in terms of communication between the writer/text and the reader. While both of these applications are, then, not only important but often actually interrelated in meaningful reading, the primary concern of this chapter will be with the communication between the writer/text and the reader since this requires greater elucidation than does the other application, which has already been discussed to some extent in Chapter 4.

Since it has been a central argument of the previous two chapters that the knowledge of the communication situation, or state of affairs, in which the communication takes place is of essential importance in determining the meaning of an intended message, the first question that arises in regards to reading and the reader is what is to constitute a reading situation. In the normal reading situation, as posited in the first chapter of this study, the writer and reader have been described as having no personal knowledge of each other. In such situations, readers can be considered to be confronted by written texts of messages which are read at particular times and places, such as in classrooms, living rooms, or while traveling on buses.

While there seems to be a legitimate sense in which the actual spatial and temporal situation of the reader at the time of his reading can be considered to be a reading situation, this type of situation, or environment, seems inappropriate for the consideration of the reading situation as communication situation, even though this environment may

well influence the reader in his understanding of the text. This is evident from the view of meaning that has been adopted here, for an essential aspect of the communication situation is that it be mutually known by the utterer and the audience. The environment in which the reader confronts the text is, however, obviously neither mutually known nor intended by the utterer/writer to provide good or very good evidence for the audience/reader's recognition of the utterer's intended response. Also, since the structures of communication situations must be in some way intersubjectively understood by the participants, it would seem that the reader's knowledge of the environment cannot serve as a basis for intersubjective understanding since the same text can be read upon different occasions and in different environments, all of which are unknown to the writer of the message.

It is not, however, just the nature of the reading situation that provides an initial difficulty; for a further problem arises in considering the nature of the participants. While from an omniscient point of view it is possible to distinguish a writer and a reader, from the reader's point of view the interaction is not necessarily between the reader and a writer, but often between the reader and a text. Since in the normal reading situation the reader is personally unacquainted with the writer, the reader must infer the writer. Consequently, the basic reading situation can be described from the reader's point of view as an interaction not between the reader and a writer, but rather between the reader and a text. Since the purpose of the present study is to focus upon the reader, rather than upon the reader/writer dyad, this interpretation of the reading situation will provide a basis for the consideration of the reader as the recipient

of meaningful communication.

The fact that the reading situation as considered here is understood to involve a reader/text dyad rather than a reader/writer dyad does not mean that the notion of a writer can be eliminated. Such a position would contradict the basic view of language communication described in Chapter 3, for in this view the audience is required to perceive the utterance as being in some way M-intended in order to understand the meaning. Since texts must be considered to be utterances, not utterers, such M-intentions cannot be posited of the text itself but must be attributed to the utterer of the text, or the writer. The point here, however, is that the utterer that is posited by the reader of the utterance/text may not necessarily be identical to the writer as considered from an omniscient point of view; for the writer of concern here is posited by the audience/reader only as a means for considering the text as an utterance that is M-intended. Thus, the writer of a meaningful text will be considered here not in terms of the actual omnisciently identified writer, but in terms of the reader's perception of the writer as a source of the M-intended message of the text.

This view of the writer presents difficulties, of course; but these difficulties are not unique to written texts; for the same type of situation can arise with oral language as well (e.g., in instances involving telephone calls from strangers, or recorded speeches or conversations). In order to clarify and elucidate the basic position that has been suggested here in regards to reading situations, however, it is necessary to consider this situation in terms of the three communication situations discussed in Chapter 4: SA-1, SA-2, and

SA-3. After this has been done, it will be possible to apply this view of reading situations to a few selected examples of texts in order to illustrate the applicability of this general position.

The Reading Situation as SA-1

The situation involving message transmission, or SA-1, was discussed in Chapter 4 in terms of Gricean meaning and messages, and was seen to involve intersubjective understanding between the participants in order for there to be mutual knowledge of the state of affairs in which the utterance is made. This can be described, of course, in terms of the pairs of definitions given in Chapter 3 for an utterer meaning something, and for an audience understanding the meaning of an utterance. In formulating the definitions of what is required for an audience to understand an utterer's intended meaning, it was noted that difficulties could arise if an audience's intentions were considered; and consequently the definitions were given without regard to these intentions. This difficulty was due primarily to specific types of situations that did not involve extended discourse, but rather involved situations in which the audience was in some way caught by surprise by the utterance and therefore probably could not be considered to intend to understand the M-intended message. In considering the normal reading situation, however, these objections do not seem to be relevant; for while a reader may be suddenly confronted by a text, and may respond "automatically" to it without perhaps intending to (e.g., subliminal advertising), in cases involving texts of extended discourse it would seem that the reader would have to intend to comprehend the meaning of the text in order for this understanding to take place. This is, of course, basic to many current

theoretical positions in reading (e.g., Goodman, 1976; Rumelhart, 1976; Smith, 1971; Stauffer, 1969), and is in no way unique to the position developed in the present study. The implications of this position are, however, important in regards to the immediate issue.

If in cases of extended discourse the reader must be understood to intend to understand in order for him to recognize the M-intended message of the text, it would seem that in confronting a text a reader can either have this intention to understand, or can have some other intention such that he does not intend to understand this message. For convenience, this can be considered in terms of the reader intending to understand (R+), or the reader not intending to understand (R-). As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the intention to understand is not sufficient for understanding since understanding involves the recognition of the M-intentions of the utterer, but this intention does seem to be a preliminary requirement for the understanding of lengthy texts. For the present purposes, the M-intended message is, of course, the message as perceived by the reader, not as perceived from an omniscient point of view; and the reader's perception of the message may, of course, differ from what would be considered the message from an omniscient point of view, or from the perspective of the writer. This suggests that the M-intended message of a text must be considered here in terms of the reader's perception of the text rather than as something inherent in the text which must be "discovered" by the reader. This is, of course, consistent with the view of meaning and messages discussed in regards to SA-1; for the meaning of the text cannot be considered to be, as Swanson & Delia (1976) point out, analogous to a billiard ball that has a predictable effect, but rather obtains its

effect by means of the reader's recognition of the message.

This description of the situation can be restated in a simpler form by first noting that the reader can either perceive the text as an M-intended message (M_t) or can perceive it as not embodying such a message (M-). M- does not, however, mean that the reader denies that the text is capable of being interpreted as an M-intended message, but only notes that in terms of the reader's purposes in confronting a text, this text can be perceived as not being M-intended. For example, if a reader consults a history text in order to obtain a particular historical fact (e.g., an answer to a factual question about the reign of Henry IV), the reader is involved in some type of reading and communication situation with the text; but it is not the reader's intention to recognize or understand the M-intended message of the text. In fact, whether or not there is such an M-intended message is irrelevant to the reader in obtaining the information he seeks. This example can be contrasted with the case in which the reader confronts the text in order to understand what was meant by the writer of the text in uttering the information about the reign of Henry IV.

While there seems to be at least some intuitive basis for suggesting that M- is possible, as in the example cited above, it can be argued that in such examples the information that is sought is in some way a part of the M-intended message and that the reader must, therefore, perceive the text as an utterance with an M-intended message in order for him to obtain the particular information that is sought. The difficulty suggested by this argument results from the fact that messages are complex in nature, and can entail many different aspects; and for the reader to obtain even a part of the intended message

requires that the text be perceived as a message. Similarly, messages can, as suggested above, be considered both in terms of the narrow and the broad application of the nature of meaning such that the perception of any meaning in a text requires at least some type of narrow application such that a part of the text is perceived as meaningful.

This difficulty does not, unfortunately, seem to be easily or neatly resolvable. In the example cited above, however, it is possible to suggest that the reader is relying upon what Grice terms the timeless meaning of the utterance-type in order to obtain the desired information, and consequently does not deal with the applied timeless or occasion-meaning. Thus, the text is approached ultimately in terms of a set of utterance-types, rather than in terms of occasion-meanings; and the reader consequently does not intend to recognize the meaning that was M-intended. There are, however, other examples that cannot be accounted for so easily by this distinction. For example, a reader may be searching for the dates of the reign of Henry IV in an almanac instead of a history text, in which case the reader can recognize that the intention of the almanac is to give such assorted facts. Also, there is the case in which an automobile mechanic consults a service manual in order to obtain a particular specification, in which case the reader can intend to recognize the part of the intended message that is the specification he desires. Consequently, as illustrated by these two examples, it is not always the case that searching for specific information means that the reader perceives the text as M- rather than M_t ; for in these cases it is a part of the M_t that the reader seeks, not some information which may incidentally appear in the message.

Even this discussion, however, does not exhaust the possible complexity of the M_t /M- distinction; for it can be suggested that an automobile mechanic can be searching a service manual for a specification which he perceives to be a part of the intended message of the manual, yet can find this specification mentioned in regards to something else. In this case he can obtain the specification he desires while perceiving the part of the text that he has read as M- since the information was a part of an utterance-type that he was not concerned to recognize in terms of its applied timeless meaning. Thus, while the mechanic perceived it as part of the intended message of the manual to supply the information about the specification, the actual discovery of the specification involved perceiving the text as M-.

While it is important to recognize the complexity of the relationship between the text and the reader's perception of the text as M_t or M-, for the present purposes it is expedient to resolve this difficulty by resorting again to the contention that what is of concern here is not the situation from an omniscient point of view, but the situation from the reader's point of view. From the examples cited above, it seems that the text can only be perceived as M- if the reader recognizes that there is an M-intended message of the text and perceives this M-intended message to be different from the specific information that is sought. For example, if a reader consults a history text for specific information about the reign of Henry IV, and views the text as having an M-intended message that differs from the purpose for which it is consulted, it would seem that the reader is viewing the text as M- since the reader is not concerned with the M_t that is recognized as being M-intended by the text. In consulting

an almanac for the same information, however, it is possible for the reader to perceive the text as M-intended as a collection of such facts, in which case the information that is sought about the reign of Henry IV is a part of the M_t as perceived by the reader. Thus, it would seem that it is only when a reader recognizes a text as having an M-intended message, M_t , that it is possible for the reader to perceive, or contextualize, the text as M- since the message can only be perceived as being of no concern if this message is in some way recognized. This is not to say, of course, that readers must be correct in their views of M_t ; for it is entirely possible for readers to fail to recognize what would be, from the writer's point of view, the M_t . In the present study, however, only the reader's perception of the text is of concern.

A similar difficulty also arises in regards to describing the M_t itself; for it seems to be possible for a reader to perceive the message of the text not only as being different from that intended by the writer, but also as different from the reader's perception of the writer's intended message. The reader's perception of the writer's intended message (M_w) is, of course, all that is available to the reader, and can be understood to be based upon the reader identifying himself with the writer's motivations and intentions as if they were his own. It is, however, possible for the reader to obtain a textual message that he perceives to be different from the message intended by the writer. Such cases can occur, for example, in reading one of Shakespeare's plays as an example of Elizabethan drama rather than as a message intended by Shakespeare. Such cases can occur not only as a result of adopting a historical perspective, but can also result from reading for such purposes as the comparison of themes. To read,

for example, Donleavy's The Ginger Man as a picaresque novel, and to compare it to, for instance, Fielding's Joseph Andrews, results in a perception of the text in a different way than if the purpose were to obtain Donleavy's intended message.

Cases in which M_t is not perceived as the same as M_w differ from cases of M_- in that they are concerned with the message of the text, but a message that, while related to M_w , cannot be considered to be the same as M_w . It may or may not have been Donleavy's intention that his rogue in The Ginger Man be compared to Fielding's in Joseph Andrews, or to Mann's in The Confessions of Felix Krull; but by focusing upon this issue, the reader is contextualizing the text and interpreting its intended message in a way that may or may not actually have been intended by the writer but which is, from the reader's point of view, different than perceiving the text in terms of M_w .

In distinguishing between the case in which M_t is equal to M_w , and the case in which it is not, it is important to note that what are being described are the extremes in a range of possible combinations; for M_t can be understood to approach M_w in varying degrees. Thus, considering Dickens' Oliver Twist as an example of Victorian literature may entail a considerable difference between M_t and M_w since it was probably not Dickens' intention to produce a piece of Victorian literature. On the other hand, considering Donleavy's The Ginger Man as an example of a picaresque novel seems quite close to what Donleavy's intention probably was; and thus the difference between M_t and M_w would not be as considerable as in the case of Oliver Twist as a Victorian novel. While this complexity is important to note, it is expedient here to simplify the situation by considering only the

extreme cases in which M_t is seen to be M_w , and the other case in which M_t is understood to be different than M_w .

What is apparent even from this brief discussion of the reader's perception of a text is that the reader must in some way contextualize the text in order to recognize an intended message. Thus, it is necessary that the reader intend to understand this message, and determine whether it is the writer's intended message or some other message that is to be understood. In terms of the distinctions that have been made thus far in this chapter, the following possible reading situations can be listed:

R+: M_t ($M_t = M_w$)

R+: M_t ($M_t \neq M_w$)

R+: M-

R-: M_{\pm}

The first of these cases can be understood as the case in which the reader intends to perceive the text as an M-intended message, and where this M-intended message is perceived by the reader to be the message intended by the writer. This does not, as suggested above, mean that M_w must be equivalent to the writer's intended message from an omniscient point of view. Rather, in this context, the "writer" is the view of the writer that is held by the reader. For example, in reading a text such as Melville's Moby Dick which is written in the first person, it is possible (and perhaps helpful) to understand the intended M_w as being the message being communicated by Ishmael. In fact, in the sense being suggested here it is not even necessary that the reader consciously posit a writer of the message; for what is being contended is that when the reader is intent upon the M_w of the

text, he will contextualize the message as if it were the utterance of an individual utterer, and may focus his attention upon the message itself. While in some texts a writer is explicitly presented, this is not always the case. Thus, while 18th and 19th Century novelists such as Fielding allowed themselves authorial comments, Joyce followed an avowed intention to refine the writer out of existence in order to leave the text as an M-intentioned document which did not require or allow the perception of the writer behind it. This is not, however, to contend that Ulysses cannot be read in terms of an M_w , but only that the recognition and positing of the writer as a personality is not necessary in terms of Ulysses while it is, at times, necessary when reading for the M_w of Tom Jones.

The second type of basic reading situation, $R+$: M_t ($M_t \neq M_w$), as discussed above, involves reading for the message of the text even though this message is not considered to be identical with what the reader perceives the writer's intended message to be. Reading Donleavy's The Ginger Man or Fielding's Joseph Andrews as picaresque novels exemplifies this type of reading situation; for while the novels are presumably intended to be of this type, it is not necessarily the intention of the writer to contribute to the genre. This is not, of course, always the case; for while Austen's Northanger Abbey satirizes the gothic/romantic novel, it would seem that Austen intends as a part of the message that the novel be considered in terms of this genre.

The third basic reading situation as defined here, $R+$: $M-$, represents cases in which the reader intends to obtain information from the text that may or may not be a part of what he perceives to be the intended message of the text. As suggested above, it may be

necessary for the reader to posit an M_t for the text that can then be ignored. In such cases, the reader obviously does not intend to communicate with the text in terms of the text's message, but rather denies whatever message the text may represent and contextualizes it solely in terms of his own purposes.

The fourth basic reading situation, R-: M_t , is the case in which the reader does not intend to obtain any meaningful message from the text; and consequently whether he perceives the text as being meaningful or not is irrelevant. In such a case it is doubtful that the reader would even consult the text in more than a cursory way, for this situation represents a case in which the reader does not choose to engage in a reading situation at all. An example of such a situation would be when an individual searches the shelves of a library for a suitable book to read. Those that he rejects as unacceptable are rejected on the basis of this situation by the reader's refusal of whatever communication he may perceive the text as offering. Since this case is a denial of communication, it is not of interest here, and is described only as a contrast with the other three basic reading situations to emphasize that these situations do not occur automatically, but are selected by the reader. This is, of course, only to re-emphasize that when reading is defined as communication, it must be perceived as an active and intentional engagement on the part of the reader.

While these four descriptions of reading situations can be considered to be basic, it must be noted that they represent a simplification of the reading situation; for not only are there a range of possibilities obscured by the first two descriptions, as discussed

above, but the description of any actual reading situation by means of one of these descriptions will often, and perhaps always, be oversimplified. This is due not only to the fact that reading situations have been described thus far only in regards to SA-1, but also to the fact that as discussed here the reading situation is chosen by the reader; and this decision may change in the course of reading. Thus, readers who begin by contextualizing a text in such a way as to intend to understand M_w , may later become disinterested in this message and may change their attitudes from R+ to R-, or may come to perceive the text as M-. Similarly, a reader who abhors descriptive passages may contextualize such passages as M- while retaining an overall intention to understand M_w . It is also possible to read, for example, Dickens' Oliver Twist both in terms of what the reader perceives as Dickens' intentions, and also as an example of a Victorian novel. The text would, consequently, be contextualized by the reader both as M_t equalling M_w , and as a situation in which M_t does not equal M_w . The point here is that an actual reading situation may be a complex of different basic reading situations such that the reader contextualizes the same text in different ways, and thereby obtains multiple messages from his reading.

This view of reading situations as intentional contextualizations by the reader seems to be relevant in regards to Gibson & Levin's (1975) objections to reading models; for as they contend:

No single model will serve to describe the reading process, because there are as many reading processes as there are people who read, things to be read, and goals to be served. Reading is as varied and adaptive an activity as perceiving, remembering, or thinking, since in fact it includes all these activities. (p. 454)

To illustrate this point, Gibson & Levin give a series of descriptions of different ways in which readers approach texts. While the present study is not concerned with strategies in the sense that is intended by Gibson & Levin, it does seem that the view of basic reading situations is useful in explaining at least some of the complexity that they note. The position here, however, has not been to use the complexity of reading as an argument against the possibility of describing reading, but rather to use a complex description in order to indicate one of the sources of this complexity, and to suggest how it can be accounted for by means of a consideration of the communicative aspects of reading.

While the four basic reading situations described thus far seem to provide at least a tentative basis for understanding the reader as recipient of meaningful communication, this description has been obtained only through a consideration of SA-1. As with the description of communication situations, however, the nature of reading situations can be elaborated by means of the framework developed in Chapter 4 in regards to both SA-2 and SA-3. Such an elaboration should provide a more detailed description of reading situations, and should help to clarify what has, thus far, been described only in a general way.

The Reading Situation as SA-2

Since SA-1 is concerned with message transmission, when this view is applied to the reader and the reading situation it results in a description of the reader's perception of the message of the text, and of the message of the writer. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, in order for an audience to understand a message, it is necessary that there be some type of intersubjective understanding between the utterer

and the audience; and this understanding must be negotiated by the participants in the communication situation since each participant brings a different cultural/institutional/personal meaning-context to the situation. This negotiation was not of concern in regards to the reading situation as described by SA-1 since this preliminary description of the reading situation involved the reader's intentions toward the text's message. In considering the reading situation as SA-2, however, negotiation becomes an important and useful concept.

In Chapter 4, SA-2 was described in terms of the rhetorical situation (R-situation); and this type of situation was understood to include all situations except those in which the utterance is intended to be purely expressive. To identify a message as being either rhetorical or expressive, however, requires that there be a message; and since only the first two of the four reading situations described above represent cases in which the reader intends to understand the message of the text, it is only these two situations that can be profitably elaborated by a further consideration of communication situations. Thus, the third and fourth reading situations have already been described as thoroughly as possible in terms of communication situations, as defined in the present study. The reading situation as SA-2 and SA-3 will, consequently, be restricted to the first two cases as defined above.

According to the model developed in Chapter 4, then, the reader can contextualize the message of a text as being either rhetorical or expressive in character. This would seem to be the case whether the reader perceives this to be the intention of the writer or not; and since the reading situation has been understood as being complex in

nature, it would seem to be possible for the reader to contextualize M_t in both ways, resulting in the understanding of two different but related textual messages. This is clearly exemplified by a reader who confronts a text of Swinburne's poetry; for since Swinburne often relies heavily upon rhythm and alliteration, these technical features can obscure whatever rhetorical intention may be attributed to Swinburne. Thus, while a Swinburne poem can be understood as intended to be rhetorical, such a poem can also be read as expressive and as an "object" for aesthetic appreciation independent of the rhetorical intent. This expressive dimension can also, however, be understood as intended by Swinburne such that the text was intended to be contextualized in both ways.

In contextualizing a text, then, the reader can perceive it as being either rhetorical or expressive. This is, however, to some extent a negotiated understanding; for the text of the message may indicate the intention with which the utterance was made; and if the reader notes and accepts the writer's avowed intention in this regard, it can serve as the basis for his perception that M_w is either expressive or rhetorical. While the expressive situation was not elaborated in Chapter 4, and thus cannot be elucidated on the basis of the model presented there, the rhetorical aspect of a message was discussed in terms of an exigence that was addressed, and the constraints of the situation. While the situation seems to be constrained by the reader's own knowledge and intentions, and by the nature of the text, it is not yet clear how constraints may operate in the reading situation. Exigences, however, were defined as a continuum ranging from cases in which the exigence is mutually understood or accepted by the participants

to cases in which the exigence is created by the utterer. This distinction was illustrated by noting that a reader of Wittgenstein's Tractatus may perceive the text as addressing a mutually known exigence, or as creating an exigence, depending upon the knowledge that the reader has. Exigences are not, however, always left entirely to the reader to discover; for in many types of nonfictional writing, the text includes a discussion of the exigence that is addressed. While this can serve as a basis for the reader's determination of the rhetorical aspect of M_w , if the reader is naive in regards to the exigence that the text presents it may still be the case that the text is perceived by the reader as creating an exigence which it then addresses. Similarly, a text may suggest that it is creating an exigence when the reader has knowledge that allows him to contextualize the text as addressing an accepted or established exigence. In such a case, the reader would most likely presume that the text's claim to be creating an exigence is naive. This contextualization may, however, result in what would be, from an omniscient point of view, a naive or incorrect reading of the text; for it is possible for a text to create an exigence which is similar to, but not identical with, the exigence that the reader perceives it to be addressing.

On the basis of these distinctions in terms of R-situations, then, the first two basic reading situations described in terms of SA-1 can be elaborated to indicate the further aspects of contextualization that the reader may utilize in attempting to understand a text. In order to represent these additional features in abbreviated form, EXP will be used for the term "expressive," RH for "rhetorical," E_c for "created exigence," and E_a for "accepted exigence." Using

these abbreviations, the basic descriptions of reading situations can be expanded to the following:

$$R+: M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a)$$

$$R+: M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a)$$

$$R+: M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c)$$

$$R+: M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c)$$

$$R+: M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP$$

$$R+: M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP$$

These different reading situations can be briefly illustrated by considering the case of a research report on an empirical scientific study. While from an omniscient point of view the report may be intended to be rhetorical, with either a created or an accepted exigence, the reader is free either to accept whatever avowed intention is stated or implied in the text, or to contextualize the report in some other way. As Bitzer (1968) argues, scientific reports can be considered in some ways to be expressive rather than rhetorical since they can be intended, or contextualized, as a presentation of "fact" without a rhetorical intention to persuade or influence. Thus, the reader can contextualize the report as expressive in nature, and can do this whether or not it is the intention of the reader to understand the intended message of the writer. The case where M_t does not equal M_w for the reader can be understood to be such that the reader may or may not recognize what the research is intended to report, for the reader may search through journal articles for support of an argument that may be peripheral to the research reported. Scientific articles are not, however, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, always expressive in nature, nor are they always contextualized as such; for the reader

can contextualize the report as rhetorical discourse that addresses either an established or a created exigence. In the former case, the reader would perceive the report as addressing an issue of which the reader is aware; and in the latter case the report would be understood as creating an exigence, either because the report is exploring a new area and raising a new question, or because the reader was previously unaware of what might actually be an accepted exigence. As with expressive discourse, this can be the situation whether the reader intends to understand the writer's intended meaning, or perceives the report as a document addressed to an issue that the reader brings to the situation.

As was noted in Chapter 4, R-situations can be understood to apply either in a narrow sense, or in a broad sense in which the entire discourse is perceived as an utterance in an R-situation. While R-situations were incorporated into the model of intersubjective knowledge and the communication situation only in the narrow sense, it is important to recognize that this broad application can still apply in the realization of a particular communication situation. While this can serve to complicate further what is already a complex description of the situation, this additional complication must be recognized since it can also describe the way in which a reader contextualizes a text.

As with the reading situation as defined by SA-1, it must be noted that a reader may change his view of the R-situation while reading a text, and thus may contextualize different parts of a text in different ways. Since this contextualization is negotiated by the reader, he is free either to follow whatever intentions are expressed

by the text, or to contextualize as suits his purpose in reading.

The Reading Situation as SA-3

As suggested above, the reading situation is constrained by the substance of the text, and by the knowledge and intentions of the reader. In terms of SA-3, this can be understood in terms of the nature of the encounter that is offered by the text, and by the nature of the encounter that the reader seeks in addressing the text. The textual constraint would seem to be at least partially understandable in terms of the episodic structure; for this structure was considered, in Chapter 4, to be governed by constitutive and regulative rules that dictate the nature of the episodic encounter.

According to the model of intersubjective knowledge presented in Chapter 4, it is through an encounter that background knowledge is realized as foreground knowledge of the episode in which the participants are involved, and in the context of which the emergent and transcendent grounds are understood. In terms of the reader, then, an encounter with a text demands that the reader utilize his background knowledge of reading situations in order to contextualize the text in terms of the knowledge that has been brought to the foreground. There are, however, at least two ways in which the nature of a reading encounter can be understood from the reader's point of view; for in a strict sense, the encounter is each time that the reader confronts the text. If the text is set aside for any period of time, then again consulted, this results in a second encounter rather than a continuation of the first. In the lax sense of encounter, this type of continuation could be considered as a single encounter since the interruption would be analogous to a brief pause in an oral conversation (while, for

example, a plane passed overhead). The difficulty with the lax sense of encounter is that intervening events may make it impossible for the reader to re-establish the original encounter in exactly the same way since the reader will have intervening experiences that will enrich his personal meaning-context. Also, it is possible that the reader may contextualize the text in a different way when he addresses it a second time since the previous encounter may have developed to a point that is irretrievable. This is, of course, the point made by Poe in "The Philosophy of Composition" in which he suggests that a work of literature should not exceed what can be read at one sitting since the impact of the work will be diminished or lost if the reading is interrupted.

It must, however, be noted that interruptions in encounters can also be beneficial; for the reader may choose to interrupt an encounter in order to reconsider how the text should be contextualized. This would seem to be particularly helpful in cases in which the reader is unsatisfied with his understanding of the text and recognizes that a different approach, perhaps with different foreground parameters, may be helpful.

In terms of Chapter 4, an encounter with a text places the reader in an episode with the text involving the following sequence: initiation, definition, instantiation, rule confirmation, strategic development, and termination. The episode can, of course, be prematurely terminated at any time by the reader simply by setting the text aside. In the normal development of an encounter, however, the reader initiates the encounter by consulting the text. The definition of the nature and purpose of the encounter is either negotiated with

the text if the reader is intent upon M_w , or is brought to the encounter by the reader if the reader is not primarily concerned with M_w . Instantiation and rule confirmation would seem to result when the text is perceived and understood by the reader to yield a fruitful encounter by means of the contextualization adopted. This can mean that the reader recognizes and accepts the explicit or implicit bid by the text, or finds the text suitable for his own purposes. A reader consulting McCarthy's Birds of America expecting to encounter a discourse about birds will, of course, be unable to instantiate an episode that consists of the text supplying factual information about birds since the novel offers a quite different type of encounter. If the reader is willing to accept this bid by the text, he may then contextualize it appropriately and proceed with his reading. If his interest in birds is of primary concern, however, the failure of the text to recognize and accept the bid of the reader can result in an early termination of the encounter.

While from an omniscient point of view the encounter between a text and a reader is not interactive since the text is passive, from the reader's point of view this would not seem to be the case; for in confronting a text, the text may appear to the reader to be offering a bid for a particular type of encounter, and may defy his efforts to contextualize it and confirm the rules he seeks to instantiate. While the contextualization is, of course, being done by the reader, this contextualization would seem to result in the reader's receiving a message in terms of this contextualization. To the reader, then, the text can appear active if it is appropriately contextualized, even though this active nature results from the reader's contextualization

rather than from any activity on the part of the text itself. This was illustrated above in regards to McCarthy's Birds of America, for in that illustration the reader contextualizes the text first in terms of a type of episodic encounter that is inappropriate for the text. The fact that the text does not correspond to these expectations can be perceived by the reader as a refusal of the text to accept the reader's bid, and can result in a failure to instantiate a set of parameters for the encounters.

The nature of initiation/definition/instantiation can be more clearly understood when what is instantiated is considered; for the above discussion has suggested only in a general way what is realized as foreground knowledge through an encounter in a reading situation. As discussed in Chapter 4, what is realized is a set of procedures, or constitutive and regulative rules, that govern the way in which the episode is to be conducted. In other words, what is instantiated is the form or structure of the encounter which allows an utterance to be understood within the context of emergent and transcendent grounds.

The form of simple stories has been considered in terms of schemata by researchers concerned with memory, and it would seem that such schemata are at least related to what is being suggested here. While one group of researchers (e.g., Kintsch, 1976; Meyer, 1975) has been concerned with the textual organization in terms of the propositions of the text, another group (e.g., Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977) has been concerned with the more general structure of stories, or the macrostructure of extended discourse. These two approaches are generally considered in terms of a distinction between bottom-up and top-down processing. The concern

of those researchers who focus upon bottom-up processing is with the relationships among the propositions and the linking of individual propositions into larger and more meaningful structures, whereas the concern of those researchers who deal with top-down processing is with the general knowledge of story structure that a reader brings to a text, and uses in order to structure and comprehend the message. This kind of knowledge about stories is considered in terms of a cognitive story schema. As Mandler & Johnson suggest:

We use the term "story schema" to refer to an idealized internal representation of the parts of a typical story and the relationships among those parts. It is claimed that people use this type of representation of stories to guide comprehension during encoding and as a retrieval mechanism during recall. (p. 111)

While the present study is not directly concerned with the actual processing of texts, the notion of story schema seems to describe in part what has previously been discussed only as the structure or form of an episode.

While it is tempting to substitute this notion of story schema for an encounter, and to adopt this as the structure of reading situations involving story texts, to do so would distort and oversimplify what has been suggested in terms of communication situations. This is due to the fact that work on story schemata is at an early stage of development, and has not yet been elaborated to the extent demanded by the structure of an encounter. The descriptions of story schemata that have been constructed represent simple stories in a general way and have been concerned with the description of texts themselves rather than with the description of communication situations. Thus, the dimensions suggested in Chapter 4 such as the game/ritual continuum and the episodic dominance do not fit conveniently into the story

schemata that have been proposed. Also, these top-down schemata are designed to apply to a wide range of stories, and are thus at a more general level than the structure of encounters, as described previously; for in terms of an encounter there are obvious differences between, for example, a fable and a mystery story; and these differences can result in different contextualizations by a reader. This is not, however, to deny the relationship between schemata and encounters; for it is possible to consider encounters as a particular type of schema. In order to maintain a distinction between what is being suggested here in terms of communication and work that is being done with schemata in terms of memory, however, encounters will not be identified with schemata.

The main difficulty with the schemata designed by researchers concerned with memory is the fact that encounters have been described as the utilization of knowledge of situations, realized in terms of episodes, while schemata have been designed, as in the schemata suggested by Mandler & Johnson, Rumelhart and Thorndyke, as a complete description of a text. As was pointed out in Chapter 4 in regards to the negotiation of episodic form, the participants can contextualize a message in terms of a specific structure if they have knowledge of such a structure, or what Schank & Abelson call a script. But such scriptal knowledge is not always available to the audience; and when it is not they must use their knowledge of planning, or the concatenation of D-goals, in order to understand the nature of the episode in which they are involved. Applied to reading situations, this same flexibility seems to be an important aspect of the reader's contextualization of the text; for it is possible that the text represents a

scriptal form that is unfamiliar to the reader. In such a situation, the text would probably not be unintelligible to the reader; but the reader would have to rely upon more general knowledge of goal-oriented planning rather than upon scriptal knowledge of the form of the encounter that was presumably intended by the writer. For example, while a fable has a recognizable form that can be described in terms of constitutive and regulative rules that govern such encounters, a reader who is unfamiliar with the structure of a fable can still read and understand such a text; but instead of relying upon specific knowledge of the rules by which the episode is structured, the reader will be forced to rely upon more general strategies for understanding the structure of the episode.

As was pointed out in regards to Schank & Abelson's notion of scripts and plans, scripts arise when recurring situations are met often enough so that the structures of such encounters have been learned. In novel situations the reader must rely upon more general strategies of planning by means of a recognition of the text's D-goals, or the imposition of his own D-goals upon the text. Since scriptal knowledge develops through experience, it can be suggested that if a reader frequently encounters Victorian novels, he will probably develop specific expectations for such texts based upon the rule-governed structure of such encounters. This is not, of course, to say that the episodic rules by means of which the reader contextualizes a text will always succeed in meeting the structure bid by the text; but this is only to reiterate that the negotiation of structure may be an on-going activity throughout the course of an encounter.

In reading situations, then, it seems that episodes can be

characterized in terms of types, or genres that are based upon the knowledge of the reader and the extent to which the reader has learned general genre types of written language communication that may exist in the culture. This sense of genre can be applied in a narrow sense to, for example, Shakespeare's early comedies (as opposed to Shakespeare's other plays and poems) or to such general categories as scientific research reports or contemporary novels. When the reader has not developed specific knowledge of a genre to the point at which it becomes useful in understanding a text, he can rely upon more general structures such as, in the case of a novel, his general knowledge of narrative structure. That such flexibility is necessary is apparent from the fact that readers can, without undue difficulty, understand and contextualize novels such as Sterne's Tristram Shandy, which willfully violates many of the normal procedures for conducting encounters of this type. In fact, it can be suggested that the humor of Tristram Shandy results partly from the violation of the constitutive rules for narrative discourse.

In addition to this general description of encounter episodes, these episodes were described, in Chapter 4, in terms of their structural and dominance aspects. As indicated in Chapter 4, the game/ritual continuum is related to the script/plan distinction already discussed, and in terms of reading situations relates to the structure that is perceived by the reader and the way in which the reader perceives the writer to have intended the structure to be understood. Ritual types of structures can be understood to be genre forms that are basically inflexible, such as mystery stories, fables, and reports of empirical research, while game structures can be understood to represent

non-genre novels such as Fowles's The Magus, Donleavy's A Fairy Tale of New York, and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury. As pointed out in Chapter 4, the difference between games and rituals must be understood to be one of degree; for games too must have some constitutive structure. For the present purposes, rituals can be understood to represent contextualizations based upon scriptal knowledge, while games are understood by means of planning and D-goals.

The competition/cooperation continuum does not seem to apply to the reading situation in quite the same way as it was understood in terms of general communication situations since the reader is co-operating with the text in seeking to understand the intended message, whether this message is perceived by the reader to represent M_w or not. Competition between the reader and the text, then, must be understood in terms of situations such as $R+ : M-$ and $R+ : M_+$, since in these two situations the reader is not cooperating with the text but is, rather, competing with it in the only way that seems possible.¹ Thus, this competition/cooperation continuum seems to apply to the reading situation not at the episode or foreground level, but at the message level, and in terms of contextualization at SA-1. At any rate, nothing

¹In addition, it could be contended that critical or evaluative reading involves competition. Such reading, however, would seem to entail a complex relationship between the reader and the text; for in such reading it would be necessary for the reader first to obtain an M_t , then to consider this M_t in regards to some established or known criteria. In considering the M_t in this way, the text would be contextualized in a different way than it was in obtaining the original M_t , thus resulting in a second reading situation. It can, then, be suggested that critical or evaluative reading may involve comparing or contrasting two or more different contextualizations of the text in what may be a competitive way. But this type of competition may be different than the notion of competition when applied to an individual reading situation.

seems to be added to the understanding of reading situations by means of this continuum; and it will, consequently, not be considered further.

As suggested in Chapter 4, communication situations can be considered to be either structurally, relationally, or informationally dominant. In contextualizing a written text, then, it would seem that a reader can contextualize the situation as being dominant in terms of any of these three aspects. This is, of course, an oversimplification; for as pointed out in Chapter 4, dominance is only a matter of degree, and does not suggest an exclusive dominance. That this is a relevant aspect is suggested by the fact that a text such as Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil can be contextualized and understood by the reader as being dominant either in terms of the information presented (specific arguments), the structure (the overall method of argument), or the relationship (the personal message for the reader). This notion of dominance also seems to have possibilities in describing Walker's (1973) finding that more context information was remembered from a written presentation than from a videotaped presentation. In terms of the communication structures developed here, it could be suggested that the readers perceived the situation as being more informationally dominant than did the listeners/watchers, who may have seen the situation as being either less informationally dominant, or even relationally or structurally dominant. This can, however, only be suggested as a possibility.

In the reading situation, then, the reader can be understood to contextualize the encountered text in terms of its episodic structure, which can be represented on the game/ritual continuum, and also in terms of the dominance aspect of the situation, which reflects the

goal of the encounter. Thus, the representations of the reading situation given in terms of SA-2 can be elaborated by considering them as being either GAME or RITUAL, and as being either structurally dominant (D_{str}), relationally dominant (D_{rel}), or informationally dominant (D_{inf}). Each of the reading situations discussed as being either rhetorical or expressive can, then, be further elaborated in terms of the following possibilities:

GAME (D_{str})
 GAME (D_{rel})
 GAME (D_{inf})
 RITUAL (D_{str})
 RITUAL (D_{rel})
 RITUAL (D_{inf})

These six possibilities in relation to the six rhetorical/expressive situations suggested above yield a total of thirty-six reading situations to which can be added the two situations not considered to be either rhetorical or expressive in nature for a total of thirty-eight reading situations. These descriptions of the reading situation are listed in Appendix J; but it is important to note that they are not intended to be in any sense definitive, but are based upon the description of communication situations given in Chapter 4. Since communication situations were understood to be more complex, and subject to further description than was given there, these reading situations must be understood to be the result only of the description given to these situations in the present study. In spite of this limitation, these descriptions of reading situations do give an indication of at least some of the different possibilities that the reader has for

contextualizing written texts.

Illustrative Applications of Reading Situations

While the discussion in the first part of this chapter has demonstrated how communication situations can be understood when realized in terms of reading and the knowledge that the reader brings to an encounter with a text, in order to illustrate this application it is useful to consider a few specific examples of possible encounters. Although specific examples have been given in the course of the previous discussion, these illustrations have been considered only briefly, and in order to elucidate the nature of reading situations themselves. Consequently, the consideration of a few sample illustrations should be helpful in demonstrating how the notion of reading situations can be useful in considering the reader as recipient of meaningful communication. In addition, the consideration of these specific types of encounters will provide a basis for the further elucidation of the nature of reading situations.

Since only four texts have been selected for consideration here, it cannot be claimed that these four are representative of the multitude of possible texts, or that they are in any way exhaustive. The four texts do, however, represent a range of different possible texts in order to illustrate the general applicability of the position that has been developed in the present study. In the consideration of these examples, the purpose is not to demonstrate how the thirty-eight reading situations listed in Appendix I can be applied, but rather to demonstrate in a general way how different reading situations result from different contextualizations of texts. The consideration of these

selected texts is, then, intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, and is not intended to illustrate particular reading situations.

The first sample text that has been selected for consideration is one of Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, "The Red-headed League." This story has been selected since it offers the possibility of a highly structured, or ritualized, encounter. In contrast to this type of encounter, Nabokov's Pale Fire will then be discussed. Since reading situations do not apply solely to narrative discourse, Swift's "A Modest Proposal" will then be considered, followed by a discussion of the text of the present study in terms of communication.

Sherlock Holmes as Communication

In the first part of this chapter, it was suggested that a reader can perceive a text as being active if the reader contextualizes the text appropriately. It is in this sense that it is possible to consider a text as offering a bid for a particular type of encounter; but this bid by a text results from the contextualization that is given to the text by the reader, who utilizes his background knowledge of encounters in order to define a specific foreground episode as a means of realizing a useful encounter.

Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, such as "The Red-headed League," may, then, offer different episodic bids to different readers, and different bids to the same reader upon different occasions. Presuming that the reader is intent upon some M_t , this M_t can be understood by the reader either in terms of M_w or in terms of some other purpose; and the text, as contextualized by the reader, will be perceived by the reader to be offering such a bid. For example, a reader who is naive in regards to both Sherlock Holmes and mystery stories will not

have available in his background (form of life) knowledge of reading encounters the type of scriptal knowledge that the genre would usually evoke. Similarly, a reader who is extremely knowledgeable about such stories will probably have not only an encounter structure, or parameter specifications, for mystery stories, but also a particular understanding of the type of encounter and sequence of episodes to be expected from a reading of a Sherlock Holmes story. It is also possible, of course, that a reader will have some background knowledge of Doyle's other writings; and this knowledge would allow such a reader to contextualize the text in terms of the type of encounter to be expected from Doyle, with a particular realization in terms of the Sherlock Holmes stories.

A reader who contextualizes the text of Doyle's story such that he is intent upon M_w can understand this M_w in terms of either Doyle or Dr. Watson as writer; for while from an omniscient point of view Doyle is undoubtedly the writer, the text avows itself to be the creation of Dr. Watson; and the reader is thus free to accept the text's bid and establish an encounter upon this basis. To do so will, of course, result in a different reading of the text, and a different understanding of the message, since if Doyle is considered to be the writer, Watson becomes Holmes's foil; and a knowledgeable reader can relate Doyle's use of this device to the earlier use of this technique by Poe, and to a multitude of later uses.

The way in which "The Red-headed League" is contextualized in terms of the structural aspects of the episode will depend, of course, upon the way in which the reader contextualizes the text at the foreground level, and the knowledge that is available at the form of life or background level. If a reader is familiar with the genre of the

mystery story, or a particular realization of it such as the Sherlock Holmes story, and utilizes this knowledge when contextualizing the text, the encounter can be understood to be near the ritual end of the game/ritual continuum. As a ritual, the text can be understood in terms of the constitutive rules that Doyle/Watson must follow in instantiating an initial problem and developing it to its solution. These rules will, of course, to some extent regulate and govern the way in which the developmental sequence of the episode is realized. It is, however, only by means of a knowledge of the constitutive and regulative rules of such encounters that a contextualization as a ritual is possible; for otherwise Doyle/Watson must be understood to be offering gambits rather than etiquettes. In the ritual sense, the reporting of the mysterious situation in "The Red-headed League" is an etiquette since the presentation of a mysterious situation to be resolved is of central importance to the mystery story and would be described by the constitutive rules of the genre. Similarly, if Jabez Wilson's report of the mysterious League to Holmes and Watson is understood to be rhetorical by virtue of the scriptal structure, the exigence which this report addresses is an accepted exigence if the reader is knowledgeable about either mystery stories in general or Sherlock Holmes stories in particular. A naive reader, however, must perceive this report as a created exigence since it is only by means of episodic knowledge that an exigence can be recognized as accepted. This is, of course, a narrow interpretation of the R-situation within the context of the episode.

To contend that the reader contextualizes the encounter as a ritual does not, of course, mean that there cannot be surprising

developments, or that the reader cannot become intrigued by the problem or situation depicted in the story. What it does suggest, however, is that this interest in the Red-headed League is related to the particular content of the story rather than to the communicative structure; for the structure of the encounter, as encounter, is highly ritualized. The importance of this structure is clearly evident when considering a work such as Dickens' The Mystery of Edwin Drood. While it is clearly a mystery story, the fact that Dickens died before the story was completed has resulted in an "ending" that is abrupt and clearly unsatisfactory. Arguments abound, of course, as to how this story would have been resolved had Dickens lived to complete it; but these proposed solutions are based upon the type of encounter that the text represents, and the type of encounter that is associated with a text by Dickens. Since Edwin Drood leaves the story incomplete, it is disturbing and unsatisfactory; but this is not always the case with vaguely terminated stories, for Tristram Shandy is also incomplete, and Mann's Confessions of Felix Krull likewise ends in an unresolved state. The reason why Felix Krull and Tristram Shandy are acceptable without a clear termination of the text, while Edwin Drood is not, can be attributed to the type of encounter that each represents. In the mystery story, the resolution of the mystery is of critical importance since it is necessary in order for the text to conform to the constitutive rules that govern and define the mystery story genre. Since Felix Krull and Tristram Shandy are not encounters of this type, or of any other genre that demands a definitive ending, the fact that they are not resolved is not as troublesome.

This is not, however, to say that the episode must necessarily

be structurally dominant if the story is contextualized as a ritual; for the dominance aspect is a separate feature of the episode. Even if the story is perceived as a ritual, the encounter can be perceived as being informationally dominant so that the focus is upon the specific story content that is presented, or it can be perceived as being relationally dominant, in which case the reader would relate personally to the story or in some way perceive it as containing a personal message directed toward the reader. If, however, the episode is contextualized as being structurally dominant, the emphasis will be upon how the structural requirements are fulfilled.

In addition to this basic type of contextualization, the reader can also perceive the text as being either rhetorical or expressive in nature. If the reader is reading the story solely for enjoyment it might be perceived as being expressive. It could also, however, be rhetorical since Holmes's powers of ratiocination in discovering the reason for the League could be understood as a message intended to persuade the reader that true understanding of the world depends upon such intellectual powers, rather than upon more emotional and less rational points of view, as exemplified by Watson. This is, however, a broad application of the rhetorical/expressive distinction; and the narrower sense must be understood within the context of the structure of the episode.

In encountering texts such as "The Red-headed League," then, the reader can contextualize the text in a variety of ways depending upon his intentions and his knowledge of texts of this type; and the way(s) in which the text is contextualized will, of course, determine the message(s) that the reader obtains from his reading.

The Contextualization of Pale Fire

An encounter with the text of Nabokov's Pale Fire presents an interesting contrast to the encounter with a Sherlock Holmes story since the structure of the encounter as bid by the text will generally not be as readily apparent to the reader, and a considerable amount of negotiation may be necessary in order to contextualize the text appropriately. This is due to the fact that Pale Fire is a novel that is written in a form that does not at first seem to be capable of sustaining an encounter of this type, for the text is in the form of a medium length poem followed by a line-by-line commentary on the poem. In fact, however, the story of the novel is told by means of the commentary, which is an account by a deluded and probably insane commentator who claims to be the exiled King of Zembla. The apparent form seems to be a bid by the text for an encounter that involves an academic consideration of the poem, while in fact what the text intends to bid by means of this apparent bid is an account of the commentator. A reader who accepts the apparent bid and attempts to contextualize the text as a poem/commentary type of encounter will find the commentary somewhat difficult since much of it is not only questionable but actually extraneous to the poem. On the other hand, a reader who notes that the title page proclaims the text to be a novel and accepts this bid may find the text to be obscure, difficult and nonsensical since he will immediately be confronted by the poem and the line-by-line commentary.

If novels were generally, or even sometimes, written in the form of poem/commentary a knowledgeable reader could have an understanding of this form and would have some scriptal knowledge of this

type of encounter. Since Pale Fire seems to be unique in its use of this form, however, it would seem that a knowledgeable reader would not only be unfamiliar with this use of the form, but would find it to violate the knowledge of written language encounters that he does have. In fact, a reader who is knowledgeable about literature and familiar with poems and textual commentaries could be tempted to contextualize the encounter as a poem/commentary rather than as a story, which could make the novel more difficult to contextualize for a knowledgeable reader than for one who is not.

It is notable that the type of negotiated contextualization that is required for Pale Fire differs somewhat from the specific type of encounter structure discussed above in regards to the mystery story. This is due to the fact that the difficulty in contextualizing Pale Fire is the lack of a fundamental plan-oriented narrative structure; for it is this structure that seems, at first, to be missing in the text. The apparent structure of Pale Fire is, of course, the poem/commentary structure, and the constitutive rules that govern this type of encounter. Since it is this foreground knowledge that is being used to structure the narrative, it is necessary for the reader to contextualize the encounter in terms of both narrative and poem/commentary encounters, and this is to contextualize the text in a unique way. This contextualization results in a change in the usual focus in the text/commentary type of encounter; for it would normally be the case that the poem would be dominant, with the commentary dependent upon and secondary to the text of the poem. In Nabokov's novel, however, it is the commentary that is of primary importance with the poem serving only as an excuse for the commentary.

If a reader were to contextualize Pale Fire as a serious commentary upon a poem, such a reader would be able to read the poem as a serious offering, and would be able to criticize the commentary as being largely irrelevant and generally unsupported by the text of the poem. While it would be possible to say that the reader had received an M_t from the text and his own perception of the M_w as well, from an omniscient point of view it would be apparent that such a reader could not be said to have understood Nabokov's intended meaning, and thus that he had not really understood the message of the text. For such a reader, however, a reading of the novel as a serious attempt to present a commentary upon a poem can result in meaningful reading and a conviction that the text has been understood. To note this in regards to Pale Fire is, however, only to reiterate the complex nature of understanding and meaning, and to note that this type of lack of comprehension differs from cases in which the reader does not understand the concepts, propositions, vocabulary or other parts of the text. In terms of the discussion in Chapter 4, comprehension failure due to inappropriate contextualization can be considered as a special case of failure to comprehend due to miscommunication, or a lack of recognition of the M-intended message of the text.

Even if a reader is successful in recognizing the particular type of encounter that is bid by the text, and contextualizes it appropriately, this does not provide the reader with more than a general understanding of the constitutive rules; for even this structure is less restrictive than the structure of the mystery story. Thus, Pale Fire can be considered to be bidding a game type of encounter structure since the utterances that constitute the text can generally be

understood to be gambits rather than etiquettes. This is, in fact, also the use that is being made of the apparent poem/commentary structure; for this structure is offered as a gambit by Nabokov rather than as an etiquette that provides a serious structure for the encounter despite the fact that the encounter is actually structured in this way. In reading a commentary on a poem it is usually the case that the encounter will be informationally dominant since the commentary is designed to supply information that will elucidate the text of the poem. In Pale Fire, however, it would seem that what is bid by the text is a relationally dominant structure; for it is in the growing relationship with the commentator that the text takes on its full significance as a novel; and it can be suggested that it is by means of this unusual bid dominance of the encounter that the text indicates an unusual use of the encounter type. This is not, of course, to say that the reader must recognize the encounter as being relationally dominant, but is only to indicate that from an omniscient point of view, this is probably the appropriate way to perceive the text in order to obtain the omniscient M_w .

The particular R-situations of the text also seem to differ from those of the mystery story. For while from the broad application perspective, the R-situation would be similar, in the narrow application it would seem that if the reader is contextualizing the encounter appropriately he cannot recognize an accepted exigence since the text is not structured with the same specific constitutive imperatives as is the mystery story. Thus, the gambits of the text can probably be understood as creating exigences that are then addressed. This is in keeping with the unusual use of the poem/commentary type of encounter

since this particular use suspends the normal types of exigences that would arise and allows the text a freedom that would be difficult if not impossible to obtain in a mystery story.

The Contextualization of "A Modest Proposal"

While the examples considered above both deal with fictional narrative discourse, the notion of reading situations does not apply exclusively to such discourse. In order to illustrate this, Swift's "A Modest Proposal" can be considered. Unlike the detective story, this text does not have a recognizable structure that can be understood in terms of specific constitutive rules. Rather, like Pale Fire, the encounter is loosely structured; and the episode seems to represent a game type of encounter since it is only by means of general principles of coherence that this text can be understood.

In contextualizing this text, various possibilities are readily apparent; for the text can be considered in terms of the environmental situation in which it first appeared, or it can be considered from various points of view in a more modern perspective. For example, the text can be considered as it was originally presented, as an anonymous text, or it can be considered as a work by Swift, or as an indication of the conditions in Ireland in the 18th Century. Similarly, the text can be considered to be either rhetorical or expressive depending upon the purposes of the reader; for while the text itself avows a rhetorical intent, and claims to be addressing an accepted exigence, the reader can ignore this rhetorical intent and/or the avowed exigence and can contextualize the text as expressive in nature, or as creating an exigence. In fact, a reader who is ignorant of the social conditions of 18th Century Ireland will, most likely, perceive the text as

creating an exigence by means of its description of these social conditions, even though the text contends that this exigence is accepted and recognized, as it was at the time.

The most interesting feature of "A Modest Proposal" is, however, the fact that the reader can recognize that the proposal of the text is not seriously advocated, and is not intended to be seriously considered. It is not, however, necessary to regard it in this way; for the text can be attributed to a type of individual who would genuinely advocate such a course of action. In fact, it is questionable as to whether or not it is necessary to recognize Swift's satirical intention in order for the text to achieve its rhetorical intent; for this intent is, of course, to arouse indignation at the enormity of what is being proposed and the conditions which give rise to the proposal. Whether the reader recognizes that the writer knows that the proposal is not seriously advocated does not necessarily affect the reader's response to the text. It is, however, important to note that in order for a reader to recognize that Swift is not serious in presenting this proposal, it is necessary for the reader to rely upon information other than that presented by the text itself. A bottom-up analysis of the propositions of the text will not reveal this information; for it is only by means of the exaggerated content of the propositions and/or knowledge of Swift's own intentions and beliefs, that this reading is possible. While this amounts, of course, to an interpretation of the text, it is by means of such interpretation that texts must be understood to be contextualized; for just as the mystery story was understood to be interpretable in terms of the constitutive structure of such an encounter, so in the case of "A Modest Proposal" the intention

of the writer is recognized by means of interpretation. Here, however, the basis for this interpretation is somewhat different; for while the contextualization of the mystery story could be obtained by means of background knowledge of structures of encounters, the present case calls for contextualization by means of standards as to what is socially and culturally reasonable. Thus, it is possible to imagine an entirely different culture in which this text would be contextualized as a genuinely reasonable proposal. For Swift and his society, and for present society as well, however, the proposal is outrageous; and it is the recognition of this outrageousness that leads to an understanding of Swift's rhetorical intentions.

The fact that the interpretation and contextualization of "A Modest Proposal" differs from the previous illustrations is due to the fact, it would seem, that the previous cases could be understood as either structurally dominant or as involving problems with the structure of the encounter. In this case, however, the structural aspects are only defined in a general way; and the episode must be understood as either informationally or relationally dominant. Since relational and informational features of an encounter rely upon different background knowledge, it is understandable that the basis for contextualizing the encounter of the text should be different than in the case of a structurally dominant episode. This is not, of course, to say that a reader cannot contextualize the text as being structurally dominant; but to do so would be to focus upon the structural features of the encounter bid by the text; and such a contextualization would be appropriate for a study of these formal features, but not for obtaining the M_w since this M_w is not dependent upon the structural,

but rather upon the relational and informational aspects of the encounter. A focus upon the structural features will, then, provide a basis for aesthetic appreciation of the text as expressive; but the rhetorical intent seems to rely upon the other two aspects since the reader seems to be intended to relate to the relational aspect, in which case what is presented in the informational aspect can be recognized as exaggerated.

As with any text, "A Modest Proposal" can be contextualized in different ways by the same reader during a single reading of the text. Thus, while the reader may not have personal knowledge of the exigence addressed by the text, he can recognize the text's contention that such an accepted exigence exists. In reading the text, then, the reader is understanding the text as addressing an accepted exigence which, for the reader, is being created by the text. Even recognizing this exigence, however, the reader can still be unconcerned with this rhetorical intent, and can contextualize the text as being expressive. Similarly, the text can be perceived as a commentary upon the social conditions of the time, and also as a work by Swift, presented as an anonymous text; and in this case the reader would be contextualizing the text in three different ways in terms of the M_t and M_w aspects of the situation. To note this is, however, only to reiterate that the reader's contextualization of a text in the reading situation is often and perhaps always complex in nature. This complex contextualization makes it difficult, however, to describe the message that the reader obtains from a text in a simple way.

The Present Study as Communication

As an example of a different type of non-fictional, non-narrative

text, the present study can be considered since the text of this study differs not only from the type of encounter exemplified by "A Modest Proposal" but also from the two previous fictional encounters. As with all texts, this one can, of course, be understood either in terms of the avowed intention that the text presents or in terms of some particular purpose of the reader. For the present study, the reader can perceive the avowed intention of the text as suggested in Chapter 1 in terms of the purposes: as an examination of reading-as-communication, or the reader as recipient of meaningful communication. It is, however, possible for a reader to contextualize this text as an argument advocating a new or different perspective on the teaching and/or learning of reading. While this is not the intention of the text, as stated in Chapter 1, the reader is free to contextualize the text in this manner and receive an M_t that differs from a recognized M_w .

While in Chapter 1 the text suggests that it is rhetorical in nature since an exigence is identified in the introduction to the chapter and one of the purposes is to address this exigence, it is possible to perceive the text as expressive by contextualizing it as a dispassionate presentation of various theoretical positions in regards to an evolving P-domain, with no intention to persuade. If the avowed rhetorical intention is accepted, however, the nature of the exigence that is addressed will, of course, be dependent upon the individual reader and his personal knowledge. In terms of the avowed perspective of the text, as given in Chapter 1, the exigence is partly given by the discussion of other researchers and their advocacy of a communication perspective; but the nature of the exigence is also partly

defined by the text in questioning and redefining the rather vague use of the notion of reading-as-communication. Thus, on the continuum of accepted/created exigence, the text avows that the M_w is intended to address an exigence that lies near the center of this continuum. For a reader who has, himself, questioned the current notion of reading-as-communication, however, the exigence can be perceived as accepted; and for a reader who is unfamiliar with a communication perspective, the exigence may appear to be created by the text. For both of these readers, however, the situation may be complicated, as discussed above in regards to "A Modest Proposal," by a recognition of the difference between the reader's contextualization and the avowed intention of the text, thus resulting in a complex R-situation. In addition, if the reader is not intent upon the M_w of the text but is reading for some other purpose, then the rhetorical/expressive distinction and the nature of the exigence will depend entirely upon the way in which the reader chooses to contextualize the text.

The nature of the encounter bid by the text of the present study seeks to invoke a certain type of thesis format. If, however, a reader is familiar with the usual format for empirical studies, the invocation of this type of encounter to the foreground level will prove only partly useful. For while the present study makes use of some features of such a format, the structural differences are significant enough to cause difficulties. In the usual encounter with a thesis reporting an empirical study, the basic structures will be highly ritualistic in nature. Due to the nature of the present theoretical study, however, this study offers a bid for a game type of encounter since the developmental aspects of the D-situation are only partly defined by constitutive

rules. Thus, the text makes a bid for a particular type of encounter; and the structure of this type of encounter is given at the end of Chapter 2. In fact, Chapter 2 can be perceived as an attempt to provide a basis for the reader's understanding of the encounter with the text in terms of M_w . This is attempted by means of a discussion of a framework for understanding the construction of theoretical positions, followed by an application of this framework to the organization of the present text. This discussion seeks to establish the basic constitutive rules that govern the nature of the encounter bid by the text; but since this encounter is intended to be informationally rather than structurally dominant, this description of the encounter in terms of structure is not sufficient as a basis for understanding the M_w . It is, however, possible to contextualize the text as being structurally dominant; and this would probably result in a reading of the text as an example of a theoretical study, with an emphasis upon the structural development of such encounters rather than a concern with the actual theoretical position developed here. Similarly, the text can be contextualized as being relationally dominant if the reader perceives the text as presenting something personally useful for, and personally directed to, the reader himself.

In encountering the text of the present study, then, a reader intent upon the avowed M_w of the text can perceive the encounter as being basically a game structure. But since one of the gambits offered by the study is a bid for a ritual structure (i.e., the summary in Chapter 2), if the reader accepts this bid he can contextualize the text as a ritual in terms of the structure suggested by the text within the overall game structure of the encounter. To contextualize

the text in this way can result in the informational dominance of the encounter being somewhat lessened since the structure will become more important. In the narrow application of R-situations, this will also result in a set of accepted exigences that the text is expected to address since they are known by the reader through his negotiated understanding of the structure of the text. While these accepted exigences have been created and bid by the text, if they are recognized and accepted by the reader for the duration of the encounter, they become accepted exigences since the reader will expect, for example, that Chapter 4 will address the accepted exigence of communication situations. This seems readily apparent; for if the discussion in Chapter 2 were omitted from the text of this study, the encounter would obviously be a game encounter since the structure would be only loosely defined at best. Since one of the gambits bid by the text is, however, a ritualistic structure, if this gambit is accepted and used as a basis for contextualizing the rest of the study, it can become more ritualistic in nature within the context of the basic game episode of the text.

Summary

In this chapter, the general description of communication situations has been considered in regards to the particular realization of these situations as reading situations. This application has been considered primarily in terms of the reader confronting and contextualizing a text, and the type of encounter that is realized as a reading situation has been understood to depend upon the intentions of the reader and the use that he makes of the text. While suggestions as

to the M_t and M_w of the text may be given in the text itself, the reader can choose to ignore these avowed intentions, or bids, and can contextualize for his own purposes. Such contextualizations will necessarily result in the reader obtaining different messages than if he were intent upon the M_w that he perceives the text to intend to communicate.

By means of the consideration of particular texts, it has been suggested that the reading situation may be complex in nature since the reader may, in the course of reading, contextualize the text in different ways in order to obtain different messages. This suggests that the meaning that a reader obtains from a text may not be describable in terms of a simple message, but rather may be a complex of different messages that are obtained by means of different contextualizations. The possibility of such different contextualizations has been seen to depend upon the background knowledge that the reader can utilize as foreground knowledge. While this knowledge is related in some ways to conceptual knowledge, it has been demonstrated that a consideration of the propositions embodied in a text is insufficient to account for the potential complexity of the meaning that a reader obtains, and the type of contextualization necessary in order to obtain this meaning. As a result, the comprehension of a written text must be considered to be relative to the intentions and knowledge of encounters that the reader has, and the way in which he utilizes this knowledge to negotiate an understanding of the text.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The major implications of the general theoretical position developed in this study in regards to reading and the reader have been discussed in Chapter 5, where the nature of reading as meaningful communication was considered in some detail. Since these implications have already been discussed, the present chapter will first be concerned with giving a general summary of the study, then with discussing the position developed in Chapters 3 through 5 in regards to the description of the study that was given in Chapter 2. After this, some potential difficulties and troublesome issues that arise from the present study will be examined, followed by some general indications of topics that merit further consideration.

General Summary and Conclusions

As discussed in Chapter 1, the present study has addressed not a set of specific research questions, but instead the topic of reading-as-communication, or the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication. This topic was examined first by establishing a view of language communication by means of a consideration of the theoretical approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts. The examination of Gricean meaning yielded a description of meaningful communication that identified meaning as a result of the meaning intentions (M-intentions) with which the utterance was made. In order for an audience to understand or comprehend an utterer's meaning, it was suggested that the audience must recognize the M-intentions with which the utterance

was made.

While meaningful communication was thus described in terms of some type of mutual understanding between the utterer and his audience in regards to the utterer's intentions, speech acts were then considered in order to focus more explicitly upon linguistic communication. Austin's basic distinctions between constatives and performatives, and between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts were considered, resulting in a view of meaningful linguistic communication that was based not just upon the propositional content of the linguistic utterance but also upon the force with which the utterance was made, and what was done in and by making the utterance upon a particular occasion. While Austin's account was questioned in regards to his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, his basic description of a speech act was accepted. Searle's suggested modifications were, however, also discussed; and one major benefit that was obtained from Searle's account was the description of the structure of an illocutionary act in terms of constitutive and regulative rules.

As a result of the conjunction of the approaches of Gricean meaning and speech acts, a view of linguistic communication was obtained that described such communication in terms of an utterer's intentions, an audience's recognition of these intentions, and the intended meaning as composed of locutionary (or propositional), illocutionary, and perhaps perlocutionary aspects. An examination of the relationship between speech acts and Gricean meaning suggested that while the notion of speech acts gives a basic description of some aspects of what could be meant by a linguistic utterance, it could not be concluded that this description exhausted what could be meant by a

linguistic utterance. In addition, it was noted that in both Gricean meaning and speech acts the state of affairs, or circumstances, in which the utterance is made is of fundamental importance in describing the meaning. What was to count as such a state of affairs was, however, only vaguely indicated by the two approaches; consequently, a notion of communication situations was developed in Chapter 4.

The communication situation was defined in terms of three different states of affairs. The first of these states of affairs was described in terms of message communication. Messages were contrasted with signals, and considered to be meaningful in the sense discussed in Chapter 3. In order to account for the communication of messages, it was necessary to suggest that the participants in communication situations have a mutual or intersubjective understanding that allows them to understand the acts performed by other participants. This intersubjective understanding was understood to be the basis for what Schiffer discussed as mutual knowledge, and also as a possible basis for Grice's modes of correlation.

The second state of affairs considered message communication in regards to the immediate situation in which the utterance is made. This state of affairs was described in terms of the rhetorical situation (R-situation) which is determined by the situational constraints, and the exigence that is addressed by a rhetorical utterance. This addressed exigence was considered to be either created by the rhetor, or mutually known and accepted by the rhetor and the audience.

The third state of affairs considered the first and second states of affairs in terms of an on-going situation that develops over time. This was described in terms of an encounter which is composed of one

or more episodes. It was contended that participants in communication situations have background knowledge of how different types of transactions are conducted, and that this background knowledge is utilized in an encounter in order to establish a foreground knowledge of the immediate episode in which the participants are engaged. Such episodes are considered to be describable in terms of the restrictiveness of their structures and in terms of whether the episode is structurally, informationally, or relationally dominant. This foreground knowledge of the episode allows participants to contextualize specific rhetorical or expressive situations and to understand them in terms of an emergent ground (i.e., how the situation/episode has developed to a particular point in time) and a transcendent ground (i.e., how the episode would normally continue to develop). This type of foreground understanding was further discussed in terms of Schank & Abelson's notion of scripts and plans in order to indicate the flexibility of foreground or episodic knowledge.

This description of the communication situation resulted in a general description of language communication, and thus indicated only in a general way how various aspects could be understood in terms of reading and the reader. The reader was, however, considered in more detail in Chapter 5, where the nature of reading situations was discussed. The reader was considered to negotiate an understanding with a text in order to comprehend what he perceives to be the writer's intended message. This was discussed in terms of different ways in which a reader can contextualize a text, and resulted in a list of thirty-eight reading situations. The usefulness and applicability of this notion of reading situations was indicated by the discussion of

four different types of texts in regards to how a reader could negotiate an understanding with these texts. Thus, contrary to Kleinman & Schallert's (1978) claim that no situation exists in reading, the reading situation was seen to be an essential part of meaningful reading.

In terms of the concept of reading-as-communication, then, the view that has been developed in this study is that this type of communication cannot be described simply in terms of a message which either has a definite impact, or is defined as inherent in a text. While the communication of signals can be discussed in this way, the communication of messages depends upon the intersubjective knowledge that the reader brings to an encounter with a text. Thus, the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication is, despite the connotations of the term "recipient," active in negotiating an understanding with the text which allows the reader to recognize the meaning of the text. Different negotiated contextualizations will, however, result in different messages being obtained by the reader; and the type of understanding that is negotiated by the reader will be dependent upon the nature of the text itself, the reader's intentions and purposes, and the reader's knowledge of written language encounter types.

The Present Study as Theoretical Position

In Chapter 2, the nature of theoretical positions was discussed in terms of the theoretical contexts in which they are constructed and in which they function; and the present study was described in terms of this general framework. A reconsideration of this description of the study in regards to what was actually accomplished in Chapters 3

through 5 reveals certain difficulties with the description of theoretical positions and possibly failures of the present study to meet the goals outlined in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 2, it was claimed that the present study would involve a fourth order definition of the P-domain, resulting from the conjunction of theoretical positions from the philosophy of language, speech communication, cognitive science, and reading. It is, however, at least questionable as to whether or not the conjunction of these areas really resulted in a fourth order definition. This is due to the fact that while the philosophy of language and speech communication were conjoined in order to obtain a view of the communication situation in regards to meaningful linguistic communication, the positions from cognitive science that were used (i.e., Levin & Moore and Schank & Abelson) did not assume the same importance in formulating the final position of this study as did the other two areas. In fact, the function of these positions was primarily to clarify what had already been suggested by positions in speech communication; and while this clarification did result in a clearer and fuller theoretical position, it is doubtful that the field of cognitive science contributed directly to the elucidation of the P-domain. In the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, however, different degrees of contribution were not considered; and thus it is difficult to determine how the definition of the P-domain should be described for the present study.

Similarly, it is questionable as to whether or not the P-domain was given a fourth order definition by the addition of the field of reading; for while application of the general theoretical position to reading was made in Chapter 5, this application could be considered

to be a special examination of the P-domain as defined by language communication rather than as the conjunction with another definitional paradigmatic position. In fact, since the application to reading in Chapter 5 was related directly to the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 rather than to some other paradigm, it would seem that this description might well be more accurate. This type of definition of the P-domain was not, however, discussed as a possibility in the general discussion of the nature of theoretical positions.

A further difficulty arises in regards to the type of theoretical position that was described in Chapter 2 as the outcome of the present study. It was suggested there that a theory of language communication would be evolved, and that an analog model of this theory would be presented; and while an informal theory was articulated in Chapters 3 and 4, this theory was the result of a synthesis of different established positions from the philosophy of language, speech communication and cognitive science. This raises the question as to whether or not this theoretical position would not be better described as a theories/synthesized model position rather than as a theory/analog model position. In fact, the relationship between the synthesis of theories and the synthesized model, as discussed in Chapter 2, requires further elucidation; for a synthesis of theories may result not only in a synthesized model but in a synthesized theory; and it may be difficult, as in the present study, to determine whether the final theoretical position should be described as being dominant in terms of theory or model.

It was also suggested in Chapter 2 that Chapter 5 would present a synthesized model of the reading situation, consisting of a tentative

list of reading situations. While this model was, in fact, given in Appendix I, the discussion in Chapter 5 described more than is given in these descriptions; and it would seem that it would thus be possible to describe the position given in Chapter 5 as consisting of an informal theory and an analog model. This may, in fact, be more desirable since a synthesized model, as described in Chapter 2, is synthesized from different theories; and this was not what was actually done in Chapter 5, where the general position in regards to language communication was applied specifically to reading.

A further question arises in regards to the distinction that was made in Chapter 2 between descriptive and explanatory comments upon a P-domain. While the type of comment that the present study was intended to give was not discussed in Chapter 2, this comment does not seem to be exclusively either descriptive or explanatory. This is due to the fact that the theoretical position of Chapters 3 and 4 is basically concerned with giving a description of what is involved in the P-domain of language communication; but this description also has various implications in regards to the mechanisms underlying the workings of language communication. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether this theoretical position should be considered to offer a description with implications for an explanation, or an explanation that is only partly articulated. Similarly, the position in Chapter 5 in regards to reading situations seems to offer an appropriate description; but the discussion of readers' uses of these situations to contextualize texts in some ways resembles an explanation.

While difficulties can thus be seen to result from considering the theoretical position of the present study in terms of the

description of theoretical positions in Chapter 2, these problems seem to arise from the fact that while clear distinctions can be made in an abstract discussion, it is difficult to maintain these distinctions when considering an actual position. The discrepancies that result can, however, serve as a basis for reconsidering the nature of theoretical positions, and can give an indication of the clarification that an actual theoretical position could receive from further articulation.

Objections and General Problems

While the difficulties discussed above arise when the present study is considered in terms of the description of theoretical positions that was given in Chapter 2, this is only one source of difficulties for the present study. These further difficulties can be considered both in terms of specific objections to the present study, and in terms of general problems or issues that arise from the theoretical position that has been described here.

Objections to the Present Study

The first objection that can be made to the present study is that the theoretical position that has been developed does not include specific bridge principles that can be used as a basis for empirical tests. While this is the case, it would seem that such bridges could be obtained from either the taxonomic description of communication situations given in Chapter 4, or from the list of reading situations given in Chapter 5; for both of these sources offer specific descriptions that could be tested. This is not to say that these models do not need further articulation, but they do provide initial points

from which specific and testable bridges could be obtained. These two sources do not, however, exhaust the potential for empirical application of the position of the present study; for the general notions of negotiation and contextualization, and the specific structure of reading and communication situations, have been described in sufficient detail to provide bases for further research. In short, while specific bridge principles have not been included here, it would seem that such principles are obtainable from the position as it has been described above.

Another objection that can be made is that the theoretical position of this study seems to suggest that the meaning that a reader obtains from a text is relative only to his own intentions, purposes, and background knowledge. To contend that the reader can obtain any message he chooses would, however, deny that reading is communication since communication involves a mutuality, or mutual sharing, and the transmission of information.

While it is evident that the position developed in this study is that the message obtained by the reader is in some ways relative, it has not been contended that there are no limits upon the scope of possible meanings. To say that the message that the reader obtains from a text is relative to the intentions of the reader and his background knowledge is not to say that the communication situation is defined entirely by the way in which the reader contextualizes the text. While the constraints of texts have not been a major concern in the present study, it is evident from the discussion in Chapter 5 that there are limits on the messages that a reader can obtain from a text. For example, a reader cannot obtain a message about birds

from McCarthy's Birds of America even if the reader chooses to contextualize the text as a message of this sort. In fact, unless the reader refuses to accept the shared meaning-context of the symbol system itself, there are basic limitations imposed by the text in regards to the possible messages that it offers. It can be concluded, then, that the text constrains the possible messages that can be obtained by the reader, although the nature of this type of constraint has not been investigated here. Within the context of this constraint, however, the reader has, as discussed in Chapter 5, a variety of possible messages that are potentially available to him, depending upon his intentions and his background knowledge.

Another objection that could be made to this description of the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication is that it ultimately focuses upon obvious and commonly acknowledged aspects of reading. While to a certain extent this is true, the value of the present account is not that the features discussed in terms of reading situations are novel; rather, the value and importance of this study are based upon the fact that such aspects as the dominance of the text in terms of structure, relation or information, and the genre of the encounter type (or the schema), are essential aspects of a reader's meaningful encounter with a text and not merely aspects that are somehow extraneous to the reading process. In the position that has been developed here, the reader's contextualization of a text can result in a reading situation that allows the reader to obtain or understand what he perceives to be the text's message. Thus, the type of encounter that the reader perceives the text to be bidding becomes an integral part of reading comprehension. In addition, by indicating

that such knowledge has an intersubjective function, and describing how it is used in understanding a text, the present study has suggested the type of description of genre-types that would be useful when considering these types in regards to reading comprehension. Thus, while the notions of schemata and genres are not in any way unique to the present study, what has been indicated here is how particular types of genre can be used by a reader in order to negotiate an understanding of a text; and this, of course, implies that genres should be described in regards to this function when they are considered in relation to meaningful reading.

General Issues from the Present Study

While the present study has presented a theoretical position in regards to meaningful communication, and the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication, there are various problems and issues that arise from the position that has been developed here. While these issues do not amount to specific objections to the present study, they do raise questions that merit further consideration.

One of the major issues that requires further clarification is the relationship between the functional approaches to language that were discussed in Chapter 3 and formal aspects of language in order to consider how the formal features are related to the meaning of an utterance within the context in which it occurs. For example, as Fotion (1971) suggests, some utterances are intended to govern the type of utterances that follow, such as "Let's consider the next issue on the agenda." Fotion terms such utterances master speech acts since they are intended to control the speech acts that follow; and as is readily evident, such utterances are bids to initiate

particular types of episodes. The question, then, concerns the conventional procedures for carrying out particular types of acts. There are also, as Okby (1972) suggests, various organizational cues that can be understood to serve the same function of developing or invoking various episodic or situational structures. This issue amounts, of course, to inquiring into the conventional methods, or cues, that are available to a writer to bid various written language episodes; and it follows that such cues will aid a reader in obtaining the M-intended message of the text by allowing him to correlate these formal features to what would normally be intended by the use of such a cue. Before this can be tested effectively, however, it is necessary that these conventional cues be described and related to the function they would normally have in terms of episodic or situational structure.

Associated with this problem is the difficulty that was noted in Chapter 4 in regards to what is to count as an utterance in extended discourse. While both a broad and a narrow application have been suggested for Gricean meaning and speech acts, it has not been clearly indicated what the units of a narrow application should be. Wallace (1970) suggests that the speech act, and more particularly the illocutionary act, should function as such a unit; but this can cause difficulties since it is often the case in extended discourse that acts with similar forces will be combined so that the boundaries between them become unclear. Similarly, a difficulty arises since it is sometimes the case in extended discourse that all (or nearly all) of the utterances could be described in terms of an illocutionary act of "reporting" or "stating." To describe a set of acts in terms of a single force seems, however, somewhat useless since it is only by

means of distinctions between acts that a narrow application becomes useful.

While there does not seem to be a simple means of avoiding this difficulty, Searle's notion of illocutionary continua suggests that the points marked off by illocutionary terms may be better understood as a range of such points. For example, it could be contended that the illocutionary act of "stating" marks off a range of points on the illocutionary continuum such that it would be possible to distinguish more specific points within this range (e.g., stating₁, stating₂, stating₃, etc.). This permits the possibility of refining the illocutionary descriptions so that a more useful description of specific illocutionary acts could be obtained. What these distinctions would be, and how they could be used to describe the constitutive acts of extended discourse, requires further clarification before they can be meaningfully employed.

In addition to this problem in determining the units that should represent the narrow application, further clarification is needed in the relationship between the narrow application and the broad application of the theoretical positions of Gricean meaning and speech acts. To bridge this gap requires, of course, a further examination of the communication situation and the nature of communication itself; but it can be suggested that one possible bridge may be Schank's (1977) description of topics. This level is described by Schank in terms of rules that in some ways resemble Grice's implicatures; but these rules are written in terms of interactive situations, and would need to be modified in order to apply to extended discourse. A consideration of the evolving topic of discourse would, however, be one

means of relating the narrow application to the broad application by means of an intermediate level, although how these three levels could actually be related is not entirely clear.

Another area that requires further consideration concerns the description of the communication situation that was given in Chapter 4. As noted there, the communication situation is too complex to be exhausted by a single description; and the present study has focused only upon a few important aspects. Thus, little mention has been made of, for example, the role relations between the different participants; and consequently the role relations between the reader and text could not be discussed. While these roles would, of course, be specified by the structure of the episode, this is an aspect that merits further consideration in its own right; for a description of evolving communication situations could be given in terms of the changing roles of the participants. Roles are, however, only one further aspect; and there is no reason to believe that this feature, in conjunction with the aspects discussed in the present study, would provide a complete description of the communication situation.

Another issue that needs clarification and elucidation is the nature of expressive situations. While these situations were discussed in a general way in contrast to rhetorical situations, they were discussed only in general terms. Also, if a situation is considered to be expressive in nature, it is not clear how this changes or alters the way in which the episodic structure should be understood; for while the structure may seem to be the same for both an expressive and a rhetorical situation, some differences would seem to be necessary in order to account for the difference in function.

It is also notable that the usefulness of general communication situations is not limited to the application to reading situations that has been the focus here. Communication situations would seem to offer insights both in terms of the reading of texts that deal with or report such situations (e.g., narratives that include interactive communication between characters in a story), and also has application to the instructional situation, which is also interactive in nature. It is not, however, clear that the specific description given in this study is adequate or appropriate for these other applications.

While the reader's contextualization of a text was discussed in Chapter 5, this discussion did not elucidate the processes involved in the reader's negotiation of a context. Although it was indicated that the reader's intentions and background knowledge are of importance, how a reader actually goes about contextualizing a text is an issue that was beyond the scope of this study and thus requires further clarification.

Finally, even though some suggestions were made in Chapter 5 in regards to the description of reading encounters, this discussion was too general to give more than an indication of how these encounters should be described. Full descriptions of specific reading encounters would need to include not only what Schank & Abelson term scripts, but also various concatenations of D-goals and the contents of particular planboxes. An attempt to describe a particular type of reading situation would, however, probably raise some of the questions suggested above in regards to language communication. While it is difficult to speculate upon what a complete description of a specific reading situation would be like, it can be suggested that both Schank

& Abelson's scripts and Searle's constitutive illocutionary rules (see Appendix H) provide at least tentative models.

Despite the problems suggested above, the present study has presented both a basic view of language communication and a description of the reader as the recipient of meaningful communication. While the theoretical position presented here may require modification as other issues are considered, it does provide a basis for raising such issues and investigating further the communicative aspects of reading.

Topics for Further Consideration

While the issues and difficulties discussed above result from the lack of articulation that has been given to the position of the present study, other issues result from the fact that this position is limited in the scope that it covers. Such issues cannot, consequently, be profitably considered in terms of the position of this study even though they do arise from a consideration of this position.

The first of these issues or topics concerns the view of language that has been described here. While the purpose of this study was to present a functional view of language by means of a discussion of Gricean meaning and speech acts, it is evident that a fuller functional view still needs to be developed. This is due to the fact that, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, while Gricean meaning can account for what is necessary for an utterer to mean something, what is actually meant is described only in a very general way. Similarly, as Austin points out, the functions and uses of language lie beyond the scope of speech acts and illocutionary forces. Thus, there exists a wide gap between the functional view of Gricean meaning and

the view of speech acts; and a much fuller articulation of a functional description of language needs to be developed to fill this gap.

A second issue that arises from the present study involves the way in which intersubjectivity and intersubjective knowledge have been understood. While this study has been concerned with a particular type of knowledge that individuals have which allows them to distinguish acts, it must be recognized that there are other types of knowledge (e.g., conceptual knowledge, and knowledge of symbol systems and their functions) that have not been included in the type of knowledge that was considered here. Such knowledge is also background knowledge that can be mutually known in communication situations, and can provide a basis for the utterer's M-intentions and the audience's recognition of the intended message. What these other types of background knowledge are, and how they should be described and related to what has here been described as intersubjective knowledge, is an issue that lies beyond the scope of the position of the present study.

Another topic of concern that arises from, but is beyond the scope of, the present study involves the goals that an utterer intends to accomplish by means of his plan in a communication situation. What has been of concern here has been the utterer's intentions in regards to instantiating and developing a communication situation, but such intentions must be understood to be in some sense instrumental; for what is important to an individual is not that particular episodes are established, but that goals are attained. This is, of course, only to note that structured communication situations are not ends in themselves, but serve particular functions in terms of the goals and plans of the participants. What is accomplished by means of

particular types of communication situations, in terms of both the utterer and the audience, is, however, a topic that lies beyond the scope of the position of this study.

Related to this topic is the general problem of meaning and meaningful communication. While the question of meaning has been discussed here in terms of Grice's definition of meaning, as pointed out in Chapter 3 this type of meaning does not exhaust the notion of meaning. That there is a sense of "meaning" beyond the scope of what has been discussed here is readily apparent when it is considered that a reader can understand the meaning of a text, yet can claim that the experience of reading the text and obtaining this meaning was not, in itself, meaningful. Thus, it seems that a further consideration of meaningful reading, and reading for meaning, is necessary since the discussion of meaning here has dealt with only one aspect of this important but neglected topic.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS OF ABBREVIATIONS

Since the various abbreviations that are used in this study are not necessarily of the most important terms that are used, no attempt is made here to define the terms for which the abbreviations stand. Instead, only the full term, and the chapter in which it is first used and explained, is given since a full definition would, in some cases, imply a greater significance for the term than it has in the study itself.

A:	"Audience." (Chapter 3)
c:	"Mode of correlation." (Chapter 3)
D:	To "do something." (Chapter 3)
D _{inf}	"Informationally dominant" episode. (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)
D _{rel} :	"Relationally dominant" episode. (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)
D _{str} :	"Structurally dominant" episode. (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)
D-goals:	"Delta goals." (Chapter 4)
D/p:	To "do something (D) for particular reasons (p)." (Chapter 3)
D-situation:	"Developmental situation." (Chapter 4)
E _a :	"Accepted exigence." (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)

- E_c : "Created exigence." (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)
- EXP: "Expressive" (versus rhetorical) intention. (Term introduced, Chapter 4; abbreviation, Chapter 5)
- F: "Illocutionary force." (Chapter 4)
- M-: "No message" as perceived by a reader of a text. (Chapter 5)
- M_t : "Message of the text." (Chapter 5)
- M_w : "Message of the writer." (Chapter 5)
- Meaning_{nn}: "Non-natural meaning." (Chapter 3)
- M-intentions: The complex set of "meaning-intentions" that an utterer must have in order to mean_{nn} something by an utterance. (Chapter 3)
- P: This symbol is used to represent what is actually meant by an utterer. (Chapter 3)
- p: "Reasons" in Schiffer's account, and "propositional content" in Searle's. (Chapter 3)
- P-domain: "Phenomenal domain." (Chapter 2)
- P/p(t): To be read as "the belief that P, for the truth-supporting reasons p." (Chapter 3)
- Q: This symbol stands for what is mutually known by two or more individuals. (Chapter 3)
- R: "Relationship." (Chapter 3)
- r: "Response." (Chapter 3)
- R+: "Reader intends to understand the message" of a text. (Chapter 5)

- R-: "Reader does not intend to understand the message" of
a text. (Chapter 5)
- R-situation: "Rhetorical situation." (Chapter 4)
- RH: "Rhetorical." (Chapter 5)
- SA: "State of affairs" as defined by Schiffer (Chapter 3)
and interpreted in terms of communication situations
(Chapter 4) as SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3.
- t: "Truth-supporting." (Chapter 3)
- TP: "Theoretical position." (Chapter 2)
- U: "Utterer." (Chapter 3)
- x: This symbol is used to represent the actual "utterance"
that is made by an utterer. (Chapter 3)

APPENDIX B

THE MEANING OF LANGUAGE VERSUS UTTERANCE MEANING

The basic approach of the Gricean account of meaning has been challenged by Ziff (1967), who has charged that such an intentional account of meaning does not reflect the facts about language. His argument centers upon the contention that the fundamental meaning of a linguistic utterance does not depend upon the intentions of the utterer, but rather is dependent upon the meaning that the terms (or sentences) have in the language. As Ziff states:

The syntactic and semantic structure of any natural language is essentially recursive in character. What any given sentence means depends on what (various) other sentences in the language mean. (p. 7)

Thus, Ziff argues that there is a linguistic meaning that is independent of actual utterances upon particular occasions, and is therefore something other than what an utterance means upon such occasions.

As an example of this distinction, Ziff notes that when a person is in a deep coma he may utter a coherent sentence such as "Claudius murdered my father." While it would seem that the utterer, being in a coma, did not have the appropriate intentions for meaning anything in the sense that Grice suggests, yet the sentence, as uttered, does have a meaning that can be recognized by an audience. If sentences are to be considered to have such meanings regardless of the occasions of their utterance, Ziff argues, then, the Gricean account is not an account of the meaning of language at all, but is, rather, an account of the use of a sentence, or the use of language; and this he considers to be different from the meaning of language proper.

The difference between Ziff's and Grice's views can be understood

to reflect a disagreement as to whether linguistic meaning should be understood in terms of sentence types, or in terms of sentence tokens. Sentence types can be understood to be sentences that exist, or potentially exist, in a language, independent of the actual utterance of that sentence upon a particular occasion. A token of that sentence type is the utterance of a token of a particular type upon a particular occasion. Thus, there is only one sentence type for "That table is wobbly"; yet tokens of that type can be uttered upon many different occasions, to refer to different tables and different degrees of wobbliness. Ziff seems to be arguing that an account of linguistic meaning must be based upon the meaning of sentence types, while Grice seems to be suggesting that linguistic meaning is based upon sentence tokens since his account describes the utterance of tokens upon particular occasions. What has not been explained in the early Grice account is how sentence types can be meaningful, as in Ziff's example of a man in a coma.

This question can be understood to be of fundamental importance for an intentional theory of meaning such as Grice's; for what Ziff is suggesting is that in order to account for linguistic meaning, it is necessary to consider as fundamental the formal properties of the utterance. Only after this is done are the situational considerations meaningful. If this is, in fact, the case, then linguistic meaning is not accounted for by the early Grice account since no attention is paid to these formal properties.

Grice (1968) has responded to this particular type of argument by suggesting that while there is often a difference between the meaning of utterance types and utterance tokens, the difficulty that arises

results from the mistake of considering the meaning of types to be fundamentally different from the meaning of tokens. The type/token distinction is described by Grice in terms of occasion-meaning and utterance-type, the former dealing with what is meant by an utterance upon a particular occasion and the latter dealing with the meaning of a type. The meaning of an utterance-type can be understood to be the timeless meaning, or what one would normally mean by an utterance of a token of this type. The meaning of a token of an utterance-type, when uttered upon a particular occasion, is the applied timeless meaning of the utterance-type and may differ from what would normally be meant by the utterance. Thus, what is normally meant by an utterance-type may not be exactly what is meant by a token of that utterance-type upon a particular occasion since the occasion may demand a different meaning.

According to Grice, then, utterance-types are not fundamental in the way that Ziff seems to suggest, but rather result from the occasion-meanings of utterances of tokens of these types. In Ziff's example of the man in a coma who utters "Claudius murdered my father," Grice would contend that while the man did not mean anything by the utterance since he did not have the appropriate intentions, the audience could still recognize that his utterance had a timeless meaning as a result of being a token of an utterance-type, and consequently could construe it as meaningful in terms of what would normally be meant if the utterer were awake, mentally sound, and had the appropriate intentions. For the audience, then, the utterance could mean something in the sense that its timeless meaning, or what would normally be meant by the utterance, could be recognized even though the utterer did not mean

anything by his utterance upon that particular occasion.

In terms of the conditions of the early Grice account, given above as Definition 1, it is not readily apparent how the timeless utterance-type meaning functions in a case of occasion meaning since the conditions are not detailed enough to indicate this. It would seem, however, that when an utterance-type is uttered, the recognition of this utterance-type and its normal meaning would function as a part of the means by which the utterer intends to produce a response (belief) in his audience, and would therefore be a part of the utterer's first intention. How this is to function is not, however, entirely clear; for it is not apparent how the timeless meaning becomes applied in terms of the occasion meaning, especially when the timeless meaning differs significantly from the meaning intended by the utterer.

This potential problem has been noted by Searle (1969), who contends that the early Grice description is not sufficient since counter-examples can be proposed which meet the conditions but which would not be considered cases of meaning. In the type of counter-example proposed by Searle, the timeless meaning of the utterance seems to conflict with the occasion meaning that the utterer intends. As an example of this type of counter-example, Searle suggests the following:

During World War II, an American soldier (U) has parachuted behind enemy lines and is captured by Italian soldiers (A). U would like to make A believe that he is a German officer. Unfortunately, U does not know Italian, and the only German he knows is a line from a German poem he learned in school. Hoping that A does not understand German, U utters the sentence 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?' intending to deceive A into thinking that he has said 'I am a German soldier.'

Searle explains this counter-example as follows:

But does it follow from this account that when I say, Kennst du das land . . . etc., what I mean is, "I am a German soldier"? Not only does it not follow, but in this case I find myself disinclined to say that when I utter the German sentence what I mean is "I am a German soldier", or even "Ich bin ein deutscher Soldat", because what the words mean and what I remember that they mean is "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?" (pp. 44-45)

The problem, then, is that since U knows the timeless meaning of the utterance he cannot have the appropriate intentions to have it mean that he is a German soldier. Thus, it is not enough, according to Searle, for U to have the appropriate intentions; for he must also utter an appropriate token in order to have these intentions.

Grice (1969) has responded to this counter-example by suggesting that what Searle has proposed is not really a counter-example at all. Instead he suggests that Searle has ascribed impossible, or highly improbable, intentions to this utterer. He notes that in this instance U cannot intend to produce a response in his audience by means of the timeless meaning of the utterance since it is essential to his intentions that the audience not know the timeless meaning. Thus, the utterer in Searle's example is not intending that the timeless meaning of the German sentence function as a part of his audience's reason for coming to the appropriate belief; and the timeless meaning is therefore unimportant unless, perhaps, the Italians happen to understand German. According to Grice, then, Searle has misstated the American soldier's intentions; for given the situation, the soldier could intend to produce the belief that he is a German soldier, but could not intend to produce this belief by virtue of the meaning of the German words that he has uttered.

The problem here is, of course, still the problem of timeless meaning and occasion meaning; and Grice suggests a further example to

demonstrate his point that the timeless meaning does not have to be appropriate, or even correct, for the utterer to mean something by his utterance:

I have been listening to a French lesson being given to the small daughter of a friend. I noticed that she thinks that a certain sentence in French means "Help yourself to a piece of cake," though in fact it means something quite different. When there is some cake in the vicinity, I address to her this French sentence, and as I intended, she helps herself. I intended her to think (and to think I intended her to think) that the sentence uttered by me meant "Help yourself to some cake"; and I would say that the fact that the sentence meant, and was known by me to mean something quite different is no obstacle to my having meant something by my utterance (namely, that she was to have some cake). (pp. 162-163)

Thus, the timeless meaning of an utterance-type can, according to Grice, be used to mean something that is quite different from what would normally be meant by an utterance of this type.

APPENDIX C

OBJECTIONS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EARLY GRICE ACCOUNT

One type of argument that has been urged against the early Grice account concerns the sufficiency of this account in regards to cases involving a particular type of deception. The description and explanation of specific examples of this type of deception can become exceedingly complex, but such cases are not trivial since they suggest a basic deficiency in Grice's original formulation.

The first of these counter-examples was suggested by Strawson (1964), who presented only the general form of the counter-example. This form has, however, been given a concrete realization by Schiffer (1972), who has also contributed two further counter-examples along the same lines. In Schiffer's terms, then, Strawson's original counter-example can be given as follows:¹

U wants to get A to believe that the house A is thinking of buying is rat-infested. U decides to bring about this belief in A by taking into the house and letting loose a big fat sewer rat. For U has the following scheme. He knows A is watching him and knows that A believes that U is unaware that he, A, is watching him. It is U's intention that A should (wrongly) infer from the fact that U let the rat loose that U did so with the intention that A should arrive at the house, see the rat, and, taking the rat as "natural evidence", infer therefrom that the house is rat-infested. U further intends A to realize that given the nature of the rat's arrival, the existence of the rat cannot be taken as genuine or natural evidence that the house is rat-infested; but U knows that A will believe that U would not so contrive to get A to believe the house is rat-infested unless U had very good reasons for thinking that it was, and so U expects and intends A to infer

¹Schiffer uses the terms "speaker" (S) for what has, thus far, been termed the "utterer" (U). In order to avoid confusion, and to avoid the oral language implications of the term "speaker," U has been substituted for S throughout Schiffer's account, both here and elsewhere in the present study.

that the house is rat-infested from the fact that U is letting the rat loose with the intention of getting A to believe that the house is rat-infested. (pp. 17-18)

While this counter-example may seem, at first reading, extremely artificial, further consideration suggests that there is nothing unnatural about it, and that if it were to occur in the normal course of events, A would be able to understand the situation without undue difficulty. Despite the fact that A would probably be able to recognize what U intended him to believe, there is general agreement that it would be incorrect to say that, in this case, U meant something by letting the rat loose (Grice, 1969; Schiffer, 1972; Strawson, 1964). The reason why this example fails as a case of meaning is that U intends to deceive A in regards to his intentions, and expects A to come to the belief that U thinks the house is rat-infested not by recognizing U's intention in letting the rat loose, but through a process of rational inferencing that is not entirely correct. Thus, one would not wish to say that U meant that the house was rat-infested by letting the rat loose, but rather that by letting the rat loose in a particular situation, U intended A to reason in a particular way and draw a particular conclusion. This becomes more apparent when this situation is contrasted to the case where U confronts A and openly lets the rat loose, knowing that A knows that U knows that A knows that U is letting the rat loose with a particular set of intentions. In such a case, it would be appropriate to say that U meant something by letting the rat loose. In the counter-example, however, U seems to be intending the rat to be a natural sign, and seems to expect A to draw inferences which do not involve A's recognition of all of U's relevant intentions. Thus, the difficulty is that U is

deceiving A as to his intentions. It is important to note, however, that this is a particular type of deception and differs from the case in which a used-car salesman, for example, tells a prospective customer that a defective car is in excellent mechanical condition. In such a case, the salesman is deceiving the customer, but in a different way than the utterer in the "sewer rat" example is deceiving his audience; and it seems evident that the used-car salesman means something by his utterance since his intention to deceive is not a part of the intentions he holds in meaning something.

That the "sewer rat" counter-example is a genuine counter-example is readily demonstrated by considering it in terms of Definition 1.¹ When stated in terms of these conditions, the contention that U meant something by letting the rat loose can be given as follows:

U meant that the house was rat-infested by letting the rat go if and only if U intends:

- (1) to produce, by letting the rat go, the belief in A that the house is rat-infested,
- (2) that A recognize that U intends to produce, by letting the rat go, the belief in A that the house is rat-infested,
- (3) that A's recognition of U's intention to produce, by letting the rat go, the belief in A that the house is rat-infested, is at least part of A's reason for believing that the house is rat-infested.

Since U's letting the rat loose is not a case that one would want to say was a case of meaning something, the fact that it meets the conditions for meaning something demonstrates that the conditions are not sufficient to exclude all cases of non-meaning_{nn}. Since the reason that the "sewer rat" example is not a case of meaning is that the

¹The same demonstration could, of course, be made with Definition 2. Since Definition 1 is simpler, and since the revisions of Definition 2 are not of importance here, Definition 1 is used to avoid unnecessary complexity in what is already a complex description.

utterer intends to deceive his audience about his intentions, the way to rule out such a case of non-meaning is, as suggested by Strawson, to add an additional condition to the definition that specifies that the utterer must intend the audience to recognize his other intentions. This can be added to Definition 1 as U's fourth intention:

(4) that A recognize U's intention (2).

In terms of the "sewer rat" example, this additional intention would be:

* (4) that A recognize that U intends that A recognize that U intends to produce, by letting the rat go, the belief in A that the house is rat-infested.

Since this is exactly what U does not intend, this condition has been starred to indicate that the example does not succeed in meeting this fourth condition, and is consequently excluded as a case of meaning.

If the "sewer rat" were the last counter-example of this type that could be devised, this revised set of conditions would be sufficient to define cases of meaning. While Strawson reported his doubts about the sufficiency of even this condition, Schiffer has succeeded in devising further counter-examples which, like the "sewer rat," meet the conditions--in this case, the revised conditions--but which are also not cases of meaning since U intends to deceive A about his intentions. Schiffer reports his first counter-example as follows:

U, who has a hideous singing voice, intends . . . to bring about A's leaving the room by singing "Moon Over Miami". Further, U intends . . . that A should recognize that U is singing "Moon Over Miami" and infer therefrom that U is doing this with the intention . . . of getting A to leave the room, and U also intends . . . that A recognize U's intention . . . that A recognize U's intention to get A to leave the room (for U wishes to show his disdain for A's being in the room). Now U intends that A will believe that U plans to get rid of A by means of U's repulsive singing, but U expects and intends . . . that A's reason for leaving the room will in fact be A's recognition of U's intention . . . to get him to leave

the room. In other words, while A is intended to think that U intends to get rid of A by means of the repulsive singing, A is really intended to have as his reason for leaving the fact that U wants him to leave. (pp. 18-19)

In this example, U is again deceiving A by having one more intention than he expects A to recognize. As with the "sewer rat," one would not want to say that U meant that A was to leave the room by his singing of "Moon Over Miami" since he does not intend to produce this response by means of A's recognition of his intentions, but rather as a result of his deception of A in regards to these intentions. This example is also interesting in that, unlike the "sewer rat," U's utterance is at least marginally linguistic in nature, thus suggesting that such cases of deception are not peculiar to non-linguistic meaning. If it were objected that the repulsive singing is not really linguistic, U's reciting a patriotic speech in a sarcastic tone could be substituted, where U knows that A is extremely, and perhaps fanatically patriotic.

That this is, like the "sewer rat," a genuine counter-example can be demonstrated by stating it in terms of the revised conditions of Definition 1, as follows:

U meant that A was to leave the room by singing "Moon Over Miami" if and only if U intends:

- (1) to produce, by his singing, A's leaving the room,
- (2) that A recognize that U intends to produce, by his singing, A's leaving the room,
- (3) that A's recognition of the fact that U intends to produce, by his singing, A's leaving the room shall be at least part of A's reason for leaving the room,
- (4) that A recognize that U intends A to recognize that U intends to produce, by his singing, A's leaving the room.

Thus, U's singing "Moon Over Miami" meets the conditions that excluded the "sewer rat" example even though it is not what one would want to consider a case of meaning. As with the sewer rat, the way to rule out such a case is to add another condition such that U must also

intend:

(5) that A recognize U's intention (3).

This results in the following realization of this condition for U's singing "Moon Over Miami," where U must now intend:

* (5) that A recognize that U intends that A's recognition of the fact that U intends to produce, by his singing, A's leaving the room shall be at least part of A's reason for leaving the room.

This is, however, exactly what U does not intend; and thus the counter-example is excluded as a case of meaning, and the conditions again appear to be sufficient for distinguishing cases of meaning from cases of non-meaning.

This appearance of sufficiency is, however, again deceptive, at least according to Schiffer. Schiffer suggests that a further counter-example can be produced which succeeds in meeting the five conditions stated thus far, but which is not a case of meaning. Such a case can be established, he suggests, by considering a situation such that after U has succeeded in duping A as in the "Moon Over Miami" example, A meets a third person, C, who knows how U deceived A by singing "Moon Over Miami." C explains to A how this deception was carried out; and later, when A is again visiting U, U again desires A to leave the room. But U is also aware that C has explained to A how the previous deception was carried out. As with the previous two examples, the description and explanation of this counter-example is complex; and for the present purposes it is only necessary to note that a further such counter-example can be constructed, and would be resolved in the same way: by adding a further condition to the definition. In fact, as Schiffer suggests, "in principle we could keep on constructing counter-examples of the above kind, each time requiring

us to add a condition of the above nature" (p. 23). Thus, it would be at least theoretically possible to continue constructing counter-examples of this type since it would always be possible to construct further situations in which U had one more intention than he intended A to recognize. This, in turn, leads to an indefinite number of conditions in the description of what U must intend in order to mean something, which in turn suggests that in order to mean something, U must have an indefinite number of meaning intentions. To allow an indefinite number of M-intentions, however, is to admit that it would be impossible to give an account of meaning which would rule out cases of non-meaning.

APPENDIX D

A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE

That mutual knowledge is an important and functional part of participants' knowledge of situations has been demonstrated by Radford (1969) in an example of how this type of knowledge can develop and become important in understanding a situation. In Radford's example, Adrian (A) is having an affair with Beatrice (B), but they do not tell their friend Celia (C) who lives next door. C, however, discovers what is going on, but does not tell A or B. C does, however, keep a diary in which she records that she knows that A and B are having an affair. Without C knowing it, A and B read the diary and thus find out that C knows. The walls between the apartments are thin, and C overhears A and B discussing the fact that she knows about their affair. Thus, C knows that both A and B know that C knows that A and B are having an affair; and as Radford notes:

Theoretically, it would seem that the series could develop indefinitely, though death or loss of interest would stop it developing, and an understandable confusion on the part of either or both parties as to where he or the other is at may deform or blur the complex but regular structure of the later situations. (p. 327)

Furthermore, Radford contends that if any of the participants tell the others what they know, the whole situation collapses since the situation becomes explicit and open. This is not, however, to say that the mutual knowings have disappeared, or have ceased to be important; for when the mutual knowledge has been made explicit, this knowledge becomes more orderly since there is no longer a limit on the knowings of any of the participants. Until the situation is made explicit, the mutual knowings of the participants cannot be continued indefinitely, and

consequently what is specifically known by each participant is of importance; but as soon as the situation is explicit, it is enough that the knowings could be continued indefinitely; and the specific level of knowing is no longer of the same importance.

When the mutual knowledge of a situation is made explicit, however, this does not mean that the situation is simple; for as Radford suggests, even a simple situation will have, underlying it, a complex structure of mutual knowledge. Thus, when Celia tells Adrian and Beatrice that she knows about their affair, there is still a complex structure of mutual knowledge underlying the situation; but since Adrian and Beatrice know that Celia knows, and know that Celia knows that they know, etc., there is no deception and no limit on the mutual knowledge so that the precise level of knowings is no longer of importance. In such explicit cases, Radford suggests, the iteration of what each participant knows is there in potential, although it may not be explicitly known or realized by the participants themselves. Thus, there seems to be a possible distinction between what each participant implicitly (potentially) knows about the situation and about what the other participants know, and what each participant explicitly knows. In order to account for how the implicit knowledge is made accessible, Heal (1978) suggests that as a preparatory condition it is necessary that each participant have a reasoning ability, and that this reasoning ability allows each participant to make explicit as much of the implicit knowledge as is desirable or necessary.

APPENDIX E

SCHIFFER'S SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO GRICE'S ACCOUNT OF MEANING

While Schiffer (1972) contends that mutual knowledge of the state of affairs is really sufficient for ruling out the type of counter-example that Searle suggests (see Appendix B), he admits that this aspect should be made more explicit by stating that the response, r, must be achieved at least in part by virtue of A's belief that the utterance, x, is related in some way, R, to the appropriate response. The second and third conditions of Definition 4 can then be combined into a single condition, as follows:

- (2-3) Satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at least in part,
by virtue of A's belief that x is related in a certain
way R to r.

This is, however, only another way of expressing Grice's suggestion that the features of an utterance should be correlated in some way with the intended response, and thus does not differ significantly from the later Grice account.

In addition to this modification to Grice's account, Schiffer also suggests that a closer examination is needed of the nature of the response that the utterer intends to produce in his audience. According to Grice, this response can be explained in terms of a belief in A that is produced (Grice, 1957), or by a belief in A that U believes what he means (Grice, 1968). According to Schiffer, the production of a certain belief is, however, restricted to declarative utterances; and for imperatives and interrogatives this must be understood in terms of what U wants A to do. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish these two different types of cases and to create separate but parallel conditions

for each of them.¹

In regards to U's intending to produce a belief in A, Schiffer suggests that the production of this belief is not, as Grice's account suggests, intended to be based upon U's intention, but rather is more generally produced by virtue of some other reason. Thus, a mathematician presenting what he considers to be a decisive argument would expect his audience to come to a particular belief not because he intended to produce this belief, but because of his audience's knowledge of the subject and understanding of the argument. Similarly, when U reminds A of something that U knows that A knows, it would seem that U meant something by the utterance, but not that he intended to produce a belief on the basis of his intentions, but rather because he expects A to believe (remember) something A already knows.

While this argument seems to be a demand for an elaboration of Grice's notion of response and belief rather than a substantive challenge to Grice's account, such elaboration does provide a more specific description of what is required for an utterer to mean something by an utterance. In order to account for this expanded notion of response (belief), Schiffer suggests that it is more accurate to say that what U intends to produce in A is an activated belief about what U means. This activated belief can result either from U's intention or from A's own knowledge; but Schiffer suggests that there must be some reason(s), *p*, for this belief and that these reasons must, for A, have some

¹This distinction has also been recognized by Grice (1968), although he does not suggest that parallel conditions need to be constructed for the two cases. This is perhaps due to the fact that Grice has not thought it necessary to analyze the nature of the intended response as completely as Schiffer has.

meaningful, or truth-supporting basis. Thus, according to Schiffer, A must have truth-supporting reasons, $p(t)$, for his activated belief about what U means. If what U means is represented by \underline{P} , this description can be abbreviated as $\underline{P/p(t)}$, and can be read as "P, for the truth-supporting reasons p."

What U intends to produce in A is not, then, simply a response, r, but the activated belief that $\underline{P/p(t)}$; and as already noted, the second condition of the definition specifies that A's recognition of the relationship between the response, r, and the utterance, x, should be at least part of the reason for this activated belief. The response can now be replaced by P, or what U means by uttering x in order to bring this condition into agreement with the modifications of the nature of the response.

In addition to these further modifications for meaning, Schiffer suggest that the M-intentions can be separated into primary and secondary. This, he argues, results from the distinction between the intentions with which a person utters something, and the intentions that a person has in uttering something. The first type of intention can be considered to be the primary intention, or what is primarily intended to be accomplished; and the second type of intention can be considered to be secondary since it is not a goal or purpose in itself but is necessary for the fulfillment of the primary intention. In regards to the M-intentions of the utterer, then, it seems apparent that the primary intention is to produce an activated belief in his audience, while his secondary intentions are the further intentions he must have in order to intend to produce this belief. This is not, of course, to say that secondary intentions are not essential, but only

that they are intended solely because they are necessary for the fulfillment of the primary intention.

APPENDIX F

CONSTATIVES AND PERFORMATIVES

While constatives can be described as utterances that are either true or false, the situation with performatives is not so simple; for the utterance of a performative does not, in itself, guarantee that the act is actually performed. For example, the act of christening can be performed by making an appropriate utterance; but the utterance itself is not sufficient for the successful performance of a christening. This is readily apparent when it is considered that ships could be rechristened at the whim of any passer-by. Similarly, a bet cannot always be successfully made merely by making an utterance; for the utterance of the performative "I hereby bet you five dollars that the sun will rise tomorrow" does not, in itself, constitute a bet. As Austin (1962) notes:

Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further words. (p. 8)

Thus, in order for a performative act to be successful, it is necessary that certain conditions obtain. These conditions seem to center upon the circumstances in which the utterance is made and are similar to the state of affairs that Schiffer posits as a necessary aspect of an utterer meaning something. Knowledge of such circumstances would, then, also seem to be a possible basis for modes of correlation between the features of an utterance and the intended response, as described in the later Grice account. This is not, however, surprising since the performative aspect of a performative utterance will be part of

the meaning intended by the person making the utterance.

This circumstantial requirement for performatives is further elaborated by Austin, who considers the problem in terms of how performative acts can be unsuccessful. Since performative utterances cannot be considered to be false, even if they fail, Austin suggests that their success or failure should be considered in terms of whether the utterance is felicitous or infelicitous (happy or unhappy). Thus, a passer-by who decides to christen a ship by pronouncing what would normally be the appropriate words cannot be considered to have successfully christened the ship; and while it would be false to say that he had christened the ship, his utterance itself is not false, but unsuccessful, or infelicitous. In order for a performative to be felicitously performed, Austin suggests that the following conditions must be met:

- (A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
- (A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
- (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
- (B.2) completely.
- (C.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts and feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
- (C.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

(pp. 14-15)

When these conditions are not met, a performative utterance will be infelicitous; and this corresponds to a constative that is false. If the performative fails due to failure to meet either the A or the B

conditions, Austin suggests that the failure can be termed a "misfire," and notes that the act is not performed at all. When either of the C conditions are not satisfied, the act is successfully performed, but infelicitously, in what Austin terms an "abuse" of the normal procedures.

The necessity of these conditions can be easily demonstrated by noting cases in which the conditions are not met. Condition A.1 is violated when a man addresses his wife (or vice versa) and says "I hereby divorce you." In society as it is presently constituted, there does not exist an accepted conventional procedure for performing the act of divorce in such a manner; and consequently an act of divorce cannot be felicitously performed by such an utterance. An infelicitous performance due to failure to meet condition A.2 is illustrated in the case in which an individual happens to pass a dock where the christening of a ship is about to take place. If this individual is not the person designated to perform the christening, yet proceeds to utter a christening performative, the act is infelicitous even if he pronounces the appropriate invocation. Failure to meet either of the A conditions results, of course, in a misfire; and such misfires can be called misinvocations since a procedure is invoked that is either not appropriate (A.2) or does not exist (A.1).

Failure to meet either of the B conditions results in a type of misfire that Austin terms a misexecution. In these cases, the procedure exists, and is appropriate to the individuals involved, but is not correctly or completely executed. As Austin notes, examples of infelicities due to failure to satisfy B.1 are more common in legal matters where the exact invocation is of importance. This is

illustrated by a witness in court who says "I'll give honest answers" instead of "I swear to tell the truth, etc." A misexecution due to failure to meet B.2 is illustrated by the case in which infelicity results from a lack of completeness. For example, if a bet is offered by declaring "I bet you five dollars that the sun will rise tomorrow," the bet is not felicitously performed until and unless the bet is accepted. In the event that the bet is not accepted, it would be inaccurate to say that a bet had been made; consequently, the attempted act would be infelicitous.

The two types of abuses, or the C conditions, both result in the successful performance of the act; but according to Austin the result is still infelicitous. Thus, if C.1 is violated as, for instance, in the case of an individual who insincerely promises to be at a certain place at a certain time, the act of promising is performed, but infelicitously. Likewise, if the promise is sincerely made but is not fulfilled, condition C.2 is violated; and again the act is performed infelicitously.

While these different felicity conditions are listed separately, it is important to note that they are not mutually exclusive. An act can be infelicitous due to a combination of these factors; for an individual who insincerely invokes a non-existent "I hereby divorce you" procedure while speaking to someone other than his wife can be said to have made an infelicitous utterance for a variety of reasons. Also, it should be noted that Austin does not claim that these conditions are complete, but rather suggests that there are other possible reasons why an act can be infelicitous, as in the case in which a promise is made under duress, or when the utterer has been deceived

into making it. This list of conditions must, then, be understood to be suggestive rather than definitive, although they do seem to describe a basic structure for the felicitous performance of a performative utterance.

In terms of Gricean meaning, these felicity conditions seem to function in much the same way as do Grice's conversational implicatures since they suggest conventional procedures that allow an audience to correlate the features of an utterance with the intended response. Similarly, in terms of Schiffer's formulation, the mutual knowledge of such conditions would seem to be a part of the state of affairs that is realized by the utterance, and which provides a basis for relating the utterance to the desired activated belief or act to be performed. To suggest this, however, implies that a performative act is in some way ceremonial or ritualistic; and this is, in fact, Austin's contention; for acts such as bets, marriages, christenings and promises can only be performed when there exists a mutually known way of performing these acts. That that is essential to performatives is apparent when it is recognized that performative utterances can be either explicit or implicit. When the utterance itself names or specifies the type of performative utterance that it is, it is explicit; and when it does not specify its own type, the performative is implicit. This is illustrated by the following pair of examples:

(1) I'll be there at two o'clock.

(2) I promise that I'll be there at two o'clock.

If (1) is understood in the circumstances in which it is uttered to be a promise that the utterer will, in fact, be somewhere at two o'clock, and is so intended to be understood by the utterer, then it

is an implicit performative since the act of promising is performed even though the notion of promising is not explicitly mentioned. In (2) the promising conditions are invoked through the use of the explicit performative "I promise." In both (1) and (2), however, a part of the intended meaning of the utterer is the fact that he is promising; and therefore the social conventions that allow promising, and that specify what is required to make a promise and to fulfill one, must be mutually known by the utterer and his audience in order for the utterer to communicate his meaning. The fact that promising is not mentioned in (1) means that it is by means of their knowledge of the state of affairs, or by means of particular modes of correlation, that audiences can recognize that this is, in fact, a promise rather than a description of a hope or a fear. It is Austin's contention that an implicit performative utterance can always be made explicit, and that this is one of the features of a performative that seems to distinguish it from a constative.

While this explanation of performative utterances seems to indicate that they are easily distinguished from constative utterances, Austin suggests that such an impression is incorrect when the matter is examined closely. This difficulty in distinguishing between these two types of utterances is first brought out by Austin in terms of what is implied by each type of utterance. Performatives, he notes, seem to imply the truth of other conditions. For example, the performative "I apologize" implies the truth of the felicity conditions, and also implies that something has been done for which an apology is needed or desired, and which makes an apology appropriate.

But, as Austin suggests, constatives also indicate the truth of

certain conditions. The utterance "The cat is on the mat" entails that the contradiction of this statement is false, and that the uttered constative does, in fact, describe the case and that the cat is on the mat and not under or beside it. Another type of implication that can be drawn from constatives is exemplified by the statement "All Jack's children are bald," which presupposes that it is true that Jack has children. Thus, a constative utterance also implies that certain conditions exist; and although the conditions implied by a constative seem to be somewhat different than the conditions implied by a performative, the fact that performatives imply the existence of certain conditions is not sufficient to distinguish them from constatives.

Further, Austin points out that the inclusion of a performative word such as "bet," "promise," or "warn" in an utterance is not sufficient to establish that the utterance is a performative. Thus, "I bet five dollars" can be a performative while "He bet five dollars" is clearly a constative.

In addition to these difficulties, even the distinction between explicit and implicit is insufficient to distinguish between the two types of utterances. While an implicit performative can always be made explicit, this observation in itself is not sufficient to distinguish a performative from a constative since constatives can also be either implicit or explicit, and actually seem to resemble performatives. This is illustrated in the following examples:

- (3) I warn you that there is a bull in the field. (Explicit Performative)
- (4) There is a bull in the field. (Implicit Performative)
- (5) I state (report, declare, or assert) that there is a bull in the field. (Explicit Constative)

(6) There is a bull in the field. (Implicit Constative)

In fact, as Austin notes, constatives can not only be made explicit, but actually seem to behave as performatives; for stating is an act that is performed in making an utterance, and does not merely report or describe some other act. Thus, it would seem that stating seems to resemble a performative act even though it is obviously constative in nature since it is either true or false. But when constatives are made explicit (e.g., "I state," "I assert," "I declare," etc.) their performative nature becomes apparent, and the distinction between constatives and performatives becomes obscure since the distinction between saying and doing seems to disappear.

APPENDIX G

OBJECTIONS TO AUSTIN'S ACCOUNT OF SPEECH ACTS

One of the major difficulties with Austin's account centers upon his distinction between locutionary (or, more specifically, rhetic) acts and illocutionary acts. The difficulty with this distinction lies in Austin's definition of the rhetic act as containing the meaning, in terms of sense and reference. This is an aspect that Austin (1962) admits that he has not fully resolved:

We may well suspect that the theory of 'meaning' as equivalent to 'sense and reference' will certainly require some weeding-out and reformulating in terms of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. . . . I admit that not enough has been done here: I have taken the old 'sense and reference' on the strength of current views. (p. 149)

While Austin makes this admission, his suggestion that the notion may need some "weeding-out" seems somewhat optimistic when the difficulties that result from this assumption are examined.

One of the more vehement criticisms of Austin's distinction between locutions and illocutions has been given by Cohen (1964), who suggests that this distinction is completely empty. According to Cohen, there is no need to contrast the meaning (rhetic act) with the force of the utterance (illocutionary act). In order to illustrate why this is the case, Cohen draws attention to the following pair of sentences:

(1) Your haystack is on fire.

(2) I warn you that your haystack is on fire.

While Austin would contend that the implicit illocutionary force of (1) has been brought out in (2) so that there is no doubt about the intended force of the utterance, Cohen suggests that there is no reason to

contend that it is the force of the utterance that is being brought out here and made explicit. According to Cohen, it would make as much sense, and be more accurate, to say that it is the meaning of the utterance that is being made explicit, not the force. The prefix "I warn" can be understood to make explicit the reason that the utterance was made; and according to Cohen this is actually an expansion of the meaning of the utterance, not the force.

While it would be possible to argue that the explicit performative actually explains the meaning of the utterance in a particular context, Cohen counters this argument by noting that this type of contextual clarification is often used to obtain the meaning of an utterance, and that there is no need for a notion of force to account for this situational/occasional meaning. For example, the meanings of indexicals are usually determined by the context of the utterance, as in the sentence "It is gold." The meaning of this utterance will be determined by the context in which it is uttered, and will be understood to refer to a cloud, a mineral vein, or an automobile, depending upon the context. It would be incorrect to say that this type of contextual explication deals with the force of the utterance since it is obviously an explication of the sense and reference. This is the case with this example not just for the subject "it" but also for the predicate "is gold" since the expression can be used to refer to different concepts of what "being gold" can mean. Cohen argues that the explicit form of the performative can be understood in the same way: as making explicit in the utterance what would be implicit in the context; and this, he contends, is a part of the meaning of the utterance, not some additional force. What is done in making an

utterance, Cohen contends, is a locutionary act; and it is only necessary to distinguish the locutionary act from the perlocutionary act since what Austin terms the illocutionary force is really a part of the locution.

Cohen attributes the attractiveness of the notion of illocutionary forces to the fact that there is often a difference, in an actual utterance, between the "meaning expressed" and the "meaning intended." Since utterances are usually not as explicit as they could be, this can lead to confusion; but Cohen suggests that this confusion should be understood in terms of the meaning of the utterance and the context in which it is uttered rather than in terms of a force that is in some way in addition to the meaning.

The difficulty with Cohen's view of speech acts is that even if the performative nature of utterances is to be understood in terms of intended and expressed meanings, in the context of the situation, some means would be necessary to demonstrate how the situational explication of the meaning could be explained in a systematic way. In the example he cites, "Your haystack is on fire," some means would have to be devised to indicate how it could be expanded to "I warn you that your haystack is on fire" as opposed to "I hereby report that your haystack is on fire (as you ordered)." This is, in fact, just the type of expansion that Austin's notion of illocutionary force provides. Cohen's basic question, however, regarding the relationship between meaning and force seems a valid one since the illocutionary force does seem to be a part of the meaning of the utterance. To confine the notion of meaning to the sense and reference of the linguistic expression raises questions about the force of the

utterance; for if the force is not in some way meaningful, it is difficult to account for the meaningful connection it makes between the sense-and-reference meaning and the situational context of the utterance.

A similar objection to Austin's distinction between locutions and illocutions has been made by Searle (1968), who notes, as does Strawson (1964), that locutions and illocutions do not seem to constitute mutually exclusive classes. While this is similar to Cohen's objection, Searle accepts the notion of illocutionary forces and reconsiders the relationship between such forces and Austin's notion of a locutionary act.

Searle's basic criticism of Austin's analysis of speech acts centers upon his observation that in the case of an explicit performative, when the illocutionary force is specified, the locutionary and illocutionary acts overlap so that the illocutionary force seems to be contained in the locutionary act. The following explicit performatives exemplify this point:

(3) I (hereby) promise that I will be there at two o'clock.

(4) I (hereby) warn you that there is a bull in the field.

Since the performative nature of these utterances is made explicit by the phrases "I (hereby) promise" and "I (hereby) warn," which specify the illocutionary forces of the utterances, the fact that the forces are stated suggests that the meanings of these forces (and thus perhaps the forces themselves) can be considered in terms of the rhetic part of the locutionary act. If, however, the promising and warning aspects of these two utterances are considered at the locutionary level, it would seem that a consideration of the illocutionary force

would be redundant since it would merely repeat what has been considered in terms of the locutionary act. Thus, it would seem that, as Cohen suggests, such utterances could be considered in terms of their meanings at the locutionary level without recourse to a notion of illocutionary force. This point has also been made by Strawson (1964), who summarizes the problem succinctly:

The meaning of a (serious) utterance, as conceived by Austin, always embodies some limitation on its possible force, and sometimes--as, for example, in some cases where an explicit performative formula, like "I apologize," is used--the meaning of an utterance may exhaust its force; that is, there may be no more to the force than there is to the meaning; but very often the meaning, though it limits, does not exhaust, the force. (pp. 439-440)

If, as Austin suggests, the explicit performative is considered to be a later development in a language, this development could be seen as an attempt to specify the illocutionary force in order to avoid confusion regarding the forces that particular utterances are intended to have; and this statement of the force results in the locutionary specification of the illocutionary force. While such an argument could lead to an understanding of how the locutionary/illocutionary confusion may have developed, it does not resolve the resulting problem. While this problem only becomes readily apparent with explicit performatives, the fact that such utterances are not uncommon suggests a real difficulty in the distinction between locutions and illocutions; and Searle suggests that the difficulty in abstracting the locution from the illocution in an explicit performative is similar to "abstracting unmarried men from bachelors" (p. 408).

APPENDIX H

CONSTITUTIVE RULES AND INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS

Searle's (1969) contention that illocutionary forces can be understood in terms of constitutive rules is illustrated by his analysis of the structure of the act of promising, which he describes as follows:

The semantical rules for the use of an illocutionary force indicating device Pr for promising are:

Rule 1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S. I call this the propositional content rule . . .

Rule 2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.

Rule 3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events. I call rules 2 and 3 preparatory rules . . .

Rule 4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A. I call this the sincerity rule . . .

Rule 5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A. I call this the essential rule.
(pp. 62-63)

These rules, then, provide the structure for the act of promising; and it is Searle's contention that the four types of rules named here specify general rule types that underlie all or most illocutionary acts. It is important to note here not only that the content of the propositional act is in some way indicated by Rule 1, and thus by the illocutionary act, but also that the constitutive rules refer not to a system of language for the definition of an illocutionary act, but rather to the situation that exists between the utterer and his audience. As with Austin's felicity conditions, a certain state of affairs must exist in order for the act of promising to be successfully performed; and the set of rules that Searle gives here for

promising indicates that this state of affairs includes not just the immediate circumstances, but also the participants' knowledge of each other and their desires and intentions for the future.

To say that these constitutive rules provide the structure of the act of promising does not mean that regulative rules do not have a function in terms of illocutionary acts. Regulative rules, however, can be violated without preventing the performance of the act. For example, it would generally not be considered acceptable to offer a bet while in a church; yet if this rule is violated and a bet is offered under such circumstances, a bet can still be successfully made. Thus, the rule that specifies that bets should not be made while in a church is a regulative rule since it functions to govern behavior but does not constitute a part of the structure of the act itself.

While Searle's analysis of the structure of a speech act in terms of constitutive rules seems reasonable in regards to examples in which the force of the utterance is clear, it is not so clear how this analysis of the structure accounts for examples of indirect speech acts, in which the relationship between the utterance and its force is not so readily apparent. The usefulness of Searle's constitutive rules can, however, be demonstrated in this regard, thus demonstrating the strength of Searle's position. In order to do this, it is helpful first to consider some examples of indirect speech acts, such as the following suggested by Searle (1975a):

- (1) Can you reach the salt?
- (2) You could be a little more quiet.
- (3) I would like you to go now.
- (4) Do you want to hand me that hammer?

The problem with these sentences is that they are usually used to perform different illocutionary acts than what they seem to perform. Example (1) is usually not, in fact, a question as to whether or not the hearer can reach the salt, but is generally a request that the salt be passed. Example (2) is usually not an observation about the potential behavior of an audience, but is normally a request or an order. Example (3) seems to report the utterer's wishes, but is usually an act of suggesting, ordering or advising; and (4) is often used as an order or request instead of a question about the wishes of the audience.

In all of these utterances, the illocutionary act is performed indirectly since the act is performed by using a form that is usually used to perform a different act. An analysis of such sentences into propositional and illocutionary acts will not, generally, result in a clear explication of the act that is performed; and thus such examples serve as a challenge to the basic theory of speech acts, and to Searle's contention that constitutive rules structure the speech act.

While it is tempting to argue that in such cases the illocutionary act that is indicated by the actual utterance is not performed, Searle contends that this is not the case. Rather, he suggests that both the stated and the indirect illocutionary acts are performed, although the intended (indirect) illocutionary force is the primary one. Indirect forms are usually used out of politeness since, as in the examples considered, the indirect speech act has the effect of hedging the primary performative force intended by the utterer. Thus, "Would you get off my foot?" hedges the illocutionary force of the

imperative "I order you go get off my foot." The request, however, is still made, according to Searle; but the imperative is accomplished by means of the successful performance of the request, not in place of this act.

While this explanation perhaps explains why indirect speech acts are used in place of direct speech acts, it does not solve the problem of explaining the relationship between the primary and secondary illocutionary forces. Searle suggests that the problem is easily resolved if the constitutive rules of the primary force are considered. This can, generally, be understood in terms of the four types of rules that were indicated in terms of promising; and they are set out below in terms of a request. In this description, S represents "speaker," H represents "hearer," and A represents the "act" that is performed in making the utterance.

Preparatory condition: H is able to perform A

Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A

Propositional content condition: S predicates a future act
A of H

Essential condition: Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A
(Searle, 1975a, p. 71)

Once these conditions are recognized, Searle suggests, most indirect speech acts can be understood to be based upon one of these necessary conditions in such a way that the hearer is intended to infer, from the utterance and the context, that the primary force of the utterance is the force for which the condition holds. For example, in example (1) above, "Can you reach the salt?" the speaker is inquiring about the preparatory condition for the hearer's passing the salt. From this, the hearer is intended to infer that the speaker wishes the hearer to pass the salt. It is important to note that the context in which the utterance is made is of essential importance here, for it is

upon the basis of this context that the hearer is to infer the force of the illocution.

On the basis of this analysis, Searle suggests four generalizations that give the inference rules for the type of indirect speech acts given in examples (1) to (4):

1. S can make an indirect request (or other directive) by either asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning H's ability to do A obtains.
2. S can make an indirect directive by either asking whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains.
3. S can make an indirect directive by stating that the sincerity condition obtains, but not by asking whether it obtains.
4. S can make an indirect directive by either stating that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, except where the reason is that H wants or wishes, etc., to do A, in which case he can only ask whether H wants, wishes, etc., to do A. (p. 72)

In regards to the examples cited above, these generalizations can be used to explain how the primary force of these utterances is obtained. Example (1) is explained by Rule 1, example (2) by Rule 2, example (3) by Rule 3, and example (4) by Rule 4.

Indirect speech acts can, then, be explained by contending that the primary force of an indirect utterance is realized by means of the secondary force; for the hearer is intended to infer the primary force from a recognition of the secondary force and the propositional content of the utterance. Since the propositional content refers to one of the conditions necessary for the execution of the primary force, the hearer is intended to infer, from the situation, that the indirect force is of primary concern to the speaker. The reason for such a circuitous means of accomplishing an illocutionary act is to hedge the performative force, either out of politeness or because the speaker does not want to perform the primary act explicitly due to the relationship existing between the speaker and the hearer in a particular

context.

While other means of accounting for indirect speech acts have been suggested (e.g., Fraser, 1975; Sadock, 1974), only Searle's account has been considered here since the purpose has been to illustrate the usefulness of his contention that illocutionary acts should be considered in terms of their constitutive rules, not to compare accounts of indirect speech acts.

APPENDIX I

LEWIS'S ACCOUNT OF CONVENTIONS

In Lewis's (1969) original description, conventions are understood to be regularities in behavior or action which result from recurring coordination situations. Lewis has, however, revised this account (Lewis, 1975) in order to account for conventions involving belief as well as action. This change is necessary since Lewis wishes to contend that the use of language involves conventions of truthfulness and trust since users of language conventionally attempt to be truthful in their utterances, and impute this same truthfulness to others. Lewis suggests that his earlier account left him "cut off from what I now take to be the primary sort of conventional coordination in language use: that between the action of the truthful speaker and the responsive believing of his trusting hearer" (p. 11). To account for this trust requires an account that involves belief as well as action.

Lewis's revised description of conventions can, then, be given as follows:

A regularity R, in action or in action and belief, is a convention in a population P if and only if, within P, the following six conditions hold. (Or at least they almost hold. A few exceptions to the "everyone"s can be tolerated.)

- (1) Everyone conforms to R.
- (2) Everyone believes that others conform to R.
- (3) This belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a good and decisive reason to conform to R himself. . . .
- (4) There is a general preference for general conformity to R rather than slightly-less-than-general conformity--in particular, rather than conformity by all but any one. (This is not to deny that some state of widespread nonconformity to R might be even more preferred.) . . .
- (5) R is not the only possible regularity meeting the last two conditions. There is at least one alternative R' such

that the belief that the others conformed to R' would give everyone a good and decisive practical or epistemic reason to conform to R' likewise; such that there is a general preference for conformity to R' rather than slightly-less-than-general conformity to R'; and such that there is normally no way of conforming to R and R' both. . . .

(6) Finally, the various facts listed in conditions (1) to (5) are matters of common (or mutual) knowledge: they are known to everyone, it is known to everyone that they are known to everyone, and so on. The knowledge mentioned here may be merely potential: knowledge that would be available if one bothered to think hard enough. (Lewis, 1975, pp. 5-6)

It is notable that in this view conventional regularities are considered to be arbitrary in nature, and become conventional and useful only because other members of the population know and follow them, thus providing solutions to recurring coordination situations. This arbitrariness is brought out in Lewis's description by the requirement that there must be at least one alternative that would be acceptable if everyone (or nearly everyone) followed it instead of the regularity that is accepted as a convention. Thus, while handshaking is a conventional form of greeting, other regularities such as bowing or stamping with the left foot could become conventional and replace handshaking as a greeting if everyone (or nearly everyone) conformed to it, believed others conformed to it, etc.

It is also notable that the regularity and its conventional nature must be mutually known by the participants. This is necessary in order for the convention to serve as an accepted solution to a coordination situation; for if the convention is not mutually known by the participants it is evident that they will not be able to depend upon the other participants knowing that the particular convention exists, or is relevant. Thus, it would seem that mutual knowledge of coordination situations and conventional regularities that exist for resolving these situations can be understood to be

part of the states of affairs that Schiffer describes as bases for utterers meaning something. Similarly, in Grice's later account knowledge of coordination situations and their conventional resolutions can serve as modes of correlation between the features of an utterance and the intended response.

APPENDIX J

A TENTATIVE LIST OF POSSIBLE READING SITUATIONS

As noted in Chapter 5, the following list of possible reading situations is dependent upon the way in which communication situations were described in Chapter 4. Thus, these situations must be considered to be tentative descriptions that are subject to modification and further elucidation. The abbreviations that are used in describing these situations are explained in Chapter 5 and, for convenience, are also given in Appendix A.

1. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{str})$
2. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{rel})$
3. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{inf})$
4. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{str})$
5. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
6. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
7. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{str})$
8. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{rel})$
9. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& GAME (D_{inf})$
10. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{str})$
11. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
12. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_a) \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
13. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{str})$
14. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{rel})$
15. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{inf})$
16. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{str})$

17. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
18. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
19. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{str})$
20. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{rel})$
21. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& GAME (D_{inf})$
22. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{str})$
23. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
24. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& RH (E_c) \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
25. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{str})$
26. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{rel})$
27. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{inf})$
28. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{str})$
29. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
30. R+: $M_t (M_t = M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
31. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{str})$
32. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{rel})$
33. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& GAME (D_{inf})$
34. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{str})$
35. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{rel})$
36. R+: $M_t (M_t \neq M_w) \& EXP \& RITUAL (D_{inf})$
37. R+: M-
38. R-: $M_{\underline{+}}$

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